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Abstract
The need to edit source data through a view arises in a host of applications across many different areas of
computing. Unfortunately, few existing systems provide support for updatable views. In practice, when they
are needed, updatable views are usually implemented using two separate programs: one that computes the
view from the source and another that handles updates. This rudimentary design is tedious for programmers,
difficult to reason about, and a nightmare to maintain.
This dissertation presents bidirectional programming languages, which provide an elegant and effective
mechanism for describing updatable views. Unlike programs written in an ordinary language, which only work
in one direction, programs in a bidirectional language can be run both forwards and backwards: from left to
right, they describe functions that map sources to views, and from right to left, they describe functions that
map updated views back to updated sources. Besides eliminating redundancy, these languages can be designed
to ensure correctness, guaranteeing by construction that the two functions work well together.
Starting from the foundations, we define a general semantic space of well-behaved bidirectional
transformations called lenses. Then, building on this foundation, we describe a particular language for defining
lenses on strings with syntax based on the familiar regular operators (union, concatenation, and Kleene star).
We present extensions to the basic framework that address the subtle complications that arise when lenses are
used to manipulate, data containing unimportant details, ordered data, and confidential data.
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ABSTRACT
Bidirectional Programming Languages
John Nathan Foster
Supervisor: Benjamin C. Pierce
The need to edit source data through a view arises in a host of applications across many different
areas of computing. Unfortunately, few existing systems provide support for updatable views.
In practice, when they are needed, updatable views are usually implemented using two separate
programs: one that computes the view from the source and another that handles updates. This
rudimentary design is tedious for programmers, difàcult to reason about, and a nightmare to
maintain.
This dissertation presents bidirectional programming languages, which provide an elegant
and effective mechanism for describing updatable views. Unlike programs written in an ordi-
nary language, which only work in one direction, programs in a bidirectional language can be
run both forwards and backwards: from left to right, they describe functions that map sources
to views, and from right to left, they describe functions that map updated views back to updated
sources. Besides eliminating redundancy, these languages can be designed to ensure correctness,
guaranteeing by construction that the two functions work well together.
Starting from the foundations, we deàne a general semantic space of well-behaved bidirec-
tional transformations called lenses. Then, building on this foundation, we describe a particu-
lar language for deàning lenses on strings with syntax based on the familiar regular operators
(union, concatenation, and Kleene star). We present extensions to the basic framework that
address the subtle complications that arise when lenses are used to manipulate, data containing
unimportant details, ordered data, and conàdential data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most programs work in only one direction, from input to output. As Baker observed when he
wrote “the S combinator cheerfully copies ... the K combinator knowingly kills” (1992), the
very fundamentals of computation seem intrinsically unidirectional. However, the world is full
of situations where, after computing an initial output, we need to be able to update it and then
“compute backwards” to ànd a correspondingly modiàed input. There are numerous examples,
across many areas of computing where these bidirectional transformations are needed:
Data Synchronization: bidirectional transformations bridge the gap between heterogeneous repli-
cas (Brabrand et al., 2008; Kawanaka and Hosoya, 2006; Foster et al., 2007a).
Data Management: bidirectional transformations provide mechanisms for propagating updates
to views (Foster et al., 2007b; Bohannon et al., 2006; Bancilhon and Spyratos, 1981;
Dayal and Bernstein, 1982), for data exchange (Miller et al., 2001), and for converting
data into new formats in schema evolution (Berdaguer et al., 2007).
Software Engineering: bidirectional transformations maintain the consistency of formal soft-
ware models (Schurr, 1995; Stevens, 2007; Xiong et al., 2007).
Security: bidirectional transformations provide a way to do àne-grained sharing of conàdential
documents (Foster et al., 2009).
Serialization: bidirectional transformations map between the on-disk and in-memory represen-
tations of ad hoc and binary data (Fisher and Gruber, 2005; Eger, 2005).
Systems Administration: bidirectional transformations map between the áat low-level repre-
sentations and higher-level structured representations of system conàguration àles (Lut-
terkort, 2008).
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Programming Languages: bidirectional transformations handle boxing and unboxing of run-
time values in embedded interpreters (Benton, 2005; Ramsey, 2003), and they convert
between source code written in different high-level languages (Ennals and Gay, 2007).
User Interfaces: bidirectional transformations provide convenient editing interfaces for com-
plex documents (Hu et al., 2008) and can also be used to maintain the consistency of
graphical interface elements (Meertens, 1998; Greenberg and Krishnamurthi, 2007).
Unfortunately, although the need for bidirectional transformations is ubiquitous, the linguistic
technology for deàning them is embarrassingly primitive. Most of the applications listed above
are implemented using two separate functions—one that transforms inputs to outputs and an-
other that maps outputs to inputs—a rudimentary design that is tedious to construct, difàcult
to reason about, and a nightmare to maintain.
This dissertation proposes a different approach: languages in which every program can
be read in two ways—from left to right as a function mapping inputs to outputs and from
right to left as a function that propagates updates to outputs back to inputs. Our thesis is that
these bidirectional programming languages are an effective and elegant mechanism for describing
bidirectional transformations.
1.1 The View Update Problem
Let us start by exploring some of the fundamental issues related to bidirectional transformations
in databases, an area where they have been studied extensively because of their close connection
to the view update problem. Suppose that s is a source database, q is a query, and v = q(s) is
the view that results from evaluating q on s. (We will adopt this terminology of sources and
views throughout this dissertation.) The view update problem is the following: given an update
u that transforms v to v0, calculate a source update t (the “translation” of u) that transforms s
to s0 and makes the following diagram commute:
..S .v
.s0 .v0
.q
.q
.t .u
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Despite extensive study over several decades, this problem remains largely unsolved. The main
reason it has proven so challenging is that, in general, the view update u does not uniquely
determine a source update t. For example, when q is not injective, certain updates to the view
have many corresponding source updates. One can impose additional constraints to guide the
selection of an update—e.g., requiring that the t have minimal “side effects” on the source—but
when the query and schema languages are sufàciently complicated, calculating updates satisfy-
ing these additional constraints is intractable (Buneman et al., 2002). Even worse, when q is not
surjective, some updates to the view produce structures that lie outside of the codomain of the
query! It is not hard to see that in these situations it will be impossible to propagate the view
update back to a corresponding source update—i.e., there is no t that makes the above diagram
commute. Systems often choose to reject these updates, but doing so breaks the abstraction
boundary between the source and view. It adds hidden constraints on how the view may be
updated that are only revealed when the user of the view tries to propagate an update back to
the source.
Because of these difàculties, views in relational database systems are generally read-only
(except for those deàned by very simple queries). In situations where an updatable view is
needed, programmers have to rely a variant of the rudimentary mechanism discussed above:
they deàne a separate procedure called a trigger that the system executes whenever the view is
modiàed. Triggers are arbitrary programs, so they can be used to implement any view update
policy the programmer wants. However, they are not a very attractive solution. For one thing,
checking that a trigger correctly propagates updates requires intricate, manual reasoning about
the way it works in tandem with the query. Moreover, the trigger and query will necessarily be
redundant—each will embody (at least) the correspondence between the source and view—so
they will be difàcult to maintain if the schemas evolve.
1.2 Bidirectional Programming Languages
A better approach is to deàne the view and its associated update policy together. Bidirectional
programming languages are organized around this idea: every program denotes both a function
that computes a view as well as one that propagates updates. This eliminates the need to
write—and maintain!—two separate programs, as well as the need to do any manual reasoning
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about correctness, because the language can be designed to guarantee it. The main challenge in
the design of a bidirectional language lies in balancing the tradeoffs between syntax that is rich
enough to express the queries and update policies demanded by applications, and yet simple
enough that correctness can be veriàed using straightforward, compositional, and, ultimately,
mechanizable checks.
To illustrate the tradeoffs between these two approaches, consider a simple example. Sup-
pose that the source is an XML document representing the names, dates, and nationalities of a
collection of classical music composers...
<composers>
<composer>
<name>Jean Sibelius</name>
<lived>1865-1956</lived>
<nationality>Finnish</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Aaron Copland</name>
<lived>1910-1990</lived>
<nationality>American</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Benjamin Briten</name>
<lived>1913-1976</lived>
<nationality>English</nationality>
</composer>
</composers>
...and the views are comma-separated lines of ASCII text representing just their names and
dates—i.e., compared to the source, the nationalities and all XML formatting have been dropped:
Jean Sibelius, 1865-1956
Aaron Copland, 1910-1990
Benjamin Briten, 1913-1976
Having computed this view, we might want to edit the ASCII output—e.g., correcting the error
in Sibelius’s death date and the misspelling in Britten’s name...
Jean Sibelius, 1865-1957
Aaron Copland, 1910-1990
Benjamin Britten, 1913-1976
...and push the changes back into the original XML format:
<composers>
<composer>
<name>Jean Sibelius</name>
<lived>1865-1957</lived>
<nationality>Finnish</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
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<name>Aaron Copland</name>
<lived>1910-1990</lived>
<nationality>American</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Benjamin Britten</name>
<lived>1913-1976</lived>
<nationality>English</nationality>
</composer>
</composers>
Here is a bidirectional program, written in the language of basic lenses described in Chapter 3,
that denotes both transformations, from XML to ASCII and from ASCII to XML:
(* regular expressions *)
let WHITESPACE : regexp = [\n\t ]
let ALPHA : regexp = [A-Za-z]+
let YEAR : regexp = [0-9]{4}
(* helper function *)
let xml_elt (tag:string) (body:lens) : lens =
del WHITESPACE*
. del ("<" . tag . ">")
. body
. del WHITESPACE*
. del ("</" . tag . ">")
(* helper lens *)
let composer : lens =
xml_elt "composer"
( xml_elt "name" (copy (ALPHA . " " . ALPHA) )
. ins (", ")
. xml_elt "lived" (copy (YEAR . "-" . YEAR) )
. xml_elt "nationality" ( default (del ALPHA) (fun (x:string) -> "Unknown") ) )
(* main lens *)
let composers : lens =
xml_elt "composers"
(copy "" | (composer . (ins "\n" . composer)* ) )
In the forward direction, it can be read as an ordinary function on strings. The àrst few lines
deàne regular expressions (in standard POSIX notation) for whitespace, alphabetic strings, and
years. The helper function xml_elt deàned next takes a string tag and a lens body as arguments
and returns a lens that processes an XML element named tag. It àrst removes all of the XML
formatting for the element and then processes the children of the element using body. The
concatenation operator (.) combines lenses in the obvious way. The composer lens deàned next,
instantiates xml_elt several times to construct a lens that handles XML elements representing a
single composer. It copies the name of the composer, inserts a comma and a space into the view,
copies the birth and death dates, and deletes the nationality. The ànal deànition, the composers
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lens, processes XML elements containing a sequence of composers. It uses union (|) and Kleene
star (*) to iterate composer over the list of composers, adding a newline between each. Because
this is a bidirectional program, we can also run it backwards. The details of how this works
are not important for now (see Chapter 3 for precise deànitions); the key point is that we can
use the same composers lens to map a modiàed ASCII view back to an updated XML source.
At this point, it is natural to wonder whether bidirectional languages are are really worth
the trouble. After all, how hard could it really be to just write the two functions as separate
programs in a general-purpose language? To explore this idea (and ultimately reject it), consider
implementations of the forward and backward transformations of the composers lens as sepa-
rate functions in the OCaml language. The composers_forward transformation can be written as
follows:
let composers_forward s =
let sx = parse_string s in
List.fold_left
(fun acc sxi ->
let [nx;dx;_] = children xi in
let sep = if acc <> "" then "\n" else "" in
(acc ^ sep ^ pcdata nx ^ ", " ^ pcdata dx))
""
(children sx)
(The functions parse_string, children, and pcdata are functions from a simple XML library).
It parses the source string s into an XML structure, and then folds down the list of composer
elements, extracting the name and dates of each composer and adding them to the view. The
corresponding composers_backward function is written as follows:
let composers_backward v s =
let sx = parse_string s in
let sl = children sx in
let vl = split "\n" v in
let rec aux acc vl sl = match vl with
| [] -> to_string (element "composers" (List.rev acc))
| vh::vt ->
let [n;d] = split ", " vi in
let nx = pcdata_element "name" n in
let dx = pcdata_element "lived" d in
let c,sl' = match sl with
| sh::st -> (List.nth (children sxi) 2,st)
| [] -> ("Unknown",[]) in
let cx = pcdata_element "nationality" c in
let acc' = (element "composer" [nx;dx;cx])::acc in
aux acc' vt st in
aux [] vl sl
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(Again, the functions pcdata_element, element, and to_string all come from the XML library.) It
takes two arguments, an updated view v and the original source s, and weaves them together,
propagating the names and dates from the view, and restoring the nationalities from the source.
One advantage of the lens program over the OCaml version is that we only have to write
one program instead of two. Another is that key correctness properties can be proven auto-
matically for the lens program. In particular, the type system for lenses described in Chapter 3
guarantees a number of natural well-behavedness properties—e.g., that the two functions are
totally deàned functions on the sets of strings representing XML sources and ASCII views, and
that composing them in either order yields the identity function. By contrast, to verify that
the two OCaml programs correctly implement the updatable view, we would need to estab-
lish these properties by hand. We can do this, of course, but it would involve a lot of manual
pencil-and-paper reasoning about fairly low-level properties—e.g., we would need to check that
lines concatenated in the aux loop of the composers_forward function are split the same way in
composers_backward, and so on. Perhaps the most signiàcant advantage of the lens program,
however, is that it is much easier to maintain. Suppose that, for whatever reason, we decide
that the character used to separate the àelds in each line of ASCII text should be “;” instead of
“,”. To update the lens program, we would simply replace the single occurrence of “,” with a
“;”. Both functions denoted by the lens would change and the typechecker would reverify the
well-behavedness properties automatically. The OCaml programs, however, have multiple oc-
currences of “,”. We would need to make coordinated changes to both functions—something
that would be easy to get wrong, especially if the example were slightly more complicated. We
would also need to modify and reverify the well-behavedness proof by hand. Thus, even for
this almost trivial example, the bidirectional language is a much more attractive option.
1.3 Goal and Contributions
The goal of this dissertation is to show that bidirectional languages are an effective way of
deàning updatable views. Its contributions are divided between three broad areas: foundations,
language design, and implementation.
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Foundations
One of the key beneàts of using a bidirectional language is automatic reasoning about cor-
rectness. However, before we can even talk about correctness, we need to characterize the
transformations that have the properties we want. Many current systems for building up-
datable views are constructed in an ad hoc fashion and have a rather casual attitude about
correctness. The àrst contribution of this dissertation is a general semantic framework of well-
behaved bidirectional transformations called lenses that organizes this whole area and provides
a clean foundation for building reliable updatable views. Chapter 3 describes the framework
of basic lenses, which provide the formal underpinnings for the whole project. Lenses are based
on semantic laws that are closely related to the classic conditions on view update translators
that have been proposed in databases. Chapter 4 describes quotient lenses, which relax the
basic lens laws by allowing certain speciàed portions of the source and view to be treated as
“unimportant”. This generalization is motivated by experience writing lenses for real-world
data, which often contain ignorable details such as whitespace. Chapter 5 describes resourceful
lenses which address the issue of alignment, which comes up when the source and view are or-
dered structures. In general, to do a good job of propagating an updates to ordered structures,
a lens needs to be able to compute a correspondence between pieces of the view and the pieces
of the source. Resourceful lenses extend basic lenses with new mechanisms for calculating and
using these correspondences, which we call alignments, and new properties that ensure that
they use alignment information correctly. Finally, Chapter 6 describes secure lenses, which ex-
tend basic lenses with additional guarantees about security properties of data. These properties
ensure that lenses do not reveal certain speciàed regions of the source in the view, and that
propagating updates to the view does not corrupt other speciàed portions of the source.
Language Design
Interpreting programs bidirectionally requires changing the way that we describe computa-
tions—some constructs that make sense in ordinary programming languages do not make sense
as lenses. The second contribution of this dissertation is a concrete design for a lens language
with natural, compositional syntax and a type system that guarantees the lens laws. For simplic-
ity, we focus our efforts on languages for transforming for strings rather than richer structures
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such as trees or complex values. However, even strings are simple structures, they still ex-
pose many fundamental issues. Additionally, because there is also a lot of string data in the
world—textual databases, structured documents, scientiàc data, simple XML, and all kinds of
ad hoc data—having a language for deàning lenses on strings is quite useful in practice.
Chapter 3 introduces the core language studied throughout this dissertation. It features a
set of combinators for transforming strings that includes generic operators (identity, constant,
sequential composition), the regular operators (union, concatenation, Kleene star), and some
additional operators we have found useful in applications (àlter, swap, merge, etc.). Types play
a central role in this language. Some of our operators only make sense as lenses when speciàc
side conditions are met, and we use types to express and verify these constraints. To ensure
that typechecking can be mechanized, we use regular expressions as types. Regular expres-
sions balance the tradeoffs between precision and decidability: they describe data schemas at
a reasonably high level of detail and all of the properties of regular expressions we need for
typechecking are decidable.
The later chapters in this dissertation all describe extensions of, or reànements to, this basic
language of string lenses: Chapter 4 extends it with new constructs (canonizers, quotient oper-
ators) for dealing with ignorable data. Chapter 5 adds features (chunks, keys, thresholds) for
aligning data, and Chapter 6 extends the language with a more reàned type system based on an
information-áow analysis that tracks security properties of data including conàdentiality and
integrity.
Implementation
The ànal contribution of this dissertation is an implementation of our ideas in a full-blown pro-
gramming language called Boomerang. This language, described in Chapter 7, demonstrates
our thesis that bidirectional languages are an effective way to specify updatable views. To make
it easier for programmers to develop lens programs of realistic size, Boomerang includes all the
features usually found in a modern functional language: àrst-order functions, an expressive
type system, modules, unit tests, etc. Additionally, Boomerang has several features speciàcally
designed for expressing string transformations: built-in regular expressions, operator overload-
ing, subtyping, and syntax for describing lenses based on grammars. We have implemented a
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full working Boomerang prototype and used it to develop lenses for a number of real-world
data formats. Although this prototype is not industrial strength (in particular, we have not yet
attempted to optimize performance), it is efàcient enough to handle many examples of realistic
size—e.g., our largest lens is a 4KLoc program that computes views over XML documents
representing scientiàc databases.
Lenses have been applied in industry. Augeas (Lutterkort, 2008), a tool developed by
RedHat, Inc. for managing operating system conàgurations, is a near-clone of Boomerang
(it supports some additional constructs for building trees). Augeas programmers have devel-
oped lenses for handling nearly all standard Linux conàguration àle formats. This independent
application of our ideas provides additional evidence that the concept of lenses is robust, and
that our design for Boomerang is practical.
1.4 Acknowledgments
This dissertation describes work performed in cooperation with many different colleagues and
portions of it are based on papers written in collaboration with them. In particular, the seman-
tics of basic lenses described in Chapter 3 is based on an article by Foster, Greenwald, Moore,
Pierce, and Schmitt (2007b). The string lenses presented in that chapter are based on mate-
rial from a paper by Bohannon, Foster, Pierce, Pilkiewicz, and Schmitt (2008). Chapter 4 is a
revised version of a paper by Foster, Pilkiewcz, and Pierce (2008b). Chapter 5 describes new
work with Davi Barbosa and Julien Cretin that generalizes the dictionary lenses described in the
same paper by Bohannon, Foster, Pierce, Pilkiewicz, and Schmitt (2008). Chapter 6 is a revised
version of a CSF paper by Foster, Pierce, and Zdancewic (2009). The design and implementa-
tion of Boomerang described in Chapter 7 was done in cooperation with Michael Greenberg,
Alexandre Pilkiewicz, Benjamin Pierce, and Alan Schmitt. Davi Barbosa and Julien Cretin also
helped polish and extend many aspects of the Boomerang implementation. Boomerang’s pre-
cise type system was designed and implemented in collaboration with Michael Greenberg. Its
grammar notation was designed with help from AdamMagee and Danny Puller. Finally, Chap-
ter 8 is an expanded version of survey of related work on lenses by Foster, Greenwald, Moore,
Pierce, and Schmitt (2007b).
10
Chapter 2
Notational Preliminaries
This chapter àxes notation for a standard mathematical concepts (sets, relations, functions,
etc.) and notions from formal language theory (strings, languages, regular languages, etc.). It
is intended as a reference and can be skipped on a àrst reading and referred back to as needed.
2.1 Basic Concepts
We start by àxing notation for a few standard mathematical concepts.
2.1.1 Notation [Sets]: We write fx1; : : : ; xng to denote the set containing elements x1 to xn.
We often describe sets by comprehension, writing fx 2 S j P (x)g to denote the subset of S
consisting of elements satisfying a predicate P . We write x 2 S to indicate that x is an element
of S and fg for the empty set. We write (S1 [ S2) for the union, (S1 \ S2) for the intersection,
and (S1   S2) for the difference of sets S1 and S2.
2.1.2 Deànition [Relation]: A relation R on sets S and T is a subset of (S  T ).
2.1.3 Deànition [Relation Composition]: Let Q  (S  T ) and R  (T U) be relations. The
composition of Q and R, written R Q is the relation on R and U deàned as follows:1
(R Q) , f(s; u) 2 (S  U) j 9t 2 T:(s; t) 2 Q ^ (t; u) 2 Rg
1Note the order of the relations being composed. We write the relations in this order so that function compo-
sition is a special case of relation composition.
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2.1.4 Deànition [Inverse]: The inverse of a relation R  (ST ) on S and T is the relation R 1
on T and S deàned as:
R 1 , f(t; s) 2 (T  S) j (s; t) 2 Rg
2.1.5 Deànition [Equivalence Relation]: A binary relation R  (S  S) on S is an equivalence
if it is
 reáexive: i.e., 8s 2 S:(s; s) 2 R,
 symmetric: i.e., 8s 2 S; s0 2 S:(s; s0) 2 R =) (s0; s) 2 R, and
 transitive: i.e., 8s 2 S; s0 2 S; s00 2 S:(s; s0) 2 R ^ (s0; s00) 2 R =) (s; s00) 2 R.
2.1.6 Deànition [Identity Relation]: The identity relation Id(S), the ànest equivalence relation
on S, is deàned as Id(S) , f(s; s) 2 (S  S) j s 2 Sg.
2.1.7 Deànition [Total Relation]: The total relation Tot(S), the coarsest equivalence relation
on S, is deàned as Tot(S) , f(s; s0) 2 (S  S) j s 2 S ^ s0 2 Sg.
2.1.8 Deànition [Transitive Closure]: The transitive closure of a binary relation R  (SS) on
S, written TransClosure(R) is the smallest transitive relation S that contains R.
2.1.9 Deànition [Function]: A relation f  (ST ) is a function if and only if for every element
of S there is at most one element of T related to it by f :
8s 2 S; s0 2 S; t 2 T: (s; t) 2 f ^ (s; t0) 2 f =) t = t0
We write f(s) = t instead of (s; t) 2 f when f is a function.
2.1.10 Notation [Deàned]: Let f 2 S ! T be a function and let s 2 S. We say that f is deàned
on s, written f(s) #, if f(s) = t for some t 2 T and f(s) = ? otherwise.
2.1.11 Convention: Throughout this dissertation, we take function application to be strict.
That is, if g 2 S ! T and f 2 T ! U are functions then f(g(x)) # implies g(x) #.
2.1.12 Deànition [Domain, Codomain]: Let f 2 S ! T be a function. The domain of f ,
written dom(f), is the subset of S on which f is deàned as dom(f) , fs 2 S j f(s) #g.
Similarly, the codomain of f written cod(f) is the subset of T that is mapped to by f , deàned
as cod(f) , ft 2 T j 9s 2 S: f(s) = tg.
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2.1.13 Deànition [Total Function]: A function f 2 S ! T is total (on S) if dom(f) = S.
2.1.14 Deànition [Injective Function]: A function f 2 S ! T is injective if for every t 2 T there
is at most one s 2 S such that that f(s) = t:
8s 2 S; s0 2 S; t 2 T: f(s) = t ^ f(s0) = t =) s = s0
2.1.15 Deànition [Surjective Function]: A function f 2 S ! T is surjective if for every element
of t there exists at least one element of S such that f(s) = t.
2.1.16 Deànition [Bijective Function]: A function f 2 S ! T is bijective if it is injective and
surjective.
2.1.17 Deànition [Curry and Uncurry]: Let f 2 A  B ! C be a function. The function
curry f 2 A! B ! C is deàned as:
curry f , a : A: b : B: f (a; b)
Likewise, let uncurry f 2 A! B ! C be a function. The function uncurry f 2 AB ! C
is deàned as:
uncurry f , (a; b) : (AB): f a b
2.2 Formal Language Theory
Now we turn to formal language theory, àxing notation for alphabets, strings, languages, etc.
2.2.1 Deànition [Alphabet]: Let  = fc1; : : : ; cng be a ànite set of symbols (e.g., ASCII). We
call the set  an alphabet and every symbol c 2  a character.
2.2.2 Deànition [String]: A string is a ànite sequence (c1    ck) of characters in . The set of
all strings over  is written .
2.2.3 Notation [Empty String]: We write  for the empty string.
2.2.4 Notation [Length]: We write juj for the length of a string u 2 .
2.2.5 Notation [String Concatenation]: We write uv for the concatenation of strings u and v.
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2.2.6 Deànition [Language]: A language is a subset of .
2.2.7 Notation [Representative Function]: The function representative() 2 2() !  takes
as a language L   as an argument. It yields an arbitrary string belonging to L if L is
non-empty and is otherwise undeàned.
2.2.8 Deànition [Language Concatenation]: The concatenation of languages L1   and L2 
, written L1L2, is the language containing every concatenation of a string in L1 with a string
in L2:
L1L2 , fuv j u 2 L1 and v 2 L2g
2.2.9 Deànition [Language Iteration]: The n-fold iteration of a language L  , written Ln,
is the language containing every concatenation of n strings from L. It is deàned formally by
induction on n as follows:
L0 , fg
Li+1 , LiL
Note that L1 = L as (L0L) = (fgL).
2.2.10 Deànition [Kleene Closure]: The Kleene closure of L, written L, is the union of every
iteration of L:
L =
1[
i=0
Li
Many of our deànitions require that every string belonging to the concatenation of two
languages have a unique factorization into a pair of substrings belonging to the concatenated
languages.
2.2.11 Deànition [Unambiguous Concatenation]: Two languages L1   and L2   are
unambiguously concatenable, written L1!L2, if for all strings u1 2 L1 and u2 2 L2 and all
strings v1 2 L1 and v2 2 L2 if (u1u2) = (v1v2) then u1 = v1 and u2 = v2.
Likewise, many of the deànitions that follow require that every string belonging to the
Kleene closure of a language have a unique decomposition into a list of substrings belonging to
the iterated language.
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2.2.12 Deànition [Unambiguous Iteration]: A language L   is unambiguously iterable, writ-
ten L!, if for all strings u1 2 L to um 2 L and all strings v1 2 L to vn 2 L, if (u1   um) =
(v1    vn) then m = n and ui = vi for every i from 1 to n.
2.3 Regular Languages
This section reviews the regular languages, which enjoy many nice properties including closure
under the boolean operators as well as algorithms for deciding equivalence, inclusion, disjoint-
ness, and the ambiguity conditions just deàned. There are many equivalent ways to deàne
regular languages. We give a syntactic characterization in terms of regular expressions here.
2.3.1 Deànition [Regular Expressions]: The set of regular expressions over  is the smallest set
generated by the following grammar
R ::= u j ; j RR j R jR j R
where u ranges over strings (including ) in .
2.3.2 Deànition [Semantics of Regular Expressions]: The set of strings [[R]] denoted by a regular
expression R 2 R is deàned by structural induction on R as follows:
[[u]] , fug
[[;]] , fg
[[R1R2]] , [[R1]][[R2]]
[[R1 jR2]] , [[R1]] [ [[R2]]
[[R1]] , [[R1]]
2.3.3 Deànition [Regular Language]: A language L   is regular if and only if there exists a
regular expression R 2 R such that L = [[R]].
2.3.4 Fact [Closure Properties]: Let L1   and L1   be regular languages. The following
languages are also regular (Hopcroft and Ullman, 1979):
 the intersection (L1 \ L2) of L1 and L2,
 the difference (L1   L2) of L1 and L2,
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 the left quotient (L1nL2) = fu 2  j 9v 2 L1: uv 2 L2g of L1 by L2, and
 the right quotient (L1=L2) = fu 2  j 9v 2 L2: uv 2 L1g of L1 by L2.
2.3.5 Fact [Emptiness]: It is decidable whether a regular language L   is empty (Hopcroft
and Ullman, 1979). As regular languages are effectively closed under negation and intersection,
inclusion and equivalence for regular languages are also decidable.
We ànish this preliminary section by showing that ambiguous concatenation and iteration
is decidable for regular languages.
2.3.6 Lemma: It is decidable whether the concatenation of regular languages L1   and
L2   is ambiguous.
Proof: LetL1   andL1   be regular languages. Deàne languages S1 and P2 as follows:
S1 , (L1nL1) = fv j 9u 2 L1: u  v 2 L1g
P2 , (L2=L2) = fu j 9v 2 L2: u  v 2 L2g
We will prove that (S1 \P1)   fg = fg if and only if L1 and L2 are unambiguously concaten-
able.
()) Suppose, for a contradiction, that ((S1 \ P2)   fg) = fg but L1 and L2 are not unam-
biguously concatenable. Then there exist strings u1 2 L1 and u2 2 L2 and v1 2 L1 and
v2 2 L2 such that (u1u2) = (v1v2) and u1 6= v1 or u2 6= v2.
Without loss of generality, suppose that ju1j > jv1j and ju2j < jv2j. As (u1u2) = (v1v2)
there exists a string w 2  such that w 6=  and u1 = (v1w) and v2 = (wu2). Hence,
w 2 (S1 \ P2)   fg, a contradiction. We conclude that L1 and L2 are unambiguously
concatenable.
(() Suppose, for a contradiction, that L1 and L2 are unambiguously concatenable but ((S1 \
P2)   fg) 6= fg. Then there exists a string w 2  such that w 6=  and w 2 S1 and
w 2 P2. Moreover, by the deànition of S1 and P2, there exist strings u1 2 L1 such that
(u1w) 2 L1 and u2 2 L2 such that (wu2) 2 L2. Hence, as concatenation is associative,
we have
(u1w)u2 = u1(wu2)
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but (u1w) 6= u1 and u2 6= wu2, which contradicts the assumption that L1 and L2 are
unambiguously concatenable. We conclude that ((S1 \ P2)   fg) = fg.
The required result is immediate as regular languages are closed under intersection and differ-
ence and as emptiness is decidable for regular languages. 
2.3.7 Fact: It is decidable whether a regular language L   is unambiguously iterable.
Proof: Let L  . We will prove that  62 L and L!L if and only if L is unambiguously
iterable.
()) Suppose, for a contradiction, that  62 L and (L!L) but L not unambiguously iterable.
Then there exist strings u1 to um in L and v1 to vn in L such that (u1   um) = (v1    vm)
but either m 6= n or ui 6= vi for some i between 1 and n. We will prove by induction on
m that m = n and ui = vi for i from 1 to n.
Case m = 0: From  = (v1    vn) and  62 L we have that n = 0. We also have ui = vi
for every i from 1 to n vacuously.
Case m > 0: As (u1   um) = (v1    vn) and  62 L we have n > 0. As (L!L) we also
have u1 = v1 and (u2   un) = (v2    vm). By the induction hypothesis, we have
(m  1) = (n  1) and ui = vi for i from 2 to n.
Hence, we have a contradiction. We conclude that L is unambiguously iterable.
(() Suppose, for a contradiction, that L is unambiguously iterable but either  2 L or not
L!L. On the one hand, if  2 L, then we immediately have  =  which contradicts
the assumption that L is unambiguously iterable. On the other hand, if it is not the case
that (L!L), then there exist strings u1 2 L and u2 2 L and v1 2 L and v2 2 L
such that (u1u2) = (v1v2) but u1 6= v1 or u2 6= v2. From these facts it follows that
u1 6= v1 and u2 6= v2. However, as (u1u2) 2 L and (v1v2) 2 L and L unambiguously
iterable, we also have that u1 = v1, a contradiction. Hence, we conclude that  62 L and
(L!L). 
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Chapter 3
Basic Lenses
“Never look back unless you are planning to go that way.”
—Henry David Thoreau
This chapter presents the syntax and semantics of a simple bidirectional language for trans-
forming strings. Although the computational power of this language is limited—it is based on
ànite state transducers (Berstel, 1979)—it is still powerful enough to express a large class of ex-
amples. It also cleanly illustrates many of the fundamental choices in the design of lenses. We
begin the chapter in Section 3.1 by deàning the semantics of lenses and developing some of their
main properties. Section 3.2 develops some of the main properties of basic lenses. Section 3.3
presents syntax for a core set of string lenses combinators. We conclude in Section 3.4
3.1 Semantics
Before we can delve into concrete language design, we need a framework in which we can pre-
cisely evaluate whether a bidirectional transformation correctly implements a view, or not. In
this section, we present a natural mathematical space of well-behaved bidirectional transfor-
mations called basic lenses, and we develop some of fundamental properties of lenses.
Although we will primarily focus on lenses for strings in this dissertation, the semantics
of lenses can be formulated over arbitrary structures. Thus, in this section, we will work in
a completely abstract setting, parameterizing all of our deànitions on a universe U of objects.
Later, we will instantiate this framework by picking U to be the set of ASCII strings.
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Figure 3.1: Basic Lens Architecture
3.1.1 Deànition [Basic Lens]: Fix a universe U of objects and let S  U (“sources”) and V  U
(“views”) be sets of objects. A basic lens l from S to V comprises three total functions
l:get 2 S ! V
l:put 2 V ! S ! S
l:create 2 V ! S
that obey the following laws for every s 2 S and v 2 V :
l:get (l:put v s) = v (PG)
l:get (l:create v) = v (CG)
l:put (l:get s) s = s (GP)
The set of all basic lenses mapping between S and V is written S () V .
The intuition behind the names get, put and create is that the get function “lifts” a view out
of a source structure, while the put function “pushes down” an updated view into the original
source, yielding a new source that reáects the modiàcations made in the view. (We will often
say “put v into s (using l)” instead of “apply l’s put function to v and s.”) The create function
handles the special case where we need to construct a source from a view, but we have no source
to use as the original. It uses the view to manufacture a new source “from scratch,” àlling in any
missing data with defaults. The diagram in Figure 3.1 depicts these components graphically.
Broadly speaking, the semantics of lenses is designed to provide three important guarantees:
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1. Lenses are robust abstractions. Users can make arbitrary updates to views without having
to consider whether their changes can be propagated back to the source.
2. Lenses propagate view updates “exactly” to the underlying source.
3. When possible, lenses preserve the source data that is hidden by the view.
Formally, these guarantees are ensured by the “round-tripping” laws given in Deànition 3.1.1,
which govern the handling of data as it is mapped back and forth between the source and view,
and by the requirement that put be a total function. In the next few paragraphs, we describe how
these formal conditions guarantee the informal properties enumerated above, and we discuss
the beneàts and tradeoffs of our design choices.
Robustness A fundamental choice in the design of a bidirectional language is whether it han-
dles every update to a view or only certain updates. Hegner has coined the terms “closed views”
and “open views” to describe these alternatives (1990). Many frameworks take the second al-
ternative—i.e., they allow updates to fail. This gives these systems maximum áexibility, since
the decision about whether to propagate a particular update can be made dynamically, on a
case-by-case basis. However, although they can handle many transformations that would not
be valid as lenses, these frameworks also have a signiàcant drawback: their views are “leaky”
abstractions of the source. In particular, users cannot treat views like ordinary data structures
because when they update the view, they need to consider the possibility that their update will
be incompatible with the hidden information in the source and will be rejected. By contrast,
the put component of every lens is a total function. Totality is a simple but powerful condition
which ensures that lenses are capable of doing something reasonable with every view and every
source, even when the view has been changed dramatically. In the kinds of applications where
we plan to use lenses—e.g., in data synchronizers (Foster et al., 2007a), which are often run
unsupervised—it critical that views be robust abstractions.
An interesting effect of this choice is that, in practice, it forces lens languages to have ex-
tremely precise type systems. The way that a lens can free itself from the obligation to handle
a particular view is to exclude it from the set of views mentioned in its type. Lenses that ma-
nipulate data in complicated ways typically need to be able to describe the type of that data in
correspondingly precise ways.
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Exact Translation Another fundamental consideration in the design of a bidirectional lan-
guage is the handling of updates. Many systems require that they be translated “exactly” to the
source—i.e., to a new source that reáects all of the changes made to the view. In the framework
of lenses, the PG law is the bedrock principle that guarantees this property. Formally, it
stipulates that, given an updated view and an old source, the put function must produce a new
source that the get function maps back to the very same view. As an example of a transfor-
mation that violates PG, àx an alphabet , let S =  be the set of strings over , let
V = (  N) be the set of pairs of strings and natural numbers, and deàne functions get, put
and create as follows:
l:get u = (u; 0)
l:put (u0; n) u = u0
l:create (u0; n) = u0
If we use l to put the view (“abc”; 1) into the source “xyz”, we get the new source “abc”.
However, the get function maps this string to (“abc”; 0) not (“abc”; 1)—i.e., PG fails.
Intuitively, the reason for this failure is some of the information in the view—the number—is
not propagated to the source and so updates to the number are lost. It turns out that requiring
the PG law implies that the put function must be injective (the precise condition, semi-
injectivity, is slightly stronger; see Lemma 3.2.1 (2) below).
Source Integrity The third key consideration in the design of lenses is the integrity of the
underlying source data. In some cases, for the put function to translate updates to the view
exactly, it needs to modify the underlying source, including the parts of the source that are not
exposed in the view. However, to the extent possible, we would like lenses to preserve this
hidden source data—i.e., put should not have extra “side effects”. It turns out that there are
range of conditions one can impose to ensure the integrity of source data. For lenses, we choose
a simple condition, embodied in the GP law, which stipulates that the put function must
restore the original source exactly when its arguments are a view v and a source s that generates
the very same view—i.e., such that get s = v. As example of a transformation that does not
obey GP (it does obey PG), let S = (N) be the set of pairs of strings over  and
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natural numbers, let V =  be the set of strings, and deàne get, put, and create as follows:
l:get (u; n) = u
l:put u0 (u; n) = (u0; 0)
l:create u0 = (u0; 0)
If we use l to compute a view from (“abc”; 1) and immediately put it back, we get (“abc”; 0),
which is a different source than the one we started with. One way of seeing the problem with
this transformation is that the put function has extra side effects on the source—it sets the
number to 0 even when the view is unchanged. The GP law restricts the effects that put
can have on the source by forcing it to have no effect at all, whenever it is possible for it to do
so without disobeying the other laws.
We might be tempted to go a step further and stipulate that the put function must always
have “minimal” effects on the source, and not only when the view is unchanged. Unfortunately,
even stating this condition requires seems to require building a notion of what constitutes an
update into the semantics—we need to be able to compare two updates to determine which
one has a “smaller” effect. Lenses are agnostic to the way that updates are expressed—the
put function takes the whole state of the updated view (in database terminology, a materialized
view) as input rather than an explicit operation in an update language. Being state based makes
it easy to use lenses in many different application scenarios (since applications do not need
to be retooled to manipulate the view via operations in a special update language) and to use
lenses with data in non-standard and ad hoc formats (which do not usually come equipped
with canonical update languages). But it makes it hard to express properties formulated in
terms of updates. So, because lenses are agnostic to the way that updates are expressed, we
only impose the weaker GP law, which can be stated abstractly and without assuming any
particular notion of update. However, even though the GP law only provides a relatively
loose constraint on the behavior of lenses, it is still a useful tool for designing lens primitives.
We have used it many times to generate, test, and reject candidate transformations.
A different idea for ensuring the integrity of source data is to require that the put function
preserve all of the information in the source that is not reáected in the view. This idea has been
explored extensively in the database literature, where it is known as the constant complement
condition (Bancilhon and Spyratos, 1981). The idea is that the source S should be isomorphic
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to (V C), a product consisting of the view V and a “complement” C that contains all of the
source information not reáected in the view. The get function uses the function witnessing the
isomorphism in one direction to transform the source s into a pair (v; c), and then projects away
c. The put function pairs up the new view v0 with the old complement c and applies the witness
to the isomorphism in the other direction to (v0; c) to obtain the updated source. Importantly,
as the put function is implemented by an injective function from (V  C) to S, it necessarily
propagates all of the information in the complement back to the source—i.e., the complement
is held “constant”.
We can formulate a law for lenses that is equivalent to the constant complement condition
by stipulating that the source obtained after doing two puts in a row must be the same as doing
just the second:
l:put v0 (l:put v s) = l:put v0 s (PP)
This law does not explicitly mention complements, but it forces the put function to restore all of
the information in the old source that is not reáected in the view—i.e., a complement—because
if the lens did not restore some of this information to the intermediate source produced as
the result of the àrst put, then that information would not be available for the second put.
Unfortunately, insisting that every lens obey PP is a draconian restriction that rules out
many transformations that are indispensable in practice. As an example, of a lens that does not
obey PP, let S = (  N) list be the set of lists of pairs of strings and natural numbers,
let V = ( list) be the set of lists of strings, and deàne get, put and create as follows:
l:get [(u1; n1); : : : ; (uk; nk)] = [u1; : : : ; uk]
l:put [u01; : : : ; u0l] [(u1; n1); : : : ; (uk; nk)] = [(u01; n01); : : : ; (u0l; n0l)]
where n0i =
8<:ni for i 2 f1; : : : ;min(l; k)0 for i 2 fk + 1; : : : ; lg
l:create [u01; : : : ; u0l] = [(u01; 0); : : : ; (u0l; 0)]
The get component of this lens takes a list of pairs of strings and numbers and projects away the
numbers. The put component takes a view and a source and weaves them together, propagating
the strings from the view and restoring as many numbers from the source as there are strings in
the view (because putmust be total, it needs to handle cases where the source and view lists have
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different lengths). To see why PP fails, observe that when the list of strings in the view has
fewer elements than the source list, the put function discards some of the numbers in the source,
as it must to satisfy PG. For example, putting [\a 00; \b00] into [(\a 00; 1); (\b00; 2); (\c00; 3)]
discards the 3 and yields [(\a 00; 1); (\b 00; 2)]. This accurately reáects the changemade to the view,
but if we put [\a 00; \b 00; \c00] into this intermediate source we get [(\a 00; 1); (\b 00; 2); (\c00; 0)],
which is different than the result [(\a 00; 1); (\b 00; 2); (\c00; 3)] we would have obtained if we had
put this view into the original source without doing the inner put. Because many applications
depend on transformations that do not obey PP, we do not require it. However, we pay
special attention to lenses that do obey it, calling them very well behaved.
3.1.2 Deànition [Very Well Behaved Lens]: A lens l 2 S () V is very well behaved if and only
if it obeys the PP law for all views v0 2 V and v 2 V and every source s 2 S.
Interestingly, the weaker integrity guarantee embodied in the GP law can be formulated as
a special case of PP. The PT law stipulates that the effect of doing two puts using
the same view must be the same as doing just a single put:
l:put v (l:put v s) = l:put v s (PT)
We show in Lemma 3.2.2, below, that every lens obeys PT.
Another important class of lenses are those whose put functions do not use their source
argument. We call these lenses oblivious.
3.1.3 Deànition [Oblivious Lens]: A lens l 2 S () V is oblivious if (l:put v s) = (l:put vs0)
for all views v in V and sources s and s0 in S.
Both functions denoted by an oblivious lenses are bijective. They are trivially very well behaved,
since the result computed by put never depends on its source argument.
3.2 Basic Lens Properties
Now we use the semantics of lenses to derive some of their basic properties. We begin by
proving some lemmas establishing some elementary facts about lenses. The most interesting
result, presented at the very end of this section, is an alternate characterization of lenses entirely
in terms of put functions.
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3.2.1 Lemma: For every l 2 S () V , the following facts hold:
1. l:get and (uncurry l:put) are surjective functions1
2. l:put is semi-injective in the following sense: for all views v and v0 in V and all sources s
and s0 in S if l:put v s = l:put v0 s0 then v = v0.
3. l:create is an injective function.
Proof: Let l 2 S () V be a lens. We prove each fact separately.
1. Let v 2 V be a view. Pick an arbitrary source s 2 S and let s0 = (l:put v s) be the source
obtained by putting v into s. By the PG law for l we have (l:get s0) = v. As v was
arbitrary, we conclude that l:get is surjective.
Similarly, let s 2 S be a source. By the GP law for l we have (l:put (l:get s) s) = s.
By the deànition of uncurry have (uncurry l:put) (l:get s; s) = s. As s was arbitrary, we
conclude that (uncurry l:put) is surjective.
2. Let v 2 V and v0 2 V be views and s 2 S and s0 2 S be sources such that (l:put v s) =
(l:put v0 s0). We calculate as follows:
v
= l:get (l:put v s) by PG for l
= l:get (l:put v0 s0) by assumption
= v0 by PG for l
That is, v = v0. We conclude that l:put is semi-injective.
3. Let v 2 V and v0 2 V be views such that (l:create v) = (l:create v0). We calculate as
follows:
v
= l:get (l:create v) by CG for l
= l:get (l:create v0) by assumption
= v0 by CG for l
That is, v = v0. We conclude that l:create is injective. 
1Note that the surjectivity of (uncurry l:put) and l:put are different conditions: the former means that for every
s 2 S there exists a v 2 V and s0 2 S such that l:put (v; s0) = s while the latter means that for every f 2 S ! S
there exists a v 2 V such that the partially-applied function (l:put v) and f behave the same.
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Next we prove that every lens obeys the PT law.
3.2.2 Lemma: Every lens l 2 S () V obeys PT for every v 2 V and s 2 S.
Proof: Let l 2 S () V be a lens, v 2 V a view, and s 2 S a source. We calculate as follows
l:put v (l:put v s)
= l:put (l:get (l:put v s)) (l:put v s) by PG for l
= l:put v s by GP for l
and obtain the required equality. 
A natural question to ask is whether lenses are semantically complete—i.e., given a total
and surjective function g from S to V does there exist a lens l that has g as its get component?
We answer this question positively in the next lemma.
3.2.3 Lemma: For every total and surjective function g 2 S ! V there exists a lens l 2 S ()
V such that (l:get s) = (g s) for every s in S.
Proof: Let g 2 S ! V be a total and surjective function from S onto V . For every v 2 V , letbv denote an arbitrary element of S satisfying (g bv) = v. As g is surjective, bv exists. We deàne
the components of l as follows:
l:get s = g s
l:put v s =
8<:s if v = g sbv otherwise
l:create v = bv
By the deànition of l:get, we immediately have (l:get s) = (g s) for every s in S. We show that
l is a well-behaved lens by proving each of the lens laws directly:
I GetPut: Let s 2 S. We calculate as follows
l:put (l:get s) s
= l:put (g s) s by deànition l:get
= s by deànition l:put
and obtain the required equality.
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I PutGet: Let v 2 V and s 2 S. We calculate as follows
l:get (l:put v s)
=
8<:l:get s if v = g sl:get bv otherwise by deànition l:put
=
8<:g s if v = g sg bv otherwise by deànition l:get
= v as either v = g s (by assumption) or g bv = v (by deànition bv)
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the case for PG. 
We can prove a similar completeness result in the other direction as well.
3.2.4 Lemma: For every total and semi-injective function p 2 V ! S ! S such that (uncurry p)
is surjective and (p v (p v s)) = (p v s) for every v in V and s in S, there exists a lens l 2 S () V
such that (l:put v s) = (p v s) for every v in V and s in S.
Proof: Let p 2 V ! S ! S be a total and semi-injective function such that (uncurry p) is
surjective and (p v (p v s)) = (p v s) for every v 2 V and s 2 S. Also let s 2 S be a source. We
will prove that for every source s 2 S there is a unique view v such that (p v s) = s. We àrst
demonstrate that there is at least one such v. By the assumption that (uncurry p) is surjective,
there exists a view v 2 V and source s0 2 S such that (p v s0) = s. We calculate as follows
p v s
= p v (p v s0) by (p v s0) = s
= p v s0 by p v (p v s0) = (p v s0)
= s by (p v s0) = s
and obtain the desired equality. Next let v0 2 V be a view v0 2 V satisfying p v0 s = s. As p is
semi-injective, we have v0 = v. Hence, v is unique.
Using these facts, we next deàne a lens l. For every source s 2 S, let bs 2 V denote the
unique view v 2 V satisfying (p bs s) = s. Deàne the components of l as follows:
get s = bs
put v s = p v s
create v s = p v (representative(S))
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By construction, we immediately have l:put v s = p v s for every v 2 V and s 2 S. We prove
that l is a well-behaved lens by showing each of the lens laws directly:
I GetPut: Let s 2 S. We calculate as follows
l:put (l:get s) s
= p bs s by deànition l:get and l:put
= s by deànition bs
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let v 2 V and s 2 S. We calculate as follows
l:get (put v s)
=[p v s by deànition l:get and l:put
= bs0
where s0 = p v s
= v0 by deànition b
where p v0 s0 = s0
= v by semi-injectivity of p and (p v s) = s0
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the case for PG. 
Now we turn to the main technical result in this section: a semantic characterization of
lenses entirely in terms of put functions. We start by showing that the get component of every
lens is determined by its put component.
3.2.5 Lemma: For every pair of lenses l1 2 S () V and l2 2 S () V if (l1:put v s) =
(l2:put v s) for every v 2 V and s 2 S then (l1:get s) = (l2:get s) for every s 2 S.
Proof: Let l1 2 S () V and l2 2 S () V be lenses such that (l1:put v s) = (l2:put v s) for
every view v 2 V and source s 2 S. Also let s 2 S be a source. We calculate as follows
l1:get s
= l2:get (l2:put (l1:get s) s) by PG for l2
= l2:get (l1:put (l1:get s) s) as l1:put = l2:put
= l2:get s by GP for l1
and obtain the required equality. 
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Next, we show that the create component of every lens is consistent with its put component.
3.2.6 Lemma: For every lens l 2 S () V and view v in V there exists a source s in S such
that (l:create v) = (l:put v s).
Proof: Let l 2 S () V be a lens and let v 2 V be a view. We calculate as follows
l:put v (l:create v)
= l:put (l:get (l:create v)) (l:create v) by CG for l
= l:create v by GP for l
and obtain the required equality, with l:create v as the source s 2 S. 
This last lemma suggests that we can merge the behaviors of the create and put functions
into a single function put0 2 V ! S option ! S where the optional S indicates whether we
are doing a put or a create. Using Lemmas 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 (generalized appropriately with put0
functions) we obtain an alternate characterization of the semantics of lenses just in terms of put0
functions. Thus, although lens programmers feel like they are writing the forward transforma-
tion (because the names of our primitives connote the forward transformation) and getting the
backward transformation “for free”, it is actually the opposite: they are writing the backward
transformation and getting the forward transformation for free.
However, while put0 functions sufàce for a semantic characterization of lenses, the construc-
tion of get functions in Lemma 3.2.4 is not effective—in general, it requires ànding a v 2 V
satisfying (put v s) = s. So, in the next section, when we present the primitives of a simple
language of string lenses, we will revert to the original deànition of lenses and deàne the get,
put, and create functions for each primitive explicitly.
3.3 Combinators
With the semantic foundations of basic lenses in place, we now turn our attention to syntax.
From this point on, we àx an alphabet  and take the universe U of objects to be the set  of
strings over. Why strings and not richer structures such as trees or complex values? There are
several reasons. First, although strings are simple, they crisply expose many foundational is-
sues, including all of the complications having to do with ordered data—see Chapter 5. Second,
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there is a lot of string data in the world and it is convenient to have tools for computing views
over these strings directly, without having to àrst parse them into other formats. Third, pro-
grammers are already familiar with standard string transformation languages (based on regular
expressions).
Atomic Lenses
Let us warm up with a few very simple lenses that do simple rewritings on strings.
Copy The copy lens is parameterized on a regular expression E 2 R and behaves like the
identity function in both directions. The components of copy are deàned precisely in the box
below.
.
.
. E 2 Rcopy E 2 [[E]]() [[E]]
.
get e = e
put e0 e= e0
create e= e
In the get direction, (copy E) copies every string in (the language denoted by) E from source
to view. Likewise, in the put direction, it copies the view and ignores its source argument. This
behavior makes intuitive sense: since the view was obtained by copying the source verbatim,
updates to the view should also be propagated verbatim to the source. (It is also forced by the
PG law.)
The typing rule in the box above can be read as a lemma asserting that if E is a regular
expression then copy E is a basic lens from [[E]] to [[E]]. As this is our àrst lens, we prove
it explicitly. We include analogous well-behavedness proofs for each of the lens primitives
described in the rest of this dissertation. However, since these proofs are largely calculational
we defer them to the Appendix.
3.3.1 Lemma: LetE 2 R be a regular expression. Then (copy E) is a basic lens in [[E]]() [[E]].
Proof:
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I GetPut: Let e be a string in [[E]]. We calculate as follows
(copy E):put ((copy E):get e) e
= (copy E):put e e by deànition (copy E):get
= e by deànition (copy E):put
and obtain the required result.
I PutGet: Let e and e0 be strings in [[E]]. We calculate as follows
(copy E):get ((copy E):put e0 e)
= (copy E):get e0 by deànition (copy E):put
= e0 by deànition (copy E):get
and obtain the required result.
I CreateGet: Let e be a string in [[E]]. We calculate as follows
(copy E):get ((copy E):create e)
= (copy E):get e by deànition (copy E):create
= e by deànition (copy E):get
and obtain the required result, which completes the proof. 
By inspection, copy is oblivious (and therefore very well behaved).
Constant (and derived forms) The (const E u) lens takes as arguments a regular expression
E 2 R and a string u 2 . In the get direction, it behaves like a constant function, mapping ev-
ery string in [[E]] to u. In the put direction, it discards the view, which can only be u, and restores
the original source. The create function maps u to an arbitrary string representative(E) 2 [[E]].
The side condition [[E]] 6= fg in the typing rule below ensures that such a string exists. Note
that (const E u) satisàes the PG law because the view type fug is a singleton set.
.
.
.E 2 R [[E]] 6= ; u 2 

const E u 2 [[E]]() fug
.
get e =u
put u e = e
create u= representative(E)
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3.3.2 Lemma: Let E 2 R be a regular expression and u 2  a string. Then (const E u) is a
basic lens in [[E]]() fug.
The constant lens is not oblivious, but it is very well behaved. This is easy to see since it
propagates its entire source argument in the put direction. We will often write E $ u instead
of (const E u), especially in examples.
Several lenses can be expressed as derived forms using constant:
..
del E 2 [[E]]() fg
del E , E $ 
..
ins u 2 fg () fug
ins u , $ u
These lenses are used in the composers lens from Chapter 1 to remove parts of the source
(e.g., the (del ALPHA) lens used to remove the nationality of each composer) and to add àxed
structure to the view (e.g., the (ins ", ") lens used to separate the name of each composer from
their dates in the view). The get component of (del E) matches any source string belonging
to E and deletes it, adding nothing to the view. Its put component restores the deleted string.
Conversely, (ins u) inserts a àxed string u into the view in the get direction and removes it in
the put direction.
Default The create component of the const lens we just described produces an arbitrary el-
ement of the source type. This is more convenient than always having to specify the default
string to use for create. In many applications, however, the choices of these defaults is impor-
tant. The default lens gives programmers a way to control these choices. It takes as arguments
a lens l 2 S () V and a total function f 2 V ! S. It overrides the create component of l
with a call to put, using f to manufacture the source argument from the view.
.
.
.l 2 S () V f 2 V ! Sdefault l f 2 S () V
.
get s = l:get s
put v s = l:put v s
create v= l:put v (f v)
3.3.3 Lemma: Let l 2 S () V be a basic lens and f 2 V ! S a function from S to V . Then
default l f is a basic lens in S () V .
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The default lens can be used, for example, to change the behavior of const. Suppose that we
are using the const lens to erase a date string from the source:
let DATE : regexp = DIGIT{4} . "-" . DIGIT{2} . "-" . DIGIT{2}
let l : lens = DATE <-> ""
test (l.get "2009-12-06") = ""
The line that starts with test is a unit test—mechanically checked in our implementation—which
veriàes that the expressions on the left and right sides of the equal sign evaluate to the same
value. We will use these unit tests throughout this dissertation to illustrate the behavior of
lenses on simple examples. The standard create function for l produces a representative string
generated from the DATE regular expression:
test l.create ""= "0000-00-00"
In some applications, this string may not be what we want to use as a default. Using the default
operator, we can override it with a better choice—e.g., the start of the Unix epoch
let l' : lens = default l (fun (x:string) -> "1970-01-01")
test l'.create "" = "1970-01-01"
or the current date (fetched by calling out to an external command):
let l'' : lens = default l (fun (x:string) -> Sys.exec "date +%Y-%m-%d | tr -d '\n'")
test l''.create "" = "2009-12-06"
By Lemma 3.2.6, we also have a kind of completeness result for default. Because the create
component must be consistent with its put function, we can use default to equip a lens with
every computable create function.
Regular Operators
Now we turn from simple operators to lens combinators that build bigger lenses out of smaller
ones. The next few combinators are based on the regular operators—union, concatenation,
and Kleene star. Although the details of these combinators are somewhat tailored to strings,
the same essential issues arise in the conditional, product, and iteration operators of lenses for
richer structures such as trees—c.f., the original paper on lenses (Foster et al., 2007b).
Concatenation Let us start with the concatenation operator, which is simplest:
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..
.
S1!S2 V1!V2
l1 2 S1 () V1 l2 2 S2 () V2
(l1l2) 2 (S1S2)() (V1V2)
.
get (s1s2) = (l1:get s1)(l2:get s2)
put (v1v2) (s1s2)= (l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s2)
create (v1v2) = (l1:create v1)(l2:create v2)
3.3.4 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 () V1 and l2 2 S2 () V2 be basic lenses such that (S1!S2) and
(V1!V2). Then (l1l2) is a basic lens in (S1S2)() (V1V2).
In the get direction, the concatenation lens splits the source string into two smaller strings s1
and s2 belonging to S1 and S2, applies the get components of l1 and l2 to these smaller strings,
and concatenates the resulting views. The put and create functions are similar. To lighten the
notation, we write (s1s2) in the box above to indicate that s1 and s2 are strings belonging to
S1 and S2 that concatenate to (s1s2) rather than making the split function explicit. We adopt
this convention silently in the rest of this dissertation.
The typing rule for concatenation requires that the source and view types each be unam-
biguously concatenable. These conditions ensure two important properties:
1. that the components of the lens, deàned using the convention just described, are well-
deàned functions and
2. that the lens obeys the round-tripping laws.
To see what would go wrong if we omitted them, consider the (ill-typed) transformation lambig :
lambig , (a$ a j aa$ aa)(a$ b j aa$ b)
(we assume that “$” binds tighter than “ j ”, which is the union combinator deàned below).
Unfortunately, get is not a function since, according to the above speciàcation, lambig :get aaa =
ab if we split aaa into a and aa, but also lambig :get aaa = aab if we split it into aa and a
instead. We could avoid this issue by giving the programmer a way to specify a policy for
choosing among the multiple parses of ambiguous source strings—e.g., using a shortest match
heuristic we would split (aaa) into a and aa so (lambig :get aaa) would only ever produce ab as
a result. But it is not straightforward to ensure the lens laws when heuristics are used to split
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the source and view. Intuitively, just because we split the source string using one policy does
not mean we can use the same policy for the view. As an example, consider the (ill-behaved)
lens lbogus deàned as (kk) where:
k , (a$ bb j aa$ a j b$ b j ba$ ba)
Using the shortest match policy for the source we have:
lbogus :get aaa = (k:get a)(k:get aa)
= bba
= bba
If we also used the shortest match policy to split the view, we would obtain
lbogus :put bba aaa = (k:put b a)(k:put ba aa)
= bba
= bba
6= aaa
as a result, which violates the GP law because the new source, bba, and the original source,
aaa, are different. There are similar counterexamples to the PG law.
It turns out that the condition that the source types be unambiguously concatenable is es-
sential for soundness, but the condition on the view types is not. The key observation is that we
can allow the concatenation of the view types to be ambiguous if we replace put with a more
complicated version that uses its source argument to check if the old and views can be split in
the same way, and use this way of splitting the view if so.2 This put function obeys the GP
law because the old and new views are split the same way if possible, which will always be the
case when they are identical. As an example, on the same strings as above, the put of lbogus
reàned in this way would behave as follows:
lbogus :put bba aaa = (k:put bb a)(k:put a aa)
= aaa
= aaa
2In more detail, here is how it would work, as originally proposed by Julien Cretin. Call the position of a split
in the set of all possible splits (ordered lexicographically using the length of the strings in each split) its index. As
examples, the index of the split obtained using the shortest match is 0 and the index of the split obtained using the
longest match is equal to the size of the set of possible splits. Revise the put function so that the view is split by the
index of (l1:get s1; l2:get s2) if the index corresponds to a valid split, and by any other heuristic if not.
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The same technique can not be used on the source side. The get function only takes a single
argument, so we have no way to force it to split the source in the same way as arbitrary strings
generated by l1 and l2’s put functions unless the concatenation of S1 and S2 is already unam-
biguous. Consider the following example where we use the shortest match heuristic to split the
source string:
lbogus :get (lbogus :put babb baa) = lbogus :get ((k:put ba b)(k:put bb aa))
= lbogus :get (baa)
= lbogus :get (baa)
= (k:get b)(k:get aa)
= (ba)
= ba
6= babb
The get function has no information to use to determine that bba needs be split into (baa) to
satisfy PG so it blindly uses shortest match, yielding a bad result. In general, it is impossible
to give a sound typing rule for the concatenation lens without the ambiguity condition on the
source types because of such examples where ambiguity can be exploited to cause part of the
string generated by l1’s put to be passed to l2’s get, or vice versa.
In fact, although it is interesting to see that we can allow the concatenation of the view types
to be ambiguous, we do not allow it. One reason is that, in our experience, programmers are
not very good at tracking subtle forms of ambiguity. Most of the ambiguous concatenations
we have encountered in real-world examples turned out to be bugs. Another reason is that, as
discussed in Section 3.1, the GP law is a rather weak condition, intended more as a loose
guide than as a complete speciàcation of correctness. Using the source string to decide how to
split the view when we must to satisfy GP, but splitting it in a completely different way
in all other cases violates the spirit of the law—that put function should respect the integrity
of hidden source data. The strict version of the lens (i.e., with a typing rule that requires that
the concatenation of the view types be ambiguous) produces a very well behaved lens when
applied to very well behaved arguments, and is “no less” very well behaved than its arguments
when it is applied to lenses that are merely well behaved. The relaxed version, however, does
not even preserve very well behavedness because the put function does not always preserve the
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information from the source used to split the view. This means that making a small edit to the
view can cause it to be split in radically a different way. We believe that programmers would
ànd this behavior unintuitive. A ànal reason for preferring the strict version is that it simpliàes
several extensions of basic lenses—e.g., quotient, resourceful, and secure variants—that we
consider later.
Union The next combinator is a conditional operator on lenses:
.
.
.
S1 \ S2 = ;
l1 2 S1 () V1 l2 2 S2 () V2
(l1 j l2) 2 (S1 [ S2)() (V1 [ V2)
.
get s =
(
l1:get s if s 2 S1
l2:get s if s 2 S2
put v s =
8>>>><>>>>:
l1:put v s if v 2 V1 and s 2 S1
l2:put v s if v 2 V2 and s 2 S2
l1:create v if v 2 (V1   V2) and s 2 S2
l2:create v if v 2 (V2   V1) and s 2 S1
create v=
(
l1:create v if v 2 V1
l2:create v if v 2 (V2   V1)
3.3.5 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 () V1 and l2 2 S2 () V2 be basic lenses such that (S1 \ S2) = ;.
Then (l1 j l2) is a basic lens in (S1 [ S2)() (V1 [ V2).
Like conditionals in ordinary programming languages, the union lens selects a branch by testing
its inputs. The get function selects l1 or l2 by testing whether the source string belongs to S1
or S2. The typing rule for union requires that these two types be disjoint, so the choice is
deterministic. The put function is more complicated, because the typing rule allows the view
types V1 and V2 to overlap. It tries to select one of l1 or l2 using the view types, and falls back
to the source argument to disambiguate in cases where the view belongs to both V1 and V2.
The create function is similar, but just uses l1 in cases where the view belongs to both V1 and
V2 (as it has no source argument to use). This is an arbitrary choice, but not a limitation: to
use l2 instead, the programmer can just write (l2 j l1). It does mean, however, that union is not
commutative.
37
Because put is a total function, it needs to handle situations where the view comes from one
side of the union (e.g., (V1   V2)) and the source comes from the other side (e.g., S2). The only
way that the union lens can be sure to produce a source that will map back to the same view
is to use a function from l1. In this basic lens version of union, we simply discard the source
and use create. However, this is not the only option—although the source s belongs to S2, it
might contain information that could be represented in S1. In some situations, we would like
put to reintegrate this information—in some way—with the new source. For example, consider
putting A into 3 using the lens l deàned as follows:
let l1 : lens = copy [A-Z] . del [0-9]
let l2 : lens = del [0-9]
let l : lens = l1 | l2
We might like the lens to propagate the A from the view and restore the 3 from the source, but
l’s put invokes the create function from l1, which yields A0:
test l.put "A" into "3" = "A0"
In the original paper on basic lenses (Foster et al., 2007b), we described a union combinator with
“àxup” functions—mappings from S2 to S1 and vice versa. The idea was that these functions
would be provided by programmers and used by the put function to extract information from
sources on one side of the union for use with views on the other side. Semantically àxup
functions are exactly what is needed—one can show that the union lens described in that paper
is most general. But syntactically they are a nightmare—the programmer has to write down
two additional total functions on the source types! We refrain from introducing àxup functions
here because resourceful lenses offer a mechanism for passing information from one side of a
union to another that seems to balance the semantic and syntactic tradeoffs between these two
extremes nicely—see Chapter 5.
By analogy with concatenation, one might wonder why we allow the view types to overlap
in the union lens. One reason for making this choice is that, in our experience, programmers
are much more comfortable reasoning about disjointness than they are reasoning about about
ambiguous concatenation. Another reason is that we have many examples that demand both
forms of union—overlapping and disjoint. Moreover, it turns out that the main semantic ar-
gument made in the discussion of concatenation does not apply to union: disjoint unions do
not preserve very well behavedness. In fact, editing the view from one side of the union to the
other causes the union to discard the entire source, violating PP:
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let l1 : lens = copy [a-m] . del [0-4]
let l2 : lens = copy [n-z] . del [5-9]
let l : lens = l1 | l2
test l.put "a" into (l.put "n" into "a1") = "a0"
test l.put "a" into "a1" = "a1"
In general, union only preserves very well behavedness when the view types of the sublenses are
identical, making it impossible to edit the view from one side of the union to the other, or when
both branches are oblivious so there is no hidden source data to preserve.
Kleene Star The last regular operator, Kleene star, iterates a lens. It combines the behavior of
concatenation and union:
.
.
.l 2 S () V S
! V !
l 2 S () V 
.
get (s1    sn) = (l:get s1)    (l:get sn)
put (v1    vn) (s1    sm)= s01    s0n
where s0i =

l:put vi si i 2 f1; : : : ;min(n;m)g
l:create vi i 2 fm+ 1; : : : ; ng
create (v1    vn) = (l:create v1)    (l:create vn)
3.3.6 Lemma: Let l 2 S () V be a basic lens such that S! and V !. Then l is a basic lens
in S () V .
In the get direction, it takes the source string, splits it (unambiguously) into a list of substrings
belonging to the source type of the iterated lens l, applies the get component to each string in
this list, and concatenates the results. The put and create functions are similar. Note, however,
that the put function has to handle situations where the number of substrings of the view is not
equal to the number of substrings of the source. To satisfy PG, it must produce a source
with the same number of substrings as its view argument has substrings. When there are more
source substrings than view substrings, it simply discards the extras. When there are more view
substrings than source substrings, it uses l:create to process the extras.
Because it sometimes discards substrings of the source, lenses written using Kleene star are
not always very well behaved, as illustrated in the following example:
let l = copy [a-z] . del [0-9]
test l*.put "xyz" into (l*.put "xy" into "a1b2c3") = "x1y2z0"
test l*.put "xyz" into "a1b2c3" = "x1y2z3"
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This is unfortunate, but unavoidable: we either have to allow the put component of Kleene star
to discard some of the information in the source, sacriàcing very well behavedness, or we have
to restrict put to only accept views having the same number of strings as the source, sacriàcing
totality. Since we take totality to be the more fundamental property, we choose the àrst option.
Extensions
The combinators described in the previous section are powerful enough to express a large col-
lection of useful transformations. Some applications, however, require just a little more power.
It is not difàcult to extend our set of combinators with additional primitives—we only require
that their types be given by regular languages, to ensure that typechecking remains decidable. In
this section, we present a few of the primitives that we have found especially useful in building
applications using basic lenses.
Composition It is often convenient to express a transformation as the sequential composition
of two simple ones, even when it is expressible as a (more complicated) single-pass transforma-
tion. The composition operator puts two lenses in sequence.
.
.
.l1 2 S () U l2 2 U () V
(l1;l2) 2 S () V
.
get s = l2:get (l1:get s)
put v s = l1:put (l2:put v (l1:get s))
create v= l1:create (l2:create v)
3.3.7 Lemma: Let l1 2 S () U and l2 2 U () V be basic lenses. Then (l2;l2) is a basic lens
in S () V .
The get component of the composition lens processes the source string in two phases, using the
get functions of l1 and l2 in that order. The put component applies the put functions of l1 and
l2 in the opposite order and uses l1’s get function to manufacture a string to use as the source
argument for l2’s put. The create function is similar. The typing rule for composition requires
that the view type of l1 and the source type of l2 be identical. This ensures that the strings
áowing through the composition operator have the correct type for each application.
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As an example illustrating how composition can be useful, recall the composers lens from
Chapter 1. It requires that the name of each composer be a string belonging to the set of strings
described by the regular expression ALPHA. Suppose that we wanted to extend it so that the name
could be an arbitrary string. It is not difàcult to do this, but we need to be careful to respect
the escaping conventions of the XML and ASCII formats, escaping ‘&’, ‘<’, ‘>’, etc. on the XML
side and ‘,’, 0\n0, and ‘\’ on the ASCII side. If we already have lenses xml_unesc and csv_esc
that handle unescaping for XML and escaping for ASCII (e.g., from a library), is simpler to just
compose these lenses than it is to write an end-to-end escaping lens from scratch:
let composer : lens =
xml_elt "composer"
( xml_elt "name" ( xml_unesc ; csv_esc )
. ins (COMMA . SPACE)
. xml_elt "lived" (copy (YEAR . DASH . YEAR) )
. xml_elt "nationality" ( default (del ALPHA) (fun (x:string) -> "Unknown") ) )
This new version of the composers lens maps XML sources...
<composer>
<name>Duke Ellington &amp; His
Orchestra</name>
<lived>1899-1974</lived>
<nationality>American</nationality>
</composer>
...to ASCII views
Duke Ellington & His\nOrchestra, 1899-1974
transforming the name of the composer according to the escaping conventions for each format.
Filter The next lens, àlter takes as arguments two regular expressions E and F and yields a
lens that àlters the F s away from a list of Es and F s. Its get and put functions are deàned in
terms of helper functions string lter and string unlter, which are shown in Figure 3.2.
.
.
. [[E]] \ [[F ]] = ; ([[E]] [ [[F ]])
!
àlter E F 2 ([[E]] [ [[F ]]) () [[E]]
.
get s = string lter E s
put v s = string unlter F v s
create v= v
3.3.8 Lemma: LetE and F be regular expressions satisfying ([[E]]\[[F ]]) = ; and ([[E]] [ [[F ]])!.
Then àlter E F is a basic lens in ([[E]] [ [[F ]]) () [[E]]
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let rec string àlter S xs = match xs with
j  ! 
j xxs 0 !
let xs 00 = string àlter S xs 0 in
if x 2 S then xxs 00 else xs 00
let rec string unàlter T ys xs = match ys; xs with
j ; ! string àlter T xs
j yys 0; xxs 0 !
if x 2 T then x(string unàlter ys xs 0)
else y(string unàlter ys 0 xs 0)
Figure 3.2: Pseudocode for string àlter and string unàlter.
It is tempting to deàne àlter as (copy E j del F ) but the typing rules for Kleene star do not
allow it—the view type of the iterated lens is not unambiguously iterable because it contains
the empty string. Additionally, its put function would not behave the same—it would sometimes
discard extra F s in the source while string unlter’s put always restores all of the F s in its second
argument.
As an example illustrating the use of àlter, suppose that we wanted to deàne a lens that
computes a view containing composers born in the 20th century. To achieve this, we can revise
the lens using àlter as follows:
let YEAR_20c : regexp = "19" . DIGIT{2}
let composer (birth:regexp) : lens =
xml_elt "composer"
( xml_elt "name" (copy (ALPHA . SPACE . ALPHA) )
. ins (COMMA . SPACE)
. xml_elt "lived" (copy (birth . DASH . YEAR) )
. xml_elt "nationality" ( default (del ALPHA) (fun (x:string) -> "Unknown") ) )
let composer_other : lens = composer ( YEAR - YEAR_20c )
let composer_20c : lens = composer YEAR_20c
let composers : lens =
xml_elt "composers"
( filter (stype composer_20c) (stype composer_other);
( copy EPSILON | composer_20c . (ins NEWLINE . composer_20c)* ) )
In this deànition, we have parameterized the composer lens by a regular expression for the birth
year, and instantiated it twice: the composer_20c lens handles composers born in the 20th cen-
tury, and composer_other handles composers born in any other century. The main composers
lens, àrst àlters away non-20th century composers (the function stype extracts the regular ex-
pression representing the source type of a lens) and then processes the remaining composers
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using composer_20c. On the original XML source, this lens computes the view:
Aaron Copland, 1910-1990
Benjamin Briten, 1913-1976
where Sibelius, born in 1865, has been àltered away. Note that the àlter lens always restores
the àltered composers from the source. For example, here is the source we get by putting the
empty list of composers into the original source:
<composers>
<composer>
<name>Jean Sibelius</name>
<lived>1865-1956</lived>
<nationality>Finnish</nationality>
</composer>
</composers>
It is not difàcult to show that (àlter E F ) is a very well behaved lens.
Swap All of the lenses we have described so far have get functions that are expressible as one-
way ànite state transducers (Berstel, 1979). This class of transformations is powerful enough
to express a large collection of examples, but it has a fundamental limitation: the restriction to
ànite state means that it is impossible to “remember” arbitrary amounts of data. This means
that we cannot write a variant of the composers lens where the order of the name and dates
are swapped in the view. Fortunately, lifting this restriction poses no semantic problems. The
swap lens is like concatenation but inverts the order of strings in the view:
.
.
.
S1!S2 V2!V1
l1 2 S1 () V1 l2 2 S2 () V2
l1  l2 2 (S1S2)() (V1V2)
.
get (s1s2) = (l2:get s2)(l1:get s1)
put (v2v1) = (l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s2)
create (v2v1)= (l1:create v1)(l2:create v2)
3.3.9 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 () V1 and l2 2 S2 () V2 be basic lenses such that (S1!S2) and
(V2!V1). Then (l1  l2) is a basic lens in (S1S2)() (V2V1).
Like concatenation, the get component of swap splits the source into strings belonging to S1
and S2, applies the get component of l1 and l2 to each string. However, before it concatenates
the results, it swaps them, putting the results in the opposite order. The put function is similar:
it splits the view into strings belonging to V2 and V1 and the source into strings belonging to S1
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and S2, swaps the order of the view strings, applies the put component of l1 and l2 to each, and
concatenates the results.
Let us implement a variant of the composers lens described above where the name and dates
of each composer are swapped in the view:
let composer : lens =
xml_elt "composer"
( ( xml_elt "name" (copy (ALPHA . SPACE . ALPHA) )
~ ( xml_elt "lived" (copy (YEAR . DASH . YEAR) )
. ins (COMMA . SPACE) ) )
. xml_elt "nationality" ( default (del ALPHA) (fun (x:string) -> "Unknown") ) )
Compared to the previous version of the lens, we had to make two changes. First, we moved
the lens (ins (COMMA . SPACE)) down so that it follows the lens for the lived element. We also
replaced the concatenation (.) between the name and lived elements with swap (~). On the
original XML source, this lens computes the view
1865-1956, Jean Sibelius
1910-1990, Aaron Copland
1913-1976, Benjamin Briten
It turns out that the concatenation and swap lenses can both be obtained as instance of
a more general combinator permute that takes as arguments a permutation  on f1; : : : ; ng
and a list of lenses [l1; : : : ; ln]. In the get direction, it splits the source string, processes each
string using the corresponding lens from the list of lenses, permutes the list of view strings, and
concatenates the results. The put and create functions are similar. To obtain the concatenation
(l1l2), we let  be the identity permutation on f1; 2g and the list of lenses be [l1; l2]. To obtain
(l1  l2), we let  be the transposition on f1; 2g and again let the list of lenses be [l1; l2].
3.4 Summary
Basic lenses are a natural class of well-behaved bidirectional transformations that provide the
semantic foundations of bidirectional programming languages. Their design emphasizes both
robustness and ease of use, guaranteeing totality and strong well-behavedness conditions, for-
mulated as intuitive round-tripping laws. Many familiar transformations can be interpreted as
basic lenses including the identity and constant functions, composition, iteration, conditionals,
product, and many others. In the domain of strings, these constructs can be used to elegantly
describe updatable views over many formats of practical interest.
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Chapter 4
Quotient Lenses
“Good men must not obey the laws too well.”
—Ralph Waldo Emerson
The story described in the previous chapter is an appealing one... but unfortunately, it is not
perfectly true! In the real world, most bidirectional transformations do not obey the basic lenses
laws. Or rather, they obey them in spirit, but not to the letter—i.e., only “modulo unimportant
details.” The nature of these details varies from one application to another: examples include
whitespace, artifacts of representing richer structures (relations, trees, and graphs) as text, es-
caping of atomic data (XML PCDATA, vCard, and BibTeX values), ordering of àelds in record-
structured data (BibTeX àelds, XML attributes), wrapping of long lines in ASCII formats (RIS
bibliographies, UniProtKB genomic data bases), and duplicated information (aggregate values,
tables of contents).
To illustrate, consider the composers lens again. The information about each composer
could be larger than àts comfortably on a single line in the ASCII view. We might then want to
relax the type of the view to allow lines to be broken (optionally) using a newline followed by
at least one space, so that
Jean Sibelius,
1865-1957
and
Jean Sibelius, 1865-1957
would be accepted as equivalent, alternate presentations of the same view. But now we have a
problem: as shown in Lemma 2, the PG law is only satisàedwhen put is semi-injective. This
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means that the lens must map these views, which we intuitively regard as equivalent, to different
XML sources—i.e., the presence or absence of linebreaks in the view must be reáected in the
source. We could build a lens that does this—e.g., storing the line break inside the PCDATA
string...
<composer>
<name>Jean Sibelius
</name>
<lived>1865-1957</lived>
<nationality>Finnish</nationality>
</composer>
...but this “solution” isn’t very attractive. For one thing, it places an unnatural demand on
the XML representation—indeed, possibly an unsatisàable demand if the application using
the source requires that the PCDATA not contain newlines. For another, writing the lens that
handles and propagates linebreaks involves extra work. Moreover, this warping of the XML
format and complicated lens programming is all for the purpose of maintaining information that
we don’t actually care about! Amuch better alternative is to relax the lens laws to accommodate
this transformation. Finding a way to do this gracefully is the goal of this chapter.
Several ways of treating inessential data have been explored in previous work.
1. We can be informal, stating the basic lens laws in their strict form and explaining that they
“essentially hold” for our program, perhaps providing evidence in support of this claim
by describing how unimportant details are processed algorithmically. In many applica-
tions, being informal is a perfectly acceptable strategy, and several bidirectional languages
adopt it. For example, the biXid language, which describes XML to XML conversions
using pairs of intertwined tree grammars, provides no explicit guarantees about round-
trip behavior, but its designers clearly intend it to be “morally bijective” (Kawanaka and
Hosoya, 2006). The PADS system is similar (Fisher and Gruber, 2005).
2. We can weaken the laws. The designers of the X language have argued that PG
should be replaced with a weaker “round-trip and a half” version (Hu et al., 2004):
s0 = put v s
put (get s0) s0 = s0
(PGP)
Their reason for advocating this law is that they want to support a duplication opera-
tor. Having duplication makes it possible to express many useful transformations—e.g.,
46
..
get
canonize
               
          
choose
putchoose canonize
concrete
structures
abstract
structures
lenscanonizer canonizer
canonical
concrete
structures
canonical
abstract
structures
     
Figure 4.1: Lens architecture with “canonizers at the edges”
augmenting a document with a table of contents—but because the duplicated data is not
preserved exactly on round trips (consider making a change to just one copy of the du-
plicated data), the PG law is not satisàed.
The weaker PGP law imposes some constraints on the behavior of lenses, but it
opens the door to a wide range of unintended behaviors—e.g., lenses with constant put
functions, lenses whose get component is the identity and and whose put component is
(put v s) = s, etc.1
3. We can divide bidirectional programs into a “core component” that is a lens in the strict
sense and “canonization” phases that operate at the perimeters of the transformation,
standardizing the representation of inessential data. See Figure 4.1.
For example, in our previous work on lenses for trees, the end-to-end transformations
on actual strings (i.e., concrete representations of trees in the àlesystem) only obey the
lens laws up to the equivalence induced by a viewer—a parser and pretty printer mapping
between raw strings and more structured representations of trees (Foster et al., 2007b).
Similarly, XSugar, a language for converting between XML and ASCII, guarantees that
its transformations are bijective modulo a àxed relation on input and output structures
obtained by normalizing “unordered” productions, “ignorable” non-terminals, and the
representation of XML (Brabrand et al., 2008).2
1Later work by the same authors (the journal version of Liu et al. 2007) excludes such transformations by
decorating data with “edit tags,” ordering this data according to a “more edited than” relation, and adding a new
law stipulating that doing a put followed by a get must yield a “more edited” view.
2In XSugar, XML canonization is treated as a distinct “pre-processing” phase, but canonization of other ignor-
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This approach is quite workable when the data formats and canonizers are generic. How-
ever, for ad-hoc data including textual databases, bibliographies, conàguration àles, etc.,
it rapidly becomes impractical—the two components of the canonization transformation
themselves become difàcult to write and maintain. In particular the schema of the data
is recapitulated, redundantly, in the lens and in each component of the canonizer! In
other words, we end up back in the situation that lenses were designed to avoid. In our
experience, these difàculties quickly become unmanageable for most formats of practical
interest.
4. We can develop a more reàned account of the whole lens framework that allows us to say,
precisely and truthfully, that the lens laws hold modulo a particular equivalence relation.
This is the approach we pursue in this chapter. The main advantage over the approach
using viewers, as we will see, is that it allows us to deàne and use canonizers anywhere
in a lens program, not only at the perimeters.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 presents the relaxed semantic space of
quotient lenses. Section 4.2 describes a number of generic combinators—coercions from basic
lenses to quotient lenses and from quotient lenses to canonizers, operators for quotienting a
lens by a canonizer, and sequential composition. Section 4.3 deànes quotient lens versions
of the regular operators—concatenation, union, and Kleene star. Section 4.4 introduces new
primitives that are possible in the relaxed space of quotient lenses. Section 4.5 discusses the
issue of typechecking quotient lenses. Section 4.6 illustrates some uses of quotient lenses on
a large example—a lens for converting between XML and ASCII versions of a large genomic
database. We conclude in Section 4.7.
4.1 Semantics
At the semantic level, the deànition of quotient lenses is a straightforward reànement of ba-
sic lenses. We enrich the types of lenses with equivalence relations—instead of the basic lens
type S () V , we write S=S () V=V , where S is an equivalence on S and V is an
equivalence on V—and we relax the lens laws accordingly.
able data is interleaved with the rest of the transformation; in this respect, XSugar can be regarded as a special case
of the framework proposed in this chapter.
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4.1.1 Deànition [Quotient Lens]: Let S  U and V  U be sets of sources and views and let
S and V be equivalence relations on S and V . A quotient lens l has components with the
same types as a basic lens
l:get 2 S ! V
l:put 2 V ! S ! S
l:create 2 V ! S
but is only required to obey the lens laws up to S and V :
l:put (l:get s) s S s (GP)
l:get (l:put v s) V v (PG)
l:get (l:create v) V v (CG)
Additionally, the components of every quotient lens must respect S and V :
s S s0
l:get s V l:get s0
(GE)
v V v0 s S s0
l:put v s S l:put v0 s0
(PE)
v V v0
l:create v S l:create v0
(CE)
WewriteS=S () V=V for the set of quotient lenses betweenS (moduloS) and V (modulo
V ).
The relaxed round-tripping laws are just the basic lens laws on the equivalence classes S=S
and V=V , and when we pick S and V to be equality—the ànest equivalence relation—they
are equivalent to the basic laws precisely. However, although we reason about the behavior of
quotient lenses as if they operated on equivalence classes, note that the component functions
actually transform members of the underlying sets of sources and views—i.e, the type of get
is S ! V , not S=S ! V=V . The second group of laws ensures that the components of a
quotient lens treat equivalent structures equivalently. They play a critical role in (among other
things) the proof that the typing rule for composition, deàned below, is sound.
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4.2 Quotient Lens Combinators
So much for semantics; the story in this chapter is much more interesting on the syntactic
side. We begin our exploration of syntax by describing some generic operators for constructing
quotient lenses.
Lift Intuitively, it is clear that quotient lenses generalize basic lenses. A concrete witness to
this fact is the lift operator, which lifts a basic lens to a quotient lens.
.
.
. l 2 S () Vlift l 2 S==() V==
.
get s = l:get s
put v s = l:put v s
create v= l:create v
4.2.1 Lemma: Let l 2 S () V be a basic lens. Then lift l is a quotient lens in S==() V==.
The get, put, and create components of lift l are identical to those of l. The equivalence relations
on the source and view are the ànest equivalence relation—equality. The proof that (lift l) is a
well-behaved quotient lens is immediate using the basic lens laws for l.
Left and Right Quotient The next two combinators provide mechanisms for loosening up a
lens, widening the set of structures they can handle, and coarsening their equivalence relations
in a corresponding way.
Suppose that l is a quotient lens from U=U to V=V , where U is a relatively àne equiv-
alence—e.g., l might be a lifted basic lens with U a set of “canonical strings” containing no
extraneous whitespace and U could be equality. We want to construct a new quotient lens
whose domain is a larger set S—e.g., the same set of strings, except that with arbitrary amounts
of whitespace may appear in various places—with an equivalenceS that relates pairs of strings
differing only in whitespace.
To get back and forth between S and U , we need two functions. The àrst function, called
canonize, maps every element of S to its “canonical representative” in U—e.g., by discarding
extra whitespace. The other, called choose, maps canonical representatives in U to an element
in its inverse image under canonize in S—e.g., the canonical string itself, or perhaps a pretty
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U / ~U
canonize
          
     
choose
     
V / ~V
original lens
quotiented lens
canonizer
S / ~S
Figure 4.2: Adding a canonizer to a quotient lens (on the left)
printed version obtained by adding whitespace according to a layout convention. The canonize
and choose functions together are called a canonizer—see Figure 4.2.
Clearly, a canonizer is a bit like a lens (minus the put component). The key difference is
that canonizers only have to obey one round-tripping law.
4.2.2 Deànition [Canonizer]: Let S  U and U  U be sets of objects and let U be an equiv-
alence relation on U .3 A canonizer q from S to U=U comprises two functions
q:canonize 2 S ! U
q:choose 2 U ! S
obeying
q:canonize (q:choose u) U u (RC)
for every u 2 U . That is, canonize is a left inverse of choosemoduloU . The set of all canonizers
from S to U=U is written S . U=U .
Having described how quotienting works at a high level, we now give precise deànitions.
Lenses can be quotiented in two ways—on the left, treating part of the source as ignorable, or
on the right, treating part of view as ignorable.
Left Quotient The lquot operator takes as arguments a canonizer q and a quotient lens l and
produces a new quotient lens where l’s type is coarsened on the source side using q.
3We state the equivalence on U explicitly because, when we put the canonizer together with a quotient lens
using lquot and rquot, we will need the equivalences on U to match up. We do not mention the equivalence on S,
however, because it will be calculated later (by the typing rules for lquot and rquot).
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q 2 S . U=U l 2 U=U () V=V
s S s0 () q:canonize s U q:canonize s0
lquot q l 2 S=S () V=V
.get s = l:get (q:canonize s)put v s = q:choose (l:put v (q:canonize s))
create v= q:choose (l:create v)
4.2.3 Lemma: Let q 2 S . U=U be a canonizer and l 2 U=U () V=V be a quotient
lens. Then (lquot q l) is a quotient lens in S=S () V=V where s S s0 if and only if
q:canonize s U q:canonize s0.
The get component of lquot canonizes its source argument to an element of U using q:canonize
and then maps it to a V using l:get. Similarly, the put component àrst maps its source argument
to a U using q:canonize, and then puts the view into this U using l:put. It uses q:choose to
produce the ànal source. The equivalence relation S on the source is the relation induced
by q:canonize and U—i.e., two sources are equivalent if q:canonize maps them to equivalent
elements of U (according to U ).
As an example of left quotienting, recall the del lens. It deletes a string in the get direction
and restores it in the put direction. In most situations, this is the behavior we want. However,
if the data being deleted is “unimportant”—e.g., whitespace—we might like the put function
to always produce a particular string e 2 [[E]] rather than restoring the original. This transfor-
mation is not a basic lens—it violates GP—but it is easy to deàne as a quotient lens using
lquot:
let qdel (E:regexp) (e:string in E) : lens =
lquot
(canonizer_of_lens (default (del E) (fun (x:string) -> e)))
(copy "")
test (qdel [A-Z] "Z").get "A" = ""
test (qdel [A-Z] "Z").put "" into "A" = "Z"
(The canonizer_of_lens operator, which builds a canonizer out of a lens, is deàned below.) The
get function àrst canonizes the source string to the empty string, and then copies the empty string
into the view. The put function àrst copies the empty string, and then invokes the canonizer’s
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choose function, which yields e. The type of qdel E e is [[E]]=Tot([[E]])() fg==, which records
the fact that every source string is treated equivalently.
A common use of the qdel is standardizing whitespace. For example, we can rewrite the
xml_elt helper function used in the composer lens so that it always produces pretty-printed
XML. Here is a version that allows the indentation before each opening and closing tag to be
controlled separately:
let WS : regexp = WHITESPACE*
let full_xml_elt (tag:string) (ws1:string in WS) (ws2:string in WS) (body:lens) : lens =
qdel WS ws1
. del ("<" . tag . ">")
. body
. qdel WS ws2
. del ("</" . tag . ">")
We can instantiate full_xml_elt to obtain several additional useful helper functions as follows:
let xml_elt (tag:string) (indent:string in WS) (body:lens) : lens =
full_xml_elt tag indent indent body
let xml_pcdata_elt (tag:string) (indent:string in WS) (body:lens) : lens =
full_xml_elt tag indent EPSILON body
let xml_outer_elt (tag:string) (indent:string in WS) (body:lens) : lens =
full_xml_elt tag EPSILON indent body
The xml_elt lens takes just one argument, which is used as the indentation before opening and
closing tags. The xml_pcdata_elt function adds the speciàed indentation before the opening
tag but none before the closing tag (e.g., because the value in the element is PCDATA). The
xml_outer_elt helper handles the outer-most element in a document. It adds no indentation
before the opening tag and the speciàed indentation before the closing tag. Using these helper
functions, we can rewrite the composer lens so that it produces pretty-printed XML as follows:
let INDENT0 = NEWLINE
let INDENT1 = INDENT0 . SPACE . SPACE
let INDENT2 = INDENT1 . SPACE . SPACE
let composer : lens =
xml_elt "composer" INDENT1
( xml_pcdata_elt "name" INDENT2 (copy (ALPHA . SPACE . ALPHA) )
. ins (COMMA . SPACE)
. xml_pcdata_elt "lived" INDENT2 (copy (YEAR . DASH . YEAR) )
. xml_pcdata_elt "nationality" INDENT2
( default (del ALPHA) (fun (x:string) -> "Unknown") ) )
let composers : lens =
xml_outer_elt "composers" INDENT0
( copy EPSILON | composer . (ins NEWLINE . composer)* )
In the get direction it discards the whitespace between XML elements. In the put direction, it
produces pretty-printed XML—e.g., putting
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Jean Sibelius, 1865-1957
Aaron Copland, 1910-1990
Benjamin Britten, 1913-1976
into an XML source where each element has no indentation
<composers>
<composer>
<name>Jean Sibelius</name>
<lived>1865-1957</lived>
<nationality>Finnish</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Aaron Copland</name>
<lived>1910-1990</lived>
<nationality>American</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Benjamin Briten</name>
<lived>1913-1976</lived>
<nationality>English</nationality>
</composer>
</composers>
produces a pretty-printed result
<composers>
<composer>
<name>Jean Sibelius</name>
<lived>1865-1957</lived>
<nationality>Finnish</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Aaron Copland</name>
<lived>1910-1990</lived>
<nationality>American</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Benjamin Britten</name>
<lived>1913-1976</lived>
<nationality>English</nationality>
</composer>
</composers>
that also reáects the update made to the view.
Right Quotient The rquot operator is symmetric. It quotients a lens l 2 S=S () U=U on
the right, using a canonizer q from V to U=U . An interesting difference compared to lquot is
that its canonizer argument is applied in the opposite direction. If we think of a canonizer as a
weaker form of a lens, then lquot is essentially just lens composition, while rquot is a “head to
head” composition—composing a function that discards information in the forward direction
with a function that discards information in the reverse direction—that would not make sense
with lenses.
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l 2 S=S () U=U q 2 V . U=U
v V v0 () q:canonize v U q:canonize v0
rquot l q 2 S=S () V=V
.get s = q:choose (l:get s)put v s = l:put (q:canonize v) s
create v= l:create (q:canonize v)
4.2.4 Lemma: Let l 2 S=S () U=U be a quotient lens and q 2 V . U=U a can-
onizer. Then rquot l q is a quotient lens in S=S () V=V where v V v0 if and only if
q:canonize v U q:canonize v0.
The get function àrst transforms the source to an intermediate view using l:get, and then picks
a representative using q:choose. Similarly, the put function canonizes the view using q:canonize,
and then uses l:put to compute the new source.
Recall the basic lens (ins e), which inserts the àxed string e into the view. The quotient lens
version, (qins E e), behaves like (ins e) in the get direction, but accepts any string in the set
[[E]] in the put direction (where [[E]] must contain e). We often use qins to insert formatting
elements—e.g., whitespace—into the view. For example, if we áipped the composers example
around so that the source was ASCII and the view was XML, it would be critical that we be
able to do this. It is straightforward to deàne qins using rquot:
let qins (E:regexp) (e:string) : lens =
rquot
(ins e)
(canonizer_of_lens (E <-> e))
Note that the put component of qins is not semi-injective:
let l : lens = copy ALPHA . qins SPACE* "" . copy (SPACE . ALPHA)
let src : string = "Aaron Copland"
test l.put "Aaron Copland" into src = src
test l.put "Aaron Copland" into src = src
test l.put "Aaron Copland" into src = src
Of course, it is semi-injective modulo the equivalence relation on the set of views.
Using rquot and quot, we can also deàne a quotient lens version of the constant lens:
let qconst (u:string) (E:regexp) (D:regexp) (v:string) : lens =
qdel E u . qins D v
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This lens accepts any E in the get direction and maps it to v. In the put direction, it accepts any
D and maps it to u. Its type, [[E]]=Tot([[E]])() [[D]]=Tot([[D]]), records the fact that all strings
in the source and view are treated equivalently.
Subsumption The lquot and rquot operators allow us to quotient a quotient lens repeatedly
on either side, which has the effect of composing canonizers. We do this often in quotient
lens programs—stacking up several canonizers, each of which canonizes a distinct aspect of the
concrete or abstract structures. The following rule of subsumption is often useful:
..q 2 V
. U=U U is a reànement of U 0
q 2 V . U=U 0
4.2.5 Lemma: Let q 2 V . U=U be a canonizer and let U 0 be an equivalence relation on
U such that U 0 is a reànement of U . Then q is also a canonizer in V . U=U 0 .
This rule allows the equivalence relation component of a canonizer’s type to be coarsened. For
example, if we want to quotient a lens l 2 U=U () V=V on the left using a canonizer
q 2 S . U= =, we can use it to promote q to the type S . U=U .
Sequential Composition The next combinator composes quotient lenses themselves.
.
.
.
l1 2 S=S () U=U l2 2 U=U () V=V
l1;l2 2 S=S () V=V
.get s = l2:get (l1:get s)put v s = l1:put (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s
create v= l1:create (l2:create v)
4.2.6 Lemma: Let l1 2 S=S () U=U and l2 2 U=U () V=V be quotient lenses. Then
(l2;l2) is a quotient lens in S=S () V=V .
The components of (l1;l2) are identical to the ones in the basic lens composition operator de-
scribed in the last chapter. However, they typing rule demands that the view type of l1 and
the source type of l2 have the same equivalence relation U . This raises an interesting imple-
mentation issue: to statically typecheck the composition operator, we need to be able to decide
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whether two equivalence relations are identical—see Section 4.5. To see what goes wrong if
this condition is dropped, consider
l1 = copy fag 2 fag==() fag==
l2 = copy (fag j fbg) 2 fa; bg==() fa; bg==
and q 2 fa; bg . fag== deàned by
q:canonize = a
q:choose a = a:
If we now take l = (rquot l1 q); l2 (where the equivalence on the left is the total relation on
fa; bg, which is strictly coarser than equality, the relation on the right), then the PG law
fails:
l:get (l:put b b)
= l:get a
= l2:get (q:choose (l1:get a))
= a
6= b
Conversely, if we take
l = l2; (lquot q l1)
(where the left equivalence is equality and the right equivalence is the total relation on fa; bg),
then the GP law fails, since a = l:get b but
l:put a b
= l2:put ((lquot q l1):put a (l2:get b)) b
= l2:put (q:choose (l1:put a (q:canonize (l2:get b)))) b
= l2:put a b
= a
6= b:
This failures make intuitive sense. It would be surprising if composition somehow managed
to respect the equivalences on the source and view even though l1 and l2 disagreed about the
equivalence relation in the middle.
57
Canonizer So far, we have seen how to lift basic lenses to quotient lenses, how to coarsen the
equivalence relations in their types using canonizers, and how to compose them. We have not,
however, discussed where canonizers come from! Of course, we can always deàne canonizers
as primitives—this is essentially the approach used in previous “canonizers at the perimeters”
proposals, where the set of viewers (i.e., parsers and pretty printers) is àxed. But we can do bet-
ter: we can build a canonizer out of the get and create components of an arbitrary lens—indeed,
an arbitrary quotient lens!
.
.
. l 2 S=S () U=U
canonizer of lens l 2 S . U=U
.canonize s = l:get s
choose u = l:create u
4.2.7 Lemma: Let l 2 S=S () U=U be a quotient lens. Then (canonizer of lens l) is a
canonizer in S . U=U .
Building canonizers from lenses gives us a pleasingly parsimonious design, allowing us to deàne
canonizers using whatever generic or domain-speciàc primitives are already available on lenses
(e.g., in our implementation, primitives for copying, deleting, etc., as well as all of the regular
operators).
A composition operator on canonizers can be derived from the quotienting operators. We
state a simple version here, whose type can be derived straightforwardly from the types of copy,
lquot, and canonizer of lens .
.
.
.q1 2 S
. U== q2 2 U . V==
(q1; q2) 2 S . V==
.
(q1; q2) , canonizer of lens (lquot q1 (lquot q2 (copy V )))
(In general, the equivalence on U does not need to be the identity, but it must reàne the equiv-
alence induced by q2.)
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Of course, it is also useful to design primitive canonizers de novo. The canonizer law im-
poses fewer restrictions than the lens laws so we have considerable latitude for writing speciàc
canonizing transformations that would not be valid as lenses—see Section 4.4.
4.3 Regular Operators
Having presented the semantic space of quotient lenses and several generic combinators, we
now focus our attention on quotient lenses for strings. The quotient lenses combinators in this
section are direct generalizations of corresponding basic string combinators described in the
last chapter. In particular, their functional components are identical to the basic lens versions.
However, the typing rules are different, since they deàne equivalence relations on the source
and view types.
Concatenation Before we can deàne the quotient version of concatenation, we need to lift
concatenation to relations:
4.3.1 Deànition [Relation Concatenation]: Let L1 and L2 be languages and let R1 and R2 be
binary relations on L1 and L2. The relation (R1R2) is deàned as w (R1R2) w0 if there exist
strings w1; w01 2 L1 and w2; w02 2 L2 with w = w1w2 and w0 = w01w02 such that w1 R1 w01 and
w2 R2 w
0
2.
We need to be slightly careful here: the concatenation of two equivalence relations 1 and
2 on languages L1 and L2 is not an equivalence in general because it may not be transitive.
However, it is an equivalence in two important cases
1. when the concatenation of L1 and L2 is unambiguous and
2. when 1 and 2 are both the identity relation.
When we concatenate the equivalence relations of the souce and view in the concatenation
lenses, the typing rule will ensure that the concatenations of the underlying languages are both
unambiguous.
With this deànition in hand, the concatenation operator is simply:
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S1!S2 V1!V2
l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1
l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2
S = S1 S2 V = V1 V2
l1l2 2 (S1S2)=S () (V1V2)=V
.get (s1s2) = (l1:get s1)(l2:get s2)put (v1v2) (s1s2)= (l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s2)
create (v1v2) = (l1:create v1)(l2:create v2)
4.3.2 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1 and l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2 be quotient lenses
such that (S1!S2) and (V1!V2). Then (l1l2) is a quotient lens in (S1S2)=S () (V1V2)=V
where S , (S1 S2) and V , (V1 V2).
Concatenation raises an interesting point: suppose that we have two canonizers, q1 and q2,
and two quotient lenses, l1 and l2, that we want to—in some order—concatenate and quotient
on the left. There are two ways we could do this: quotient l1 and l2 àrst using q1 and q2 and
combine the results by concatenating the resulting quotient lenses, or concatenate the quotient
lenses l1 and l2 and the canonizers q1 and q2 àrst and then quotient the results. Both are
possible in our system and both constructions yield equivalent quotient lenses (when they are
well-typed)4. We deàne concatenation on canonizers precisely and prove this fact below—see
Lemma 4.3.8.
Kleene Star As with concatenation, before we can deàne the quotient version of Kleene star,
we need to lift iteration to relations:
4.3.3 Deànition [Relation Iteration]: Let L be a regular language, and letR be a binary relation
on L. The relation R is deàned as w R w0 if and only if there exist strings w1 to wn belonging
to L and strings w01 to w0n in L with w = (w1   wn) and w0 = (w01   w0n) and wi R w0i for all
i in f1 : : : ng.
Again, the iteration of a relation is not an equivalence in general, but it is when the underlying
language is unambiguously iterable or when the relation being iterated is the identity.
4Quotienting the lenses àrst is a little more áexible, since the concatenation of the original quotient lenses need
not be unambiguous.
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Using this deànition, the generalization of Kleene star to quotient lenses is straightforward:
.
.
.l 2 S=S () V=V S
! V !
l 2 S=(S)() V =(

V )
.
get (s1    sn) = (l:get v1)    (l:get vn)
put (v1    vn) (s1    sm)= s01    s0n
where s0i =

l:put vi si i 2 f1; : : : ;min(m;n)g
l:create vi i 2 fm+ 1; : : : ; ng
create (v1    vn) = (l:create v1)    (l:create vn)
4.3.4 Lemma: Let l 2 S=S () V=V be a quotient lens such that S! and V !. Then l is a
quotient lens in S=S () V =

V .
Union The next combinator forms the union of two quotient lenses:
.
.
.
l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1
l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2
S1 \ S2 = ;
8v; v0 2 (V1 \ V2): v V1 v0 () v V2 v0
S = S1 [ S2 V = V1 [ V2
l1 j l2 2 S1 [ S2=V () V1 [ V2=V
.
get s =
(
l1:get s if s 2 S1
l2:get s otherwise
put v s =
8>>>><>>>>:
l1:put v s if v 2 V1 and s 2 S1
l2:put v s if v 2 V2 and s 2 S2
l1:create v if v 2 (V1   V2) and s 2 S1
l2:create v if v 2 (V2   V1) and s 2 S2
create v=
(
l1:create v if v 2 V1
l2:create v if v 2 (V2   V1)
4.3.5 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1 and l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2 be quotient lenses
such that (S1\S2) = ; and for all v and v0 in (V1\V2) we have v V1 v0 if and only if v V2 v0.
Then (l1 j l2) is a quotient lens in S1 [ S2=S () V1 [ V2=V where S = (S1 [ S2) and
V = (V1 [ V2).
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The relationsS andV are formed by taking the the union of the corresponding relations from
l1 and l2; the side conditions in the typing rule ensure that these are equivalences. Additionally,
the side condition on V is essential for ensuring the quotient lens laws. It stipulates that V1
and V2 must only relate strings in the intersection (V1\V2) to other elements of (V1\V2) and
that V1 and V2 must agree in the intersection. To see why this is needed, suppose we have
v in (V1 \ V2) and v0 2 (V2   V1) with v V v0, and let s 2 S1 with (l1 j l2):get s = v. Then
(l1 j l2):put v0 s = l2:create v0 c. Since (cod(l1:put) \ cod(l2:create)) = ;, the result cannot be
related to s by S—i.e., GP fails.
Swap We can also deàne a quotient lens version of swap. Strictly speaking, swap is not a
regular operator—we include it in this section because it is a natural generalization of concate-
nation. The deànition of swap is as follows:
.
.
.
S1!S2 V2!V1
l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1 l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2
S = S1 S2 V = V2 V1
(l1  l2) 2 (S1S2)=S () (V1V2)=V
.
get (s1s2) = (l2:get s2)(l1:get s1)
put (v2v1) (s1s2)= (l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s2)
create (v2v1) r =(l1:create v1)(l2:create v2)
4.3.6 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1 and l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2 be quotient lenses
such that (S1!S2) and (V2!V1). Then (l1  l2) is a quotient lens in (S1S2)=S () (V2V1)=
V where S , (S1 S2) and V , (V2 V1).
Canonizers
Now we deàne each of the regular operators on canonizers. Since canonizers only have to
satisfy the RC law, we have some additional áexibility compared to lenses.
Concatenation The concatenation operator on quotient lenses requires that the concatena-
tions of the languages on the left and on the right each be unambiguous; with canonizers, we
only need the concatenation on the left be unambiguous:
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q1 2 S1 . U1=U1 q2 2 S2 . U2=U2
S1!S2 U = TransClosure(U1 U2)
split 2 u : (U1U2): f(u1; u2) 2 (U1  U2) j (u1u2) = ug
q1q2 2 S1S2 . U1U2=U
.canonize (c1  c2)= (q1:canonize s1)(q2:canonize s2)choose u =(q1:choose u1)(q2:choose u2)
where split u = (u1; u2)
4.3.7 Lemma: Let q1 2 S1 . U1=U1 and q2 2 S2 . U2=U2 be canonizers such that S1!S2.
Also let split be a function in u : (U1U2): f(u1; u2) 2 (U1  U2) j (u1u2) = u. Then (q1q2)
is a canonizer in S1S2 . U1U2=U where U = TransClosure(U1 U2).
The split function determines how strings in the concatenation of U1 and U2, which may be
ambiguous, should be split. The dependent type for split ensures that it splits strings in (U1U2)
into substrings belonging to U1 and U2 (e.g., we can instantiate split with a function that uses a
longest-match policy, or with one that uses a shortest-match policy.) Note that we need to take
the transitive closure of (U1 U2) to ensure that it is an equivalence relation.
Using this deànition, we can now prove a result we described earlier: canonizing and quo-
tienting (on the left) in either order yields equivalent quotient lenses
4.3.8 Lemma: Let
l1 2 U1=U1 () V1=V1 q1 2 S1 . U1=U1
l2 2 U2=U2 () V2=V2 q2 2 S2 . U2=U2
be quotient lenses and canonizers and suppose that
l , (lquot q1 l1)(lquot q2 l2)
l0 , lquot (q1q2) (l1l2)
are well typed (according to the inference rules given in this section). Then l and l0 are equiva-
lent.
Proof: Let l1 and l2 be quotient lenses and q1 and q2 be canonizers with the types above and
deàne quotient lenses l and l0. Also, suppose that l and l0 are well typed according to the
inference rules given in this section.
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By the typing derivation for l, we have that V1!V2. Similarly, by the typing derivation for
l0, we have that U1!U2. Using these facts, we prove that the component functions of l and l0
are equivalent:
get: Let s = (s1s2) 2 (S1S2) be a string. As S1!S2 there exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and
s2 2 S2 such that s = (s1s2). We calculate as follows
l:get s
= l:get (s1s2) by deànition s1 and s2
= ((lquot q1 l1)(lquot q2 l2)):get (s1s2) by deànition l
= ((lquot q1 l1):get s1)((lquot q2 l2):get s2) by deànition lens concatenation
= (l1:get (q1:canonize s1))(l2:get (q2:canonize s2)) by deànition lquot
= (l1l2):get ((q1q2):canonize (s1s2)) as U1!U2
= (lquot (q1q2) (l1l2)):get (s1s2) by deànition lquot
= l0:get (s1s2) by deànition l0
= l0:get s by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equality.
put: Let v = (v1v2) 2 (V1V2) and s 2 (S1S2) be strings. As V1!V2 there exist unique strings
v1 2 V1 and v2 2 V2 such that v = (v1v2). Similarly, as S1!S2 there exist unique strings
s1 2 S1 and s2 inS2 such that s = (s1s2). We calculate as follows
l:put v s
= l:put (v1v2) (s1s2) by deànition v1; v2; s1 and s2
= ((lquot q1 l1)(lquot q2 l2)):put (v1v2) (s1s2) by deànition l
= ((lquot q1 l1):put v1 s1)((lquot q1 l1):put v2 s2) by deànition concatenation
= (q1:choose (l1:put v1 (q1:canonize s1)))
(q2:choose (l2:put v2 (q2:canonize s2))) by deànition lquot
= (q1q2):choose ((l1l2):put
(v1v2) ((q1q2):canonize (s1s2))) as U1!U2
= (lquot (q1q2) (l1l2)):put (v1v2) (s1s2) by deànition lquot
= l0:put (v1v2) (s1s2) by deànition l0
= l0:put v s by deànition v1; v2; s1 and s2
64
and obtain the required equality.
create: Similar to the previous case. 
Kleene Star The iteration operator on canonizers is similar:
.
.
.
q 2 S . U=U
S! 0U = TransClosure(

U )
split 2 u : : f[u1; : : : ; un] 2 U list j (u1   un) = ug
q 2 S . U=0U
.canonize s1    sn=(q:canonize s1)    (q:canonize sn)choose u =(q:choose u1)    (q:choose un)
where split u = [u1; : : : ; un]
4.3.9 Lemma: Let q 2 S . U=U be a canonizer such that S!. Also let split be a function
in u : : f[u1; : : : ; un] 2 U list j (u1   un) = ug. Then q is a canonizer in S . U=0U
where 0U = TransClosure(U).
Here the split function takes a string in U and splits it into a list of substrings belonging to U .
Union The ànal combinator in this section forms the union of two canonizers.
.
.
.
q1 2 S1 . U1=U1 (S1 \ S2) = ;
q2 2 S2 . U2=U2 U = TransClosure(U1 [ U2)
q1 j q2 2 (S1 [ S2) . (U1 [ U2)=TransClosure(U1 [ U2)
.
canonize s=
(
q1:canonize s if s 2 S1
q2:canonize s otherwise
choose u =
(
q1:choose u if u 2 U1
q2:choose u otherwise
4.3.10 Lemma: Let q1 2 S1 . U1=U1 and q2 2 S2 . U2=U2 be canonizers such that
(S1 \ S2) = ;. Then (q1 j q2) is a canonizer in S1 [ S2 . (U1 [ U2)=U where U =
TransClosure(U1 [ U2).
The typing rule explicitly closes (U1 [ U2) transitively to ensure that it is an equivalence
relation.
65
4.4 Primitives
So far, we have mostly focused on quotient lenses deàned using lquot, rquot, canonizer of lens,
and basic lenses. In this section, we give some examples of quotient lens and canonizers that
cannot be built using the quotienting and coercion operators from basic lenses.
Duplication In many applications, it is useful to have a way to duplicate part of the in the
view—e.g., consider augmenting a view of a document with a generated table of contents.
Unfortunately, if S is the source type, it is impossible to have a duplication lens with type
S () (SS)—e.g., consider editing just one copy of the duplicated data; the PG law
will not be satisàed because the get function will make the two copies equal. We can have
duplication if we change its type to the following:
S () f(ss0) 2 (SS) j s = s0g
but the types used in our string lenses—regular languages—are not expressive enough to track
equalities between arbitrary strings. However, in the relaxed space of quotient lenses, we can
give the duplication operator a natural type:
.
.
.
l 2 S=S () V1=V1 f 2 S ! V2
V1!V2 V = V1 Tot(V2)
dup1 l f 2 S=S () (V1V2)=V
.get s =(l:get s)(f s)put (v1v2) s =(l:put v1 s)
create (v1v2)= (l:create v1)
4.4.1 Lemma: Let l 2 S=S () V1=V1 be a basic lens and f 2 S ! V2 a function such that
V1!V2. Then (dup1 l f) is a quotient lens in S=S () (V1V2)=V where V = V1 V2 .
The dup1 lens takes as arguments a quotient lens l and a function f with the same domain
as l (f is often the get component of a lens). The get function copies the source string, passes
one copy to l’s get component and the other copy to f , and concatenates the results. The put
function discards the portion of the view generated by f and invokes l’s put function on the rest
of the view.
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As an example, suppose that e and e0 are strings belonging to [[E]]. The get component of
dup1 (copy E) ((copy E):get)
maps e to (ee), and the create component maps (ee0) to e. The typing rule for dup1 records
the fact that it ignores the part of the view generated by f . A symmetric operator (dup2 f l)
discards the àrst copy instead of the second in the reverse direction.
In both of these quotient lenses, the handling of duplicated data is admittedly simple. (In
particular, unlike the duplication operators proposed and extensively studied by Hu et al.
(2004), put and create do not make any attempt to merge changes to the duplicated data in
the abstract string.) Nevertheless, they sufàce for many examples that arise in practice. For ex-
ample, when f is an aggregation operator such as (count E), which takes a string u belonging
to [[E]] and returns the number of substrings belonging to E that u can be split into, discarding
the aggregate value while propagating the changes made to the other copy often makes sense.
Normalize The next operator is a combinator that builds a canonizer from a function that
maps a set of structures onto a “normalized” subset of itself.
.
.
.
f 2 S ! S0 S0  S 8s 2 S0: f s = s
normalize f 2 S . S0==
.canonize s= f s
choose s = s
4.4.2 Lemma: Let S and S0 be sets such that S0  S. Also let f 2 S ! S0 be a function from
S to S0. Then (normalize f) is a canonizer in S . S0==.
The canonize component is given by the function f , and the choose component is the identity
function. Together, the constraint on the behavior of f and the condition that (S0  S) ensure
that RC holds.
As an example showing how normalize is used, consider a canonizer to put substrings of a
bigger string in sorted order. To keep the notation simple, we will describe the binary version;
the generalization to an n-ary sort is straightforward. Let S1 and S2 be regular languages such
that S1!S2 and S2!S1. Let f be the function with type
f 2 ((S1S2) [ (S2S1))! (S1S2)
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deàned by the equations
f (s1s2) = (s1s2)
f (s2s1) = (s1s2)
where s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2. It is easy to check that f satisàes the side condition in the typing
rule for normalize with S0 = (S1S2) because f maps strings in sorted order to themselves. The
canonizer (sort S1 S2) deàned as (normalize f) has type:
(S1S2 [ S2S1) . S1S2==
We use this canonizer (and a variant, discussed in Section 4.5) in many of our examples to
canonize the representation of unordered data—e.g., XML attributes, BibTeX àelds, etc.
Columnize Many ad hoc formats require that long lines of text be wrapped by replacing a
space character with a newline followed by several spaces. For example, the UniProt genomic
database described in Section 4.6 requires that lines exceeding 75 characters be wrapped so that
they do not spill over into the margin. The next primitive does this transformation:
.
. .
n 2 N sp 2  nl 2 
(nl) \ S0 = ;
S = [(sp [ nl)=sp]S0
columnize n S0 sp nl 2 S . S0==
.canonize s : replace nl with sp in schoose s : replace sp with nl in s as needed to break lines longer than n
4.4.3 Lemma: Let n be a number, S0   a language, and sp 2  and nl 2  strings
such that nl does not occur in any string in S0. Then (columnize n S0 sp nl) is a canonizer in
S . S0== where S = [(sp [ nl)=sp]S0.
It takes as arguments a number n, a set of strings S0, a “space” string sp, and a “newline”
string nl. Its canonize component replaces every occurrence of newline with a space; the choose
component breaks lines longer than n as necessary by replacing spaces with newlines. The
typing rule for columnize requires that nl not appear in strings in S0 and assigns to the entire
canonizer the type S . S0==, where S is obtained by widening S0 so that nl may appear
anywhere that sp may.
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4.5 Typechecking
We were originally motivated to study quotient lenses by the need to work “modulo insignià-
cant details” when writing lenses to transform real-world data formats. However, as we began
using our language to build larger examples, we discovered a signiàcant—and completely un-
expected—side beneàt: quotient lenses allow us to assign many bidirectional transformations
coarser types than the strict lens laws permit, easing some serious tractability concerns.
The need for precise types stems from a fundamental choice in our design: put functions
are total. Totality is attractive to users of lenses, because it guarantees that any valid view can
be put back with any valid source. However, for exactly the same reason, totality makes it
difàcult to design lens primitives—the put function must do something reasonable with every
valid view and source, and the only way that a lens can avoid having to handle certain structures
is by excluding them from its type. Thus, in practice, a lens language with a sufàciently rich
collection of primitives needs to be equipped with a correspondingly rich algebra of types.
To be sure, working in a language with very precise types has many advantages. For ex-
ample, Boomerang’s type checker, based on regular expressions, uncovered a subtle source of
ambiguity in the UniProt ASCII format. But it also imposes burdens—programmers must write
programs that satisfy a very picky type checker, and implementations must mechanize these
precise analyses, often relying on algorithms that are computationally expensive. Fortunately,
the increased áexibility of quotient lenses and canonizers can be exploited to loosen types and
alleviate these burdens. We discuss three examples of this phenomenon in this section.
The àrst example involves the columnize transformation, which was deàned as a primitive
canonizer in Section 4.4. The mappings between long lines of text and blocks of well-wrapped
lines are a bijection, so they trivially satisfy the lens laws. We could deàne columnize as a basic
lens—either as a primitive, or using combinators (although the combinator program would
have to keep track of the number of characters on the current line, and so would be quite
tedious to write). However, the type of this lens, whose view type is the set of minimally-split,
well-wrapped blocks of text (i.e., sequences of lines that must be broken exactly at the margin
column, or ones that must be broken at the column just before the margin because the next two
characters are not spaces, or lines that must be broken at the second-to-last column..., and so on)
is horribly complicated and cumbersome—both for programmers and in the implementation.
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We could loosen the type to match the one we gave to the columnize canonizer—i.e., to arbitrary
blocks of text, including blocks containing “extra” newlines—but changing the type in this
way also requires changing the put function in order to avoid violating the GP law. In
particular, if we take a concrete block of text containing some extra newlines, map it to an
abstract line by get, and immediately map it back to a concrete block by put, then the strict
version of GP stipulates that all of the extra newlines must be restored exactly. Thus, the
put function cannot ignore its concrete argument and insert the minimal number of newlines
needed to avoid spilling over into the margin; it must also examine the concrete string and
restore any extra newlines from it. Formulating columnize as a canonizer rather than a lens,
avoids all of these complications and results in a primitive whose type and behavior are both
simple.
The second example of a transformation whose type can be simpliàed using canonizers is
sort. As with columnize, it is possible to deàne a basic lens version of sort. To sort (S1 : : : Sk),
we form the union of lenses that recognize the concatenations of permutations of the Sis and
apply the appropriate permutation to put them in sorted order. This lens has the behavior we
want, but its type on the concrete side is the set of all concatenations of permutations of Sis—a
type whose size grows as the factorial of k! Representing this type in the implementation rapidly
becomes impractical. Fortunately, the combinatorial blowup can be avoided by widening the
concrete type to (S1 j : : : jSn). This type over approximates the set of strings that we actually
want to sort, but has an enormously more compact representation—one that grows linearly
with k. Of course, having widened the type in this way, we also need to extend the canonizer’s
functional components to handle this larger set of strings. In particular, wemust extend canonize
to handle the case where several or no substrings belong to a given Ri. A reasonable choice,
which works well for many examples is to simply discard the extras and àll in missing ones
with defaults.
The ànal example involves the duplication operator. As discussed above, it is possible to
have duplication as a basic lens, but to satisfy PG the type of strings in the view must
include an equality constraint. By deàning dup1 and dup2 as a quotient lens, we obtain a
primitive with a much simpler—in fact, regular—type.
These examples show how quotient lenses ease certain aspects of typechecking. However,
they complicate other aspects of typechecking because the typechecker needs to track equiva-
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lence relations. In particular, the typing rules for left and right quotienting, sequential compo-
sition, and union all place constraints on the equivalence relations mentioned in the types of
sublenses. For example, to check that the composition (l;k) is well typed, we need to verify
that the equivalence on l’s view and the one on k’s source are identical.
In the rest of this section, we describe two different approaches to implementing these rules.
The àrst uses a coarse analysis, simply classifying equivalences according to whether they are or
are not the equality relation. Surprisingly, this very simple analysis captures our most common
programming idioms and turns out to be sufàcient for all of the applications we have built. The
second approach is more reàned: it represents equivalence relations by rational functions that
induce them. This works, in principle, for a large class of equivalence relations including most
of our canonizers (except for those that do reordering). Unfortunately, it requires representing
and deciding equivalences for ànite state transducers, which appears too expensive to be useful
in practice.
The àrst type system is based on two simple observations: àrst, most quotient lenses origi-
nate as lifted basic lenses, and therefore have types whose equivalence relations are both equal-
ity; second, equality is preserved by many of our combinators including all of the regular op-
erators, swap, sequential composition, and even (on the non-quotiented side) the left and right
quotient operators. These observations suggest a coarse classiàcation of equivalence relations
into two sorts:
 ::= Identity j Any
We can now restrict the typing rules for our combinators to only allow sequential composition,
quotienting, and union of types whose equivalence relation type is Identity . Although this
restriction is draconian (it disallows many quotient lenses that are valid according to the typing
rules presented in earlier sections), it turns out to be surprisingly successful in practice—we
have not needed anything more to write many thousands of lines of demo applications. There
are two reasons for this. First, it allows two quotient lenses to be composed, whenever the uses
of lquot are all in the lens on the left and the uses of rquot on the right, a very common case.
And second, it allows arbitrary quotient (with any equivalences) to be concatenated as long as
the result is not further composed, quotiented, or unioned—another very natural idiom. This
is the typechecking algorithm used in Boomerang.
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In theory, we can go further by replacing the Identity sort with a tag carrying an arbitrary
ànite state transduction f—i.e., a function computable by a ànite state transducer (Berstel,
1979):
 ::= Fst of f j Any
Equivalence relations induced by rational functions are a large class that includes nearly all of
the equivalence relations that can be formed using our combinators—everything except quo-
tient lenses constructed from canonizers based on sort and swap. Moreover, we can decide
equivalence for these relations.
4.5.1 Deànition: Let f 2 A ! B be a rational function. Denote by f the relation f(x; y) 2
AA j f(x) = f(y)g.
4.5.2 Lemma: Let f 2 A ! B and g 2 A ! C be rational and surjective functions. Deàne a
rational relation h  C B as (f  g 1). Then (g  f ) iff h is functional.
Proof: Let us expand the the deànition of h
h(c) = ff(a) j a 2 A and g(a) = cg
Observe that, by the surjectivity of g we have h(c) 6= ;.
()) Suppose that g  f .
Let b; b0 2 h(c). Then by the deànition of h, there exist a; a0 2 A with b = f(a) and
b0 = f(a0) and g(a) = c = g(a0). We have that a g a0, which implies that a f a0, and
so b = b0. Since b and b0 were arbitrary elements of h(c), we conclude that h is functional.
(() Suppose that h is functional.
Let a; a0 2 A with a g a0. Then there exists c 2 C such that g(a) = g(a0) = c. By the
deànition of h, and our assumption that h is functional, we have that f(a) = h(c) = f(a0)
and so a f a0. Since a and a0 were arbitrary, we conclude that g  f . 
4.5.3 Corollary: Let f and g be rational functions. It is decidable whether f = g.
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Proof: Recall that rational relations are closed under composition and inverse. Observe that
f = g iff both f  g 1 and g  f 1 are functional. Since these are both rational relations, the
result follows using the decidability of functionality for rational relations (Blattner, 1977). 
The condition mentioned in union can also be decided using an elementary construction on
rational functions. Thus, this àner system gives decidable type checking for a much larger set of
quotient lenses. Unfortunately, the constructions involved seem quite expensive to implement.
4.6 Example
Most of the examples discussed in this chapter have focused on fairly simple transforma-
tions—e.g., handling whitespace. In this last section, we illustrate the use of quotient lenses in
a larger transformation that maps between XML and ASCII versions of the UniProtKB/Swiss-
Prot protein sequence database. We originally implemented this transformation as a basic lens,
but found that although the lens handled the essential data correctly, it did not handle the full
complexity of either format. On the XML side, the databases had to be a certain canonical
form—e.g., with attributes in a particular order—while on the ASCII side, it did not conform
to the UniProt conventions for wrapping long lines and did not handle àelds with duplicated
data. We initially considered implementing custom viewers to handle these complexities, but
this turned out to be almost as difàcult as writing the lens itself, due to the slightly different
formatting details used to represent lines for various kinds of data. Re-engineering the program
as a quotient lens was a big improvement.
To get a taste of programming with quotient lenses, let us start with a simple example
illustrating canonization of XML trees. In the XML presentation of UniProt databases, patent
citations are represented as XML elements with three attributes:
<citation type="patent" date="1990-09-20" number="WO9010703"/>
In ASCII, they appear as RL lines:
RL Patent number WO9010703, 20-SEP-1990.
The bidirectional transformation between these formats is essentially bijective—the patent num-
ber can be copied verbatim from the attribute to the line, and the date just needs to be trans-
formed from YYYY-MM-DD to DD-MMM-YYYY—but, because the formatting of the element may include
extra whitespace and the attributes may appear in any order, building a lens that maps between
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all valid representations of patent citations in XML and ASCII formats is more complicated
than it might àrst seem.
A bad choice (the only choice available with just basic lenses) would be to treat the whites-
pace and the order of attributes as data that should be explicitly discarded by the get function
and restored by the put. This complicates the lens, since it then has to explicitly manage all
this irrelevant data. Slightly better would be to write a canonizer that standardizes the repre-
sentation of the XML tree and compose this with a lens that operates on the canonized data
to produce the ASCII form. But we can do even better by combining the functionality of the
canonizer and the lens into a single quotient lens. (It uses some library code identiàed below.)
let patent_xml : lens =
ins "RL " .
Xml.attr3_elt_no_kids NL2 "citation"
"type" ("patent" <-> "Patent number" . space)
"number" (escaped_pcdata . comma . space)
"date" date .
dot
This lens transforms concrete XML to abstract ASCII in a single pass. The àrst line inserts the
RL tag and spaces into the ASCII format. The second line is a library function from the Xml
module that encapsulates details related to the processing of XML elements. The àrst argu-
ment, a string NL2, is a constant representing the second level of indentation. It is passed as an
argument to an qdel instance that constructs the leading whitespace for the XML element in the
reverse direction. The second argument, citation, is the name of the element. The remaining
arguments are the names of the attributes and the lenses used for processing their correspond-
ing values. These are given in canonical order. Internally, the Xml.attr3_elt_no_kids function
sorts the attributes to put them into this order. The space, comma, and dot lenses insert the in-
dicated characters; escaped_pcdata handles unescaping of PCDATA; date performs the bijective
transformation on dates illustrated above.
The next example illustrates quotienting on the ASCII side. In the XML format, taxonomic
lineages of source organisms are represented like this
<lineage>
<taxon>Eukaryota</taxon>
<taxon>Lobosea</taxon>
<taxon>Euamoebida</taxon>
<taxon>Amoebidae</taxon>
<taxon>Amoeba</taxon>
</lineage>
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while in ASCII, they are áattened onto lines tagged with OC:
OC Eukaryota; Lobosea; Euamoebida; Amoebidae; Amoeba.
The code that converts between these formats is:
let oc_taxon : lens = Xml.pcdata_elt NL3 "taxon" esc_pcdata in
let oc_xml : lens =
ins "OC " .
Xml.elt NL2 "lineage"
(iter_with_sep oc_taxon (semi . space)) .
dot
The àrst lens, oc_taxon, processes a single taxon element using a library function pcdata_elt
that extracts encapsulated PCDATA from an element. As in the previous example, the NL3
argument is a constant representing canonical whitespace. The second lens, oc_xml, processes
a lineage element. It inserts the OC tag into the ASCII line and then processes the children of
the lineage element using a generic library function iter_with_sep that iterates its àrst argument
using Kleene-star, and inserts its second argument between iterations. The dot lens terminates
the line. The lineage for amoeba shown above is compact enough to àt onto a single OC line,
but most lineages are not:
OC Eukaryota; Metazoa; Chordata; Craniata; Vertebrata; Euteleostomi;
OC Mammalia; Eutheria; Euarchontoglires; Primates; Haplorrhini;
OC Catarrhini; Hominidae; Homo.
The quotient lens that maps between single-line OC strings produced by oc_xml and the ànal
line-wrapped format:
let oc_q : canonizer = columnize 75 (vtype oc_xml) " " "\nOC "
let oc_line : lens = rquot oc_xml oc_q
(The vtype primitive extracts the view part of the type of a quotient lens; stype, used below,
extracts the source part.)
Lastly, let us look at two instances where data is duplicated. In a few places in the UniProt
database, there is data that is represented just once on the XML side but several times on the
ASCII side. For example, the count of the number of amino acids in the actual protein sequence
for an entry is listed as an attribute in XML
<sequence length="262" ...>
but appears twice in ASCII, in the ID line...
ID GRAA_HUMAN Reviewed; 262 AA.
...and again in the SQ line:
75
SQ SEQUENCE 262 AA; 28969 MW;
Using dup2, we can write a lens that copies the data from the XML attribute and onto both
lines in the ASCII format. The backwards direction of dup2 discards the copy on the ID line, a
reasonable policy for this application, since it is generated information.
Another place where duplication is needed is when data is aggregated. The ASCII format
of the information about alternative splicings of the gene is
CC -!- ALTERNATIVE PRODUCTS:
CC Event=Alternative initiation; Named isoforms=2;
CC Name=Long; Synonyms=Cell surface;
CC IsoId=P08037-1; Sequence=Displayed;
CC Name=Short; Synonyms=Golgi complex;
CC IsoId=P08037-2; Sequence=VSP_018801;
where the Named isoforms àeld in the second line is the count of the number of Name blocks that
follow below. The Boomerang code that generates these lines uses dup2 and count to generate
the appropriate integer in the get direction; in the reverse direction, it simply discards the integer
generated by count.
4.7 Summary
Quotient lenses generalize basic lenses, allowing their forward and backward transformations
to treat certain speciàed portions of the source and view as “inessential”. This extension, while
simple at the semantic level, turns out have an elegant syntactic story based on canonizers and
quotienting operators. The resulting system is parsimonious—the same primitives can be used
as lenses and as canonizers—and compositional—unlike previous approaches, where canon-
ization is kept at the edges of transformations, canonizers can be freely interleaved with the
processing of data. Moreover, the áexibility offered by quotient lenses make it possible to
deàne additional primitives such as duplication and sorting operators and simpliàes the typing
rules for several operators, which addresses some serious engineering concerns. Our experience
indicates that canonizers and quotient lenses are essential for building lenses for real-world data.
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Chapter 5
Resourceful Lenses
“The art of progress is to preserve order amid change
and to preserve change amid order.”
—Alfred North Whitehead
Alignment is a fundamental issue in bidirectional languages. Intuitively, to correctly propagate
an update to a view, the put component of a lens needs to be able to match up the pieces of the
view with corresponding pieces of the underlying source. Unfortunately, the basic and quotient
lenses we have seen so far have extremely limited capabilities with respect to alignment—they
are only able to match up data by position. When the update to the view preserves the positional
association between pieces of the source and pieces of the view this simple strategy works àne,
but when the update breaks the association, it does not—it causes the put function to reintegrate
information extracted from pieces of the source with completely unrelated pieces of the view.
Alignment is especially critical in the context of lenses because, unlike view update transla-
tors that work on explicit update operations (e.g., insert, delete, reorder, etc.), lenses are state
based and therefore agnostic to the way that updates are expressed. As discussed in previous
chapters, this design is well-motivated—it makes it easy to deploy lenses in a wide variety of
application contexts—but because lenses are not supplied with the update operation performed
on the view, they cannot use the update to align the original source and the updated view. In-
stead, they need to calculate an alignment using a function that is appropriate to the application
at hand.
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As an example illustrating the problems with alignment that come up with lenses, recall the
composers lens and consider a source XML tree
<composers>
<composer>
<name>Jean Sibelius</name>
<lived>1865-1956</lived>
<nationality>Finnish</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Aaron Copland</name>
<lived>1910-1990</lived>
<nationality>American</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Benjamin Briten</name>
<lived>1913-1976</lived>
<nationality>English</nationality>
</composer>
</composers>
and the corresponding ASCII view:
Jean Sibelius, 1865-1956
Aaron Copland, 1910-1990
Benjamin Briten, 1913-1976
Notice that in going from source to view, the get component of the composers lens deletes the
nationality of each composer (along with all of the XML formatting). In the put direction it
restores nationalities positionally—i.e., by matching up the ith line in the view with the ith
XML element in the source. For certain updates—e.g., when composers have been edited in
place and perhaps added at the end of the view, but the order of lines has not changed—this
simple policy does a good job. For example, if the update to the view replaces Sibelius’s death
date with “1957”, corrects Britten’s name to from “Briten” to “Britten”, and adds a new line
for Tansman, the put function will combine the new view
Jean Sibelius, 1865-1957
Aaron Copland, 1910-1990
Benjamin Britten, 1913-1976
Alexandre Tansman, 1897-1986
with the original source and yield an update XML tree that accurately reáects the modiàcations
made to the view:
<composers>
<composer>
<name>Jean Sibelius</name>
<lived>1865-1957</lived>
<nationality>Finnish</nationality>
</composer>
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<composer>
<name>Aaron Copland</name>
<lived>1910-1990</lived>
<nationality>American</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Benjamin Britten</name>
<lived>1913-1976</lived>
<nationality>English</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Alexandre Tansman</name>
<lived>1897-1986</lived>
<nationality>Unknown</nationality>
</composer>
</composers>
On other updates, however, the behavior of the put function is highly unsatisfactory. If the
update to the view breaks the positional association between lines in the source and view, the
output will be mangled—e.g., when the view is obtained by making the same corrections to
Sibelius’s death date and Britten’s name as above and swapping the order of Britten and Copland,
combining
Jean Sibelius, 1865-1957
Benjamin Britten, 1913-1976
Aaron Copland, 1910-1990
with the original source produces an output
<composers>
<composer>
<name>Jean Sibelius</name>
<lived>1865-1957</lived>
<nationality>Finnish</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Benjamin Britten</name>
<lived>1913-1976</lived>
<nationality>American</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Aaron Copland</name>
<lived>1910-1990</lived>
<nationality>English</nationality>
</composer>
</composers>
where the nationality has been taken from Copland’s element and inserted into Britten’s, and
vice versa.
This is a serious problem, and a pervasive one: it is triggered whenever a lens whose get
function discards information is iterated over an ordered source and the update to the list of
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items in the view does not preserve the positional correspondence between items in the source
and view. It is a show-stopper for many of the applications we want to write using lenses.
What we would like, of course, is for the put function to align composers in the source and
view using some criteria other than their absolute position. For example, it could match up
composers with the same name. On the same inputs as above, a put function that matched up
composers by name would produce a result
<composers>
<composer>
<name>Jean Sibelius</name>
<lived>1865-1957</lived>
<nationality>Finnish</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Benjamin Britten</name>
<lived>1913-1976</lived>
<nationality>English</nationality>
</composer>
<composer>
<name>Aaron Copland</name>
<lived>1910-1990</lived>
<nationality>American</nationality>
</composer>
</composers>
where each nationality is restored to the appropriate composer. Unfortunately, neither basic
lenses nor any of the other existing bidirectional languages provides the means to achieve this
effect. Developing mechanisms that allow lenses to specify and use sophisticated alignment
strategies is the goal of this chapter.
Our solution is to enrich lenses with a simple mechanisms for specifying alignment policies
for the source and view. The idea is that the programmers should specify the locations of
chunks in the source and view as well as the policy to use for aligning chunks. The put function
can use the speciàed policy to compute an association—formally, a partial bijection—between
the chunks in the original view and the updated view and combine this association with the
association between chunks in the source and view realized by the lens to obtain an end-to-
end alignment that connects chunks in the original source with chunks in the updated view. It
can then use this alignment to put back corresponding chunks—i.e., according to the speciàed
policy—together.
Here is a lens that has the desired behavior for the composers example:
let composer : lens =
xml_elt "composer"
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( xml_elt "name" ( ..key (copy (ALPHA . SPACE . ALPHA) ) )
. ins (COMMA . SPACE)
. xml_elt "lived" (copy (YEAR . DASH . YEAR) )
. xml_elt "nationality" ( default (del ALPHA) (fun (x:string) -> "Unknown") ) )
let composers : lens =
xml_elt "composers"
( copy EPSILON | ..<same_key : composer> . (ins NEWLINE . ..<same_key : composer>)* )
Compared to the earlier version of this program we have made two changes (both shaded in
grey). First, we have enclosed both occurrences of the composer lens in angle brackets, indicating
that each composer should be treated as a reorderable chunk. The same_keys “tag” speciàes the
policy for aligning chunks in the put direction. Second, we have wrapped the lens that copies
the name of each composer to view with a special primitive key. This speciàes that the portion
of the view produced by this lens should be used as the key for the enclosing chunk when
computing an alignment. Note that we do not actually demand that the key of each chunk be
unique—i.e., these “keys” are not keys in the strict database sense. When several chunks in the
view have the same key, the relative alignments of chunks having the same key goes by position.
The net effect of these changes is that the put function aligns composers by name, as desired.
To make these new features behave as expected, we modify the framework of lenses in
several ways. Semantically, we enrich the source and view types with notions of chunks and
we add behavioral laws that capture the essential constraints on the handling of chunks—e.g.,
we stipulate that the get and put functions must carry chunks in the source through to chunks
in the view, and vice versa. Using these laws, can derive many intuitive properties—e.g., that
reorderings the chunks in the view will be propagated to corresponding reorderings on the
source. We call these revised structures resourceful lenses.
Operationally, we change the type of the put function so that instead of taking the entire
source as an argument, it takes a pair of structures: a “rigid complemment” that represents
the source information that must be handled positionally, and a “resource”, that represents the
information in chunks, which can be freely reordered. We also add a new component to lenses
called res (for “residue”) that extracts these structures from the source. These modiàcations
to the lens architecture are depicted graphically in Figure 5.1. Separating the representation
of rigidly ordered and reorderable information in this way provides a clean interface for using
alignment information with lenses—by shufáing and discarding resource elements according to
the alignment, we can pre-align the resource so that the source chunks will be matched up with
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Figure 5.1: Resourceful Lens Architecture
the speciàed chunks in the view.
Syntactically, we develop new primitives that allow programmers to specify the locations
of chunks and alignment policies for chunks. We reinterpret each of the regular operators
(union, concatenation, and Kleene star) as resourceful lenses, and we demonstrate that re-
sourceful lenses are closed under composition. One of the main hallmarks of our design is
that it is cleanly separates the treatment of alignment information from rest of the lens. Re-
sourceful lenses can be instantiated with arbitrary alignment functions—the only property we
require is that these functions return the identity alignment when the structures being aligned
are identical. Accordingly, we describe several different algorithms for computing alignments
and we show how these algorithms can be tuned using programmer-speciàed notions of “keys”
and “thresholds”.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 àxes some new notation for
chunks that we will use to formalize resourceful lenses. Section 5.2 presents the semantic space
of resourceful lenses. Section 5.3 describes syntax for resourceful lenses including: coercions to
and from basic lenses, a combinator for indicating chunks, and resourceful versions of the reg-
ular, swap, and composition operators. Section 5.4 discusses alignment algorithms and several
extensions to this core language. We conclude the chapter in Section 5.5.
5.1 Notation
Before we can deàne resourceful lenses precisely, we need a few additional pieces of notation.
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Chunk Annotations
The types of resourceful lenses will be given by regular string languages decorated with extra
annotations that indicate the locations of chunks. Let h and i be two fresh symbols not in . A
chunk-annotated string is a string over the extended alphabet ([fh; ig) in which occurrences
of h and i are balanced and non-nested:
5.1.1 Deànition [Chunk-Annotated Strings]: The set of chunk-annotated strings is generated by
the following grammar:
w ::= u j hui j ww
where u ranges over ordinary strings in .
Note that every ordinary string is a chunk-annotated string and that chunks only appear at the
top level—i.e., they cannot be nested. To describe sets of chunk-annotated strings, we will use
chunk-annotated regular expressions:
5.1.2 Deànition [Chunk-Annotated Regular Expression]: The set of chunk-annotated regular ex-
pressions is generated by the following grammar:
A ::= R j hRi j A jA j AA j A
where R ranges over ordinary regular expressions.
Again, note that every ordinary regular expression is also a chunk-annotated expression, and
that chunks only appear at the top level.
A chunk-annotated string can be converted to an ordinary string by erasing annotations:
5.1.3 Deànition [Erase Function]: The erase function, written bc, maps chunk-annotated strings
to ordinary strings by sending h and i to  and every other character to itself.
We lift bc to regular expressions and languages in the obvious way, and we observe that for
every chunk-annotated regular expression E we have bL(E)c = L(bEc).
We will use chunk-annotations to “read off” the locations of chunks in ordinary strings.
Some chunk-annotated languages, however, do not uniquely identify the chunks of strings in
their erasure—e.g., we can interpret the in (ab) using the chunk-annotated regular expression
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(haib j ahbi) in two ways. We will rule out these situations by only considering chunk unam-
biguous languages:
5.1.4 Deànition [Chunk Unambiguous]: A chunk-annotated regular language L is chunk un-
ambiguous if and only if the erase function bc is injective on L.
In what follows, we tacitly assume that all chunk-annotated regular languages under discussion
are chunk unambiguous. (And when we deàne typing rules for our resourceful lens combina-
tors, below, we will be careful to ensure it.)
We reference the chunks in a string by position, starting from 1. For the next few deàni-
tions, àx a chunk-annotated regular language L and let u be a string in bLc. To lighten the
presentation, we will not explicitly mention L in the deànitions that follow. It will always be
clear from context.
5.1.5 Notation [Locations]: We write juj for the number of chunks in u and locs(u) the set of
locations of chunks in u.
Observe that locs(u) = f1; : : : ; jujg.
5.1.6 Notation [Chunk Access and Update]: When x is a location in locs(u) and v is a string,
we write u[x] for the chunk located at x in u and w[u:=v] for the string obtained from u by
setting the chunk at x to v.
In general, updating a chunk of a string in L may not preserve membership in L. However, if
membership in L is preserved by updating chunks with arbitrary strings in a given language S,
and if the chunks of each string in L all belong to S, then we say that S is chunk compatible
with L:
5.1.7 Deànition [Chunk Compatible]: A language S is chunk compatible with L if and only
if for all strings u 2 L and v 2 S and every location x 2 locs(u) we have u[x] 2 S and
u[x:=v] 2 L.
To reorder the chunks of a string, we apply a permutation:
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5.1.8 Notation [Permutations]: We write Perms(u) for the set of permutations of chunks in
u and ( q	 u) for the string obtained by reordering chunks according to a permutation q in
Perms(u).
The skeleton of a string u is the string that remains after replacing every chunk with , a fresh
symbol not in .
5.1.9 Notation [Skeleton]: We write skel(u) the skeleton of u.
Finite Maps
To represent resources we will use ànite maps from locations (i.e., positive integers) to strings.
Our notation for ànite maps is as follows:
5.1.10 Notation [Empty Map]: We write fjjg for the totally undeàned map.
5.1.11 Notation [Singleton Map]: We write fjx 7! ujg for the singleton map that associates the
location x to the string u, and is otherwise undeàned.
5.1.12 Notation [Map Length]: We write jrj for the largest element in the domain of r.
Let r1 and r2 be ànite maps. The map (r1 ++ r2) behaves like r1 on locations in dom(r1)
and like r2 (shifted down by jr1j) on all other locations :
5.1.13 Deànition [Map Concatenation]:
(r1 ++ r2)(x) ,
8<:r1(x) if x  jr1jr2(x  jr1j) otherwise
The split(n; r) function takes an integer n and a map r and splits it in two. The àrst map
behaves like r restricted to locations less than or equal to n and the second map behaves like r
shifted up by n:
5.1.14 Deànition [Map Split]:
(1(split(n; r)))(x) =
8<:r(x) if x < n and x 2 dom(r)undeàned otherwise
(2(split(n; r)))(x) =
8<:r(x+ n) if (x+ n) 2 dom(r)undeàned otherwise:
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Observe that split(jr1j; r1 ++ r2) = (r1; r2). We describe sets of maps using the following
notation:
5.1.15 Notation [Set of Maps]: We write fjN 7! Sjg for the set of maps with codomain S.
5.2 Resourceful Lens Semantics
With this notation in place, we are now ready to deàne the semantic space of resourceful lenses.
Unlike the semantic spaces of basic and quotient lenses, which we described completely generi-
cally, in this chapter, to keep things simple we will assume that the source and view are strings
from the start. (It would not difàcult generalize the deànition of resourceful lenses to arbitrary
structures, but we would need to generalize the notions of chunks, skeletons, etc.)
Let S and V be languages of chunk-annotated strings, t a tag, k a basic lens, and C be a
set of rigid complements such that k:S and k:V (i.e., the source and view type of k) are chunk
compatible with S and V respectively. The basic lens k will be used to process the strings in
chunks and the tag t will be used to determine the policy for aligning chunks. The set C of rigid
complements is an arbitrary set of structures.
5.2.1 Deànition [Resourceful Lens]: A resourceful lens l between S and V over C and (t : k)
comprises functions
l:get 2 bSc ! bV c
l:res 2 bSc ! C  fjN 7! k:Sjg
l:put 2 bV c ! C  fjN 7! k:Sjg ! bSc
l:create 2 bV c ! fjN 7! k:Sjg ! bSc
obeying the following laws for every source s 2 bSc, views v 2 bV c and v0 2 bV c, rigid
complement c 2 C, and resource r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg:
l:get (l:put v (c; r)) = v (PG)
l:get (l:create v r) = v (CG)
l:put (l:get s) (l:res s) = s (GP)
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locs(s) = locs(l:get s) (GC)
c; r = l:res s
locs(s) = dom(r)
(RC)
x 2 (locs(v) \ dom(r))
(l:put v (c; r))[x] = k:put v[x] (r x)
(CP)
x 2 (locs(v) \ dom(r))
(l:create v r)[x] = k:put v[x] (r x)
(CC)
x 2 (locs(v)   dom(r))
(l:put v (c; r))[x] = k:create v[x]
(NCP)
x 2 (locs(v)   dom(r))
(l:create v r)[x] = k:create v[x]
(NCC)
skel(v) = skel(v0)
skel(l:put v (c; r)) = skel(l:put v0 (c; r0))
(SP)
skel(v) = skel(v0)
skel(l:create v r) = skel(l:create v0 r0)
(SC)
The set of all resourceful lenses from S to V over C and k is written S C;t:k() V .
The àrst thing to notice about this deànition is that although the types of the source and
view are chunk-annotated languages, the functions that make up a resourceful lens operate on
ordinary strings—i.e., the type of get is bSc ! bV c not S ! V . Second, note that the basic
lens k that processes the strings in chunks is built into the semantics of resourceful lenses. This
allows us to formulate behavioral laws such as CP and NCP that specify the
handling of strings in chunks in terms of k’s behavior.
The PG, CP, and GP laws are the same as the basic lens version (gener-
alized because put now takes a rigid complement and a resource rather than the source itself).
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The GC law states that the chunks in the source must be carried through to chunks
in the view. This rules out lenses whose view type advertises the presence of chunks but whose
source type does not have chunks (and vice versa). The RC law requires an analogous
property for the resource generated by res from the source. Lenses that violate these these laws
would cause problems with the procedure for using alignments described at the beginning of
this chapter—we would not necessarily be able to propagate alignments on the view back to
alignments on the source. We do not state explicit PC and CG laws because
they can be derived from GC, PG, and CG:
5.2.2 Lemma [PutChunks]: For every resourceful lens l 2 S C;t:k() V , string v 2 bV c, skeleton
c 2 C, and resource r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg we have locs(l:put v (c; r)) = locs(v).
5.2.3 Lemma [CreateChunks]: For every resourceful lens l 2 S C;t:k() V , string v 2 bV c, and
resource r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg we have locs(l:create v r) = locs(v).
The CP and CC laws codify how resourceful lenses must use their re-
sources. Formally, they stipulate that the ith chunk in the source produced by P and C
must be the identical to the string produced by k:put with the ith view chunk and the string
associated to i in the resource. The NCP and NCC laws are similar.
They specify the behavior of the lens in cases where the resource does not contain an item for
the ith view chunk and it uses k:create instead of k:put.
Finally, the SP law stipulates that the skeleton of the updated source produced by put
must only depend on the skeleton of the view, and not on any of the chunks in the view or the
items in the resource. Among other things, this law is critical for ensuring that the union lens
is well behaved.
The laws for resourceful lenses have a more operational áavor than the laws for basic and
quotient lenses. This is unavoidable—the resourceful laws spell out the processing of individual
chunks in intricate detail—but it is often useful to think in terms of higher-level, more declarative
properties. To illustrate the semantics of resourceful lenses, let us prove one such property:
that the put function of a resourceful lens translates reorderings on the view to corresponding
reorderings on the source.
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5.2.4 Lemma [ReorderPut]: For every resourceful lens l 2 S C;t:k() V , string v 2 bV c, rigid
complement c 2 C, resource r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg, and permutation q 2 Perms(v) we have:
q	 (l:put v (c; r)) = l:put ( q	 v) (c; r  q 1).
As another illustration of the semantics of resourceful lenses, consider a coercion that takes
a resourceful lens and packages it up with the interface of a basic lens. The bc combinator
takes a resourceful lens l in S C;(t:k)() V as input and constructs a basic lens blc in bSc () bV c.
It realizes the procedure for using a resourceful lens described above in which the put function
àrst pre-aligns the resource using an alignment computed between the chunks in the old view
and new view, and then invokes the actual put function:
.
.
. l 2 S
C;t:k() V
blc 2 bSc () bV c
.
get s = l:get s
res s = s
put v s = l:put v (c; r  g)
where (c; r) = l:res s
and g = align(v; l:get s)
create v= l:create v fjjg
5.2.5 Lemma: Let l 2 S C;t:k() V be a resourceful lens. Then blc is a basic lens in bSc () bV c.
The basic get function is identical to the resourceful version. The put function, however is
different. It takes a view v and a source s as arguments and calculates an alignment g between
the chunks in v and the chunks in s using the following àve steps: First, it applies get to s to
recalculate the original view v0 (in an implementation, v0 could be cached to avoid computing
it twice). Second, it applies res to s to calculate a rigid complement c and a resource r. Third, it
applies the alignment function align to v and v0 calculate the alignment g—formally, a partial
bijection between the locations of their chunks. The align function itself is controlled by the tag
t—see Section 5.4. For now, let us assume that align is the function that matches chunks in the
view having the same key (and that falls back to a positional strategy when there are multiple
chunks with the same key). Fourth, it composes g and r. Since r is a ànite map from locations
to source chunks and g is a partial bijection on locations, this has the effect of pre-aligning r
using g. Finally, it passes v, c and (rg) to l:put, which produces the updated source. The basic
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create function invokes l:createwith the view and the empty resource. Note that the blc coercion
does not place any constraints on the alignment function align except that it must return the
identity alignment when its arguments are two identical strings (this property is needed to show
that blc obeys GP).
5.3 Resourceful Lens Primitives
This section describes syntax for resourceful lenses. We start with two simple primitives—one
that converts from basic to resourceful lenses and another that provides a way for programmers
to specify the locations of chunks. Next, we describe resourceful versions of each of the regular
operators, generalizing their put and create functions to operate on rigid complements and
resources instead of source strings. The last part of the section presents resourceful versions of
the sequential composition and swap operators.
Raise Every basic lens can be used as a resourceful lens, by taking the rigid complement to
be the entire source:
.
.
.k 2 S
0 () V 0 l 2 S () Vbl 2 S S;t:k() V
.
get s = l:get s
res s = l:res s; fjjg
put v (c; r)= l:put v c
create v r = l:create v
5.3.1 Lemma: Let l 2 S () V and k 2 S0 () V 0 be basic lenses. Then bl is a resourceful lens
in S C;t:k() V .
Since l is a basic lens, the source and view types S and V are ordinary regular expressions
that do not contain chunks. We pick the set of strings denoted by S as the set of rigid comple-
ments and let res be the function that maps a source string s to the the pair containing s and
the empty resource fjjg. The put and create functions simply ignore their resource argument
and otherwise behave the same as the corresponding functions from l. Note that the basic lens
k mentioned in the type of bl can be an arbitrary basic lens. This will be important for other
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combinators such as concatenation and union, whose typing rules stipulate that the basic lens
mentioned in the types of their sublenses must be identical.
Match The match combinator handles the processing of strings in chunks. It takes a tag t
and a basic lens k as arguments and produces a resourceful lens ht : ki that uses k to process
the source and view in each direction. The tag t controls the align function that is used to align
chunks in coercing to a basic lens using bc.
.
.
.t 2 T k 2 S () V
ht : ki 2 hSi fg;t:k(=) hV i
.
get s = k:get s
res s =; fj1 7! sjg
put v (; r)=

k:put v (r(1)) if 1 2 dom(r)
k:create v otherwise
create v r =

k:put v (r(1)) if 1 2 dom(r)
k:create v otherwise
5.3.2 Lemma: Let t 2 T be a tag and k 2 S () V be a basic lens. Then ht : ki is a resourceful
lens in hSi fg;t:k(=) hV i.
The get component of match simply passes off control to k. Its res function takes a source
string s as input and produces a pair consisting of the rigid complement  and the resource
f1 7! sg as the resource. This forces the put function to access all source information through
the resource—the rigid complement  does not contain any information. There are two cases
for put: If the resource r contains an mapping for 1, then put invokes l:put on the view and
r(1). Otherwise, it invokes l:create on v and the empty resource fjjg. The create function is
identical to put.
In examples, we often omit the tag and write “<k>” instead of “<t:k>”. The Boomerang
parser silently inserts a default tag that aligns chunks by key, as discussed previously.
Concatenation The next few primitives are resourceful versions of the regular operators. For
the most part, these lense are straightforward generalizations of the corresponding basic lenses,
but there are many interesting details—e.g., the concatenation and union lenses need to ensure
that the resource from its left sublens can be safely passed to its right sublens and vice versa.
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The resourceful concatenation operator constructs the resource by concatenating the re-
sources produced by its sublenses in res, and splits the resource using the split operator in its
put and create function:
.
.
.
bS1c!bS2c bV1c!bV2c
l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2
(l1l2) 2 (S1S2) (C1C2);t:k(===) (V1V2)
.
get (s1s2) = (l1:get s1)(l2:get s2)
res (s1s2) = (c1; c2); (r1 ++ r2)
where c1; r1 = l1:res s1
and c2; r2 = l2:res s2
put (v1v2) (c; r)= (l1:put v1 (c1; r1))(l2:put v2 (c2; r2))
where c1; c2 = c
and r1; r2 = split(jv1j; r)
create (v1v2) r =(l1:create v1 r1)(l2:create v2 r2)
where r1; r2 = split(jv1j; r)
5.3.3 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 and l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2 be resourceful lenses such that
bS1c!bS2c and bV1c!bV2c. Then (l1l2) is a resourceful lens in (S1S2) (C1C2);t:k(===) (V1V2).
The get function splits the source string in two, applies the get components of its sublenses,
and concatenates the results, just like basic concatenation. The res function splits the source
string in two and uses l1:res and l2:res to compute rigid complements c1 and c2 and resources
r1 and r2. It combines the complements into the pair (c1; c2) 2 (C1  C2) and the resources
into the single resource (r1 ++ r2). Because the same basic lens k is mentioned in the types of
both l1 and l2, the resources r1, r2, and (r1 ++ r2) all belong to fjN 7! k:Sjg. This ensures that
we can reorder the resource and pass portions of it to l1 and l2. The put function splits the
view into v1 and v2, the rigid complement (c1; c2) into c1 and c2, and the resource into r1 and
r2 using split . Recall the equality split( ..,r_1)r1 ++ r2 = (r1; r2), which is essential for ensuring
the GP law. The create function is similiar.
One reason that we require that the same basic lens k be used for every chunk is to ensure
that the resource has a uniform type fjN 7! k:Sjg, as discussed above. We might be tempted
to allow chunks to be processed using different lenses, as long as the lenses had equivalent
types, but this would force us to settle for weaker properties. For instance, consider the lens
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(hk1ihk2i) where k1 and k2 are basic lenses deàned as follows:
k1 , (copy [ab]) 2 fa; bg () fa; bg
k2 , (a <-> b j b <-> a) 2 fa; bg () fa; bg
and suppose that we put back the view “aa” (since k1 and l2 are both oblivious, the result of the
put does not depend on the rigid complement or the resource). The put function will yield “ab”
as the result. Now suppose that we swap the order of chunks in “aa”. Lemma 5.2.4 states that
the result produced by put should be “ba”—i.e., the string obtained by swapping the chunks in
“ab”. But this is not what happens. Swapping the chunks in “aa” is a no-op, so put produces the
very same result, “ab”, as before. Thus, although it is tempting to allow resourceful lenses that
use several different lenses to process chunks, we cannot do so without sacriàcing properties
such as Lemma 5.2.4.
Kleene Star The Kleene star operator iterates resourceful lenses:
.
.
.l 2 S
C;t:k() V bSc! bV c!
l 2 S (C list);t:k(=) V 
.
get (s1    sn) = (l:get s1)    (l:get sn)
res (s1    sn) = [c1; : : : ; cn]; (r1 ++ : : : ++ rn)
where ci; ri = l:res si for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
put (v1    vn) (c; r)= s01    s0n
where s0i =

l:put vi (ci; ri) i 2 f1; : : : ;min(n;m)g
l:create vi ri i 2 fm+ 1; : : : ; ng
and [c1;    ; cm] = c
and r00 = r
and ri; r0i = split(jvij; r0(i 1)) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
create (v1    vn) r =(l:create v1 r1)    (l:create vn rn)
where r00 = r
and ri; r0i = split(jvij; r0(i 1)) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
5.3.4 Lemma: Let l 2 S C;t:k() V be a resourceful lens such that bSc! and bV c!. Then l is a
resourceful lens in S (C list);t:k(=) V .
The get component of the Kleene star lens is identical to the basic lens version. The res
function splits the source string into a list of smaller strings and passes each element of this list
to l:res. It then merges the rigid complements into a list [c1; : : : ; cn] 2 C list and combines the
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resources into a single resource (r1++ : : :++rn) 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg. The put function splits the view
into a list of smaller strings [v1; : : : ; vm] and uses the number of chunks in each vi and split to
divide the resource r into resources r1 to rm—one for each segment of the view. It invokes l:put
or l:create on each vi as in the basic lens version.
The Kleene star lens demonstrates why it is important that the create function take a resource
as an argument, and not just a view. Even when the list of rigid complements contains fewer
elements than the list of substrings of the view, the resource may contain items that should be
restored to chunks processed by l:create. To illustrate, consider the following example:
let k : lens = key [A-Z] . del [a-z]
let l : lens = <k> . (copy "," . <k>)*
The lens k copies an upper-case letter from source to view and deletes a lower-case letter while
l uses the match, concatenation, and Kleene-star lenses to iterate k over a non-empty list of
comma-separated chunks (the Boomerang implementation automatically inserts coercions to
convert basic lenses to resourceful lenses as needed). The behavior of k:get is straightforward:
test l.get "Xx,Yy,Zz" = "X,Y,Z"
But the behavior of k:put is more sophisticated: it restores the lower-case letters to each piece
of the source by matching up the letters in the old and new new views:
l.put "Z,Y,W,X" into "Xx,Yy,Zz" = "Zz,Yy,Wa,Xx"
To see how this works, let us trace the evaluation of the put function in detail. First, note that
we are using lwith the interface of a basic lens—i.e., we pass its put function strings rather than
a string, a rigid complement, and a resource. The Boomerang implementation silently inserts
the bc coercion. Thus, l:put àrst uses l.get to calculate the old view X,Y,Z and l:res to calculate
a rigid complement c and a resource r from the source string Xx,Yy,Zz:
c = (; [;]) r =
8>>><>>>:

1 7! (X;x)
2 7! (Y; y)
3 7! (Z; z)

9>>>=>>>;
Next, it aligns the old view “X,Y,Z” and new view “Z,Y,W,X” using by matching up chunks
with the same key. This yields a partial matching g between chunks in the view, also depicted
graphically below:
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g =
8>>><>>>:

4 7! 1
2 7! 2
1 7! 3

9>>>=>>>; .
.X
.Y
.Z
.Z
.Y
.W
.X
Next, it applies g to r, yielding a pre-aligned resource r0:
r0 = (r  g) =
8>>><>>>:

4 7! (X;x)
2 7! (Y; y)
1 7! (Z; z)

9>>>=>>>;
Finally, it invokes the put component of <k> with the new view, the rigid complement c and the
pre-aligned resource r0. The effect is that the lower-case letters are restored to the chunk con-
taining the corresponding upper-case letter, as in the example above. Notice that even though
Kleene star lens uses <k>.put for the third chunk in the updated view and <k>.create for the fourth
chunk, the third chunk “W” is created fresh because the resource r0 is undeàned on 3 while the
lower-case letter “x” is restored to the fourth chunk because r0 contains an item for 4.
Union The ànal regular operator forms the union of two resourceful lenses.
.
.
.
bS1c \ bS2c = ; bV1c \ bV2c  bV1 \ V2c
l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2
(l1 j l2) 2 (S1 [ S2) (C1+C2);t:k(===) (V1 [ V2)
.
get s =

l1:get s if s 2 bS1c
l2:get s if s 2 bS2c
res s =

Inl(l1:res s) if s 2 bS1c
Inr(l2:res s) if s 2 bS2c
put v (c; r)=
8>><>>:
l1:put v (c1; r) if v 2 bV1c ^ c = Inl(c1)
l2:put v (c2; r) if v 2 bV2c ^ c = Inr(c2)
l1:create v r if v 62 bV2c ^ c = Inl(c2)
l2:create v r if v 62 bV1c ^ c = Inr(c1)
create v r =

l1:create v r if v 2 bV1c
l2:create v r if v 62 bV1c
5.3.5 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 and l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2 be resourceful lenses such that bS1c \
bS2c = ; and bV1c \ bV2c  bV1 \V2c. Then (l1 j l2) is a resourceful lens in (S1 [S2) (C1+C2);t:k(===)
(V1 [ V2).
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The get component of the resourceful union operator behaves just like the basic lens version.
The res function selects one of l1:res and l2:res using the source string and puts the resulting
rigid complement into a tagged sum, yielding Inl(c) in the l1 case and Inr(c) in the l2 case.
The resource r is not tagged. As with concatenation, the typing rule for union stipulates that
both branches must use the same basic lens k to process chunks. This ensures that a resource
r generated using l1:res can be safely passed to l2:put and vice versa. The put function selects a
branch in an analogous manner to the basic version of union: it àrst tries to select a branch using
the view and falls back to the tag on the rigid complement when the view could be processed by
either branch. The side condition mentioned in the typing rule for union requires bV1c\bV2c 
bV1 \ V2c. This ensures that (V1 j V2) is chunk unambiguous—in particular, that strings in the
intersection (V1 \ V2) have unique parses. It rules out languages such as (ahbi j haib).
Interestingly, using the resource, the union lens is able to pass some source information be-
tween branches in the put direction. This recovers some of the functionality of “àxup functions”
discussed in Chapter 3. To illustrate, consider the following deànitions:
let k : lens = del [0-9]
let l1 : lens = copy [A-Z] . <k>
let l2 : lens = <k>
let l : lens = (l1 | l2)
The lens l is similar to a basic lens we discussed in Chapter 3, except that the lens k that deletes
the number occurs within a chunk. This means that when we put A back into 3, the 3 will
be restored from the source even though the source and view come from different sides of the
union:
test l.put "A" into "3" = "A3"
Thus, using resources, we can realize some of the beneàts provided by àxup functions without
having to describe them explicitly.
Composition The next primitives is a resourceful version of the sequential composition op-
erators. Composition is interesting to consider as a resourceful lens because information can
be discarded during both phases of the evaluation of the get function, so it must be restored
during both phases of the evaluation of put. One way to achieve this is by merging the re-
sources produced by each phase of computation into a single structure. This makes it easy to
apply alignments calculated for the ultimate view (i.e., the view produced by the second lens)
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to the reorderable information represented in the àrst resource—i.e., it allows alignments to be
translated through composite transformations in a natural way.
.
.
.
l1 2 S C1;t1:k1(=) U l2 2 U C2;t2:k2(=) V
(l1;l2) 2 S (C1
C2);t2:(k1;k2)(=====) V
.
get s = l2:get (l1:get s)
res s = hc1; c2i; (zip r1 r2)
where c1; r1 = l1:res s
and c2; r2 = l2:res (l1:get s)
put v (hc1; c2i; r)= l1:put (l2:put v (c2; r2)) (c1; r1)
where r1; r2 = unzip r
create v r = l1:create (l2:create v r2) r1
where r1; r2 = unzip r
5.3.6 Lemma: Let l1 2 S C1;k1(=) U and l2 2 U C2;k2(=) V be resourceful lenses. Then (l1;l2) is a
resourceful lens in S (C1
C2);(k1;k2)(=====) V .
The get function applies l1:get and l2:get to the source in sequence, just like the basic lens
version. The res function àrst applies l1:res to the source s, yielding a rigid complement c1 and
a resource r1, and then applies l2:res to (l1:get s), yielding another rigid complement c2 and
resource r2. It combines the rigid complements into a pair hc1; c2i (we use angle brackets to
distinguish them from the pairs produced as rigid complements by the concatenation lens) and
merges the resources using zip. The resource produced by zip represents all of the reorderable
information from the source and from the intermediate view in a single structure. In the put
direction, the composition takes a view v, a rigid complement hc1; c2i, and a resource r. It àrst
unzips the resource, yielding resources r1 and r2, and then applies l2:put to v, c2, r2, yielding
an intermediate view u. To ànish the job, it applies l1:put to u, c1, and r1, yielding the ànal
source. The create function is similar.
To illustrate the behavior of the composition lens, consider the following deànitions:
let k1 = del [0-9] . key (copy [A-Z]) . copy [a-z]
let k2 = del [A-Z] . key (copy [a-z])
let l =
<k1> . (copy COMMA . <k1>)* ;
<k2> . (copy COMMA . <k2>)*
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The get function takes a non-empty list of comma-separated chunks containing a number, an
upper-case letter, and a lower-case letter, and deletes the number in the àrst composition phase
and the upper-case letter in the second phase:
test l.get "1Aa,2Bb,3Cc" = "a,b,c"
In the put direction, it restores the information deleted in each phase:
test l.put "b,a" into "1Aa,2Bb,3Cc" = "2Bb,1Aa"
The resource produced by res represents the letter and number deleted in each phase of compu-
tation together, so that when the resource is aligned using the view, the information from the
àrst phase is also aligned.
The composition lens requires that the view type of l1 must be identical to the source type
of l2. In particular, it requires that the chunks in these types must be identical. Intuitively,
this makes sense—the only way that the put function can reasonably translate alignments on
the view back through both phases of computation to the source is if the notions of chunks
used in each lens agree. However, in some situations, it is useful to compose lenses that have
identical erased types but different notions of chunks—e.g., one lens does not have any chunks,
while the other lens does have chunks. To do this “asymmetric” form of composition, we can
convert both lenses to basic lenses using bc, which erases chunks, and then compose them
as basic lenses. The tradeoff is that we lose all guarantees about the handling of alignments
alignments—although the individual lenses will be resourceful internally, the top-level lens will
only be guaranteed to obey the basic lens laws.
Swap The ànal primitive discussed in this chapter is the swap operator. All of the lenses we
have seen so far do not permute the order of chunks in going from the source to view—i.e., the
get function carries the ith chunks in the source through to the ith chunk in the view. Adding
swap breaks this property, which, among other things, causes problems with the composition
operator just discussed—if the two phases of computation permute the order of chunks in dif-
ferent ways, then zipping the resources from each phase together and aligning them against the
view does not make sense.
To recover the behavior we want in the presence of swap, we need to add a new component
to lenses that keeps tracks of the permutation on chunks computed by the get function:
l:perm 2  s : bSc: Perms(s)
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It is straightforward to add perm to each of the lenses we have seen so far—e.g., the match
lens returns the identity permutation on one chunk while the concatenation operator merges
the permutations returned by its sublenses.
We also need to generalize the laws that specify the handling of chunks and resources in the
put direction—the old versions no longer hold as stated when lenses may reorder chunks:
x 2 (locs(v) \ dom(r)) (l:perm (l:put v (c; r)))(y) = x
(l:put v (c; r))[y] = k:put v[x] (r(x))
(CP)
x 2 (locs(v) \ dom(r)) (l:perm (l:put v (c; r)))(y) = x
(l:create v r)[y] = k:put v[x] (r(x))
(CC)
x 2 (locs(v)   dom(r)) (l:perm (l:put v (c; r)))(y) = x
(l:put v (c; r))[y] = k:create v[x]
(NCP)
x 2 (locs(v)   dom(r)) (l:perm (l:put v (c; r)))(y) = x
(l:create v r)[y] = k:create v[x]
(NCC)
With these adjustments to the semantic framework, we can generalize the composition op-
erator as follows. We àrst revise the res function to permute the resource produced by l1 using
the inverse of the permutation on chunks realized by l2:
..
(l1;l2):res s = hc1; c2i; zip (r1  p 12 ) r2
where c1; r1 = l1:res s
and c2; r2 = l2:res u
and p2 = l2:perm u
and u = l1:get s
This has the effect of putting the resource computed by l1 into the view order of l2. We also
revise the deànition of put to apply the permutation on chunks realigned by l2 to resource we
pass to l1:
..
(l1;l2):put v (hc1; c2i; r) = l1:put u (c1; r1  p)
where r1; r2 = unzip r
and u = (l2:put v (c2; r2))
and p2 = l2:perm u
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This puts the items in the resource back into the view order of l1.
Now we turn to the resourceful version of the swap lens itself:
.
.
.
bS1c!bS2c bV2c!bV1c
l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2
(l1  l2) 2 (S1S2) (C2C1);t:k(===) (V2V1)
.
get (s1s2) = (l2:get s2)(l1:get s1)
res (s1s2) = (c2; c1); (r2 ++ r1)
where c1; r1 = l1:res s1
and c2; r2 = l2:res s2
perm (s1s2) = (l2:perm s2)  (l1:perm s1)
put (v2v1) (c; r)= (l1:put v1 (c1; r1))(l2:put v2 (c2; r2))
where c1; c2 = c
and r2; r1 = split(jv2j; r)
create (v2v1) r =(l1:create v1 r1)(l2:create v2 r2)
where r1; r2 = split(jv2j; r)
5.3.7 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 and l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2 be lenses with bS1c!bS2c and
bV1c!bV2c. Then (l1  l2) is a resourceful lens in (S1S2) (C2C1);t:k(===) (V2V1).
The get, res, put, and create components are all straightforward generalizations of the con-
catenation lens. The perm component of swap merges the permutations q1 and q2 computed
using l1 and l2 using the () operator, which behaves as follows:
(q2  q1)(i) =
8><>:
q1(i) + jq2j if i  jq1j
q2(i  jq1j) otherwise
5.4 Alignments
So far, our discussion of resourceful lenses has mostly focused on the mechanisms for specifying
chunks and for using alignment information to propagate updates to views back to sources. We
have not, however, said much about where alignments actually come from, except to say that
they are controlled by the tag argument to the match combinator. In this section, we describe
the alignment functions we have implemented in Boomerang, we show how to combine multiple
alignment policies in the same lens, and we describe mechanisms for tuning alignments using
programmer-speciàed notions of keys and thresholds.
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Keys
In many situations, we do not want to consider all of the information contained in the chunks
when we compute an alignment. For example, consider the following deànitions:
let k = del [0-9] . copy [A-Z] . copy [a-z]
let l = <k> . (copy COMMA . <k>)*
The get function takes a list of comma-sparated chunks containing a number, an upper-case
letter, and a lower-case letter, deletes the number, and copies the letters. The put function uses
the default alignment policy which, perhaps surprisingly, aligns chunks by position in this case:
test l.put "Cc,Bb,Aa" into "1Aa,2Bb,3Cc" = "1Cc,2Bb,3Aa"
The reason that it uses positional alignment is that the default alignment policy only considers
the portions of chunks that are designated as “keys” when computing an alignment, and the k
lens does not designate any keys—i.e., every chunk has the empty string as its key. Here is an
alternate version of the lens that uses the upper-case letter as the key for the enclosing chunk:
let k = del [0-9] . ..key (copy [A-Z]) . copy [a-z]
let l = <k> . (copy COMMA . <k>)*
If we evaluate the same put as above, the numbers will be restored to each chunk by key instead
by position:
test l.put "Cc,Bb,Aa" into "1Aa,2Bb,3Cc" = "3Cc,2Bb,1Aa"
Note that we have not designated the lower-case letter as a key. This means that we can edit
the lower-case letters without changing the alignment:
test l.put "Cx,By,Az" into "1Aa,2Bb,3Cc" = "3Cx,2By,1Az"
The ability to designate some, all, or none of the view as a key is a simple but important feature
that we use often examples.
Our implementation has two primitives for specifying keys. The key combinator takes a lens
as an argument and designates the entire view as a key while the nokey combinator designates
none of the view as a key. Semantically, these combinators do not change the behavior of the
lenses they enclose—i.e., outside of a chunk, the lenses k, key k, and nokey k all behave the same.
Instead, they add (or remove) annotations to the type of the view that indicate which parts of
the view should be counted as a part of the key. Before we align two lists of chunks, we use the
annotations on the type of the view to calculate a key for each chunk. We then align the lists
of chunks using keys instead of the actual contents.
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Figure 5.2: Alignment species
Species
Because alignment is a fundamentally heuristic operation, the ability to select between different
alignment strategies is important in practice. One of the strengths of the resourceful lens frame-
work is that correctness does not hinge on special properties of the alignment function—the only
property we require is that return the identity alignment whenever its arguments are identical.
This áexibility gives us enormous latitude in designing alignment functions to use with resource-
ful lenses. Our implementation currently supports several different alignment functions:
 Positional: The alignments matches up chunks by position in the two lists of chunks. If
one list has more chunks than the other, the extra items at the end of the list are not
aligned.
 Bush-like: The alignmentminimizes a cost function deàned as the sum of the edit distances
between the keys of aligned chunks and the sizes of the keys of unaligned chunk.
 Diff-like: The alignment minimizes the same cost function as the bush-like heuristic, but
does not consider alignments with “crossing” edges. This heuristic corresponds to the
longest common subsequence, so it can be implemented quite efàciently.
 Operation-based: The alignment is obtained from the actual update operation performed
to the view.
(Strictly speaking, the operation-based strategy is not an alignment function; we include it in
this list because alignments can also be provided to lenses directly.) These strategies are depicted
graphically in Figure 5.2, and the àrst three strategies are illustrated in the following examples:
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let l = key [A-Z] . del [0-9]
test <pos : l>*.put "BCA" into "A1B2C3" = "B1C2A3"
test <dif : l>*.put "BCA" into "A1B2C3" = "B2C3A0"
test <bsh : l>*.put "BCA" into "A1B2C3" = "B2C3A1"
To select a particular “species” to use to align chunks, programmers supply the appropriate tag
to the match combinator—e.g., the pos tag selects positional alignment, bsh uses bush-like, and
dif uses diff-like. When combined with key annotations, these species allow programmers to
specify many useful alignment policies.
Multiple Chunks
All of the resourceful lenses we have seen so far all have a single kind of chunk. However, it is
often convenient to deàne resourceful lenses that operate on several different kinds of chunks
where the alignment of different kinds of chunks is handled separately in the put direction. As
an example, consider the following deànition, which introduces a lens with two different kinds
of chunks identiàed by tags.
let INT : regexp = [0-9]+
let FLOAT : regexp = INT . "." . INT
let l1 : lens = key [A-Z] . ("=" . INT) <-> ":int"
let l2 : lens = key [A-Z] . ("=" . FLOAT) <-> ":float"
let l : lens = <tag "t1" : l1> | <tag "t2" : l2>
let k : lens = l . (copy "," . l)*
In the get direction, k takes a non-empty list of comma-separated chunks containing either an
letter and an integer or a letter and a áoating point number, copies the letter, deletes the number,
and inserts a string recording whether the chunk contained an integer or a áoat:
test k.get "A=1,A=1.0,B=2,B=0.5" = "A:int,A:float,B:int,B:float"
In the put direction, the tags t1 and t2 specify that the lens should handle integer and áoating
point chunks separately, even when their keys overlap. For example, if we reorder the chunks
so that all of the áoating point chunks come before the integer chunks
test k.put "A:float,B:float,A:int,B:int" into "A=1,A=1.0,B=2,B=0.5" =
"A=1.0,B=0.5,A=1,B=2"
the lens restores the numbers to each chunk. If we had deàned k using only one kind of chunk,
the behavior of put would be different, aligning chunks by key in the put direction but ignoring
the distinction between integer chunks and áoat chunks:
let l' : lens = < l1 | l2 >
let k' : lens = l' . (copy "," . l')*
test k'.put "A:float,B:float,A:int,B:int" into "A=1,A=1.0,B=2,B=0.5" =
"A=0.0,B=0.0,A=0,B=0"
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This results in integer chunks being matched up with áoat chunks (and vice versa), so instead of
numbers from the old source being restored to the new source, each of the new source chunks
are created with defaults.
Generalizing the type system to accommodate tags is straightforward: rather than having a
single basic lens in its type, each lens has a ànite map from tags to basic lenses in its type (i.e., a
lens for each tag). We change the typing rules for combinators such as union and concatenation,
to check that the maps for the sublenses agree on the basic lens on all tags where both maps
are deàned. Likewise, we generalize resources from ànite maps from locations to strings to
ànite maps from tags to maps from locations to strings. Finally, we compute alignments tag-
wise—i.e., for each tag, we use the alignment function corresponding to the species of the chunk
under that tag.
Thresholds
Some of the alignment strategies just discussed—in particular, set-like and diff-like—match up
chunks by minimizing the global cost of an alignment. These stratgies work well in cases where
the keys of chunks have been edited. However, in many situations, it is important to not match
up chunks that are “too different”, even if aligning those chunks contributes to the minimal
cost alignment. For example, in the following program, where the keys are three characters
long
let l : lens = key [A-Z]{3} . del [0-9]
test <bsh : l>*.put "DBDCCCAAA" into "AAA1BBB2CCC3" = "DBD2CCC3AAA1"
we might prefer to create the chunk for DBD rather than matching it up with the BBB2 source
chunk. Unfortunately, the bush-like heuristic does align these chunks because the cost of a
two-character edit is less than the cost of a newly created chunk. To achieve the behavior we
want, we tune the bush-like species with a threshold annotation, as illustrated in the following
example:
let l : lens = key [A-Z]{3} . del [0-9]
test <sim 50 : l>*.put "DBDCCCAAA" into "AAA1BBB2CCC3" = "DBD0CCC3AAA1"
The sim species takes an integer n as an argument. It behaves like bush-like, but only matches
chunks whose keys have not been edited by more than (100   n)%—e.g., the bsh species is
actually deàned as (sim 0). In this example, the lens does not align DBD with the BBB2 from
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the source because the view is more than 50% different. The diff-like species also supports
thresholds. Tuning alignment functions using thresholds controls the behavior of the heuristic,
and makes it more predictable—e.g., we often use it when we need to align totally unstructured
blocks of text.
5.5 Summary
Resourceful lenses extend the simple mechanisms of basic lenses with new constructs for han-
dling ordered data. These features make it possible to handle situations where the update to
the view involves a reordering. Semantically, we redesign the architecture of lenses to separate
the handling of rigidly ordered and reorderable data and we add new laws ensuring that the
components of lenses use alignment information correctly. This design allows us to instantiate
resourceful lenses with arbitrary alignment heuristics. Syntactically, we add a new combinator
for specifying the reorderable chunks in the source and view, we reinterpret each of our core
lens combinators as resourceful lenses, and we add new primitives for specifying and tuning
alignment policies.
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Chapter 6
Secure Lenses
“Whoever wishes to keep a secret must
hide the fact that he possesses one.”
—Johannes Wolfgang von Goethe
One of the primary uses of views in databases is as a mechanism for controlling access to sen-
sitive information. By forcing users to access data sources via a security view that only exposes
public information, data administrators ensure that secrets will not be leaked, even if the users
mishandle the view or are even malicious. Security views are a robust mechanism, making it
impossible for users to expose the source data hidden by the view,1 and they are áexible: since
they are implemented as arbitrary programs, they can be used to enforce extremely àne-grained
access control policies. However, they are not usually updatable—and for good reason! Prop-
agating updates to views made by untrusted users can, in general, alter the source, including
the parts that are hidden by the view.
This is a shame, since there are many applications in which having a mechanism for reliably
updating security views would be extremely useful. As an example, consider the Intellipedia
system, a collaborative data sharing system based on Wikipedia that is used by members of the
United States intelligence community. The data stored in Intellipedia is classiàed at the granu-
larity of whole documents, but many documents actually contain a mixture of highly classiàed
1Strictly speaking, the user of the view may still be able to gain some knowledge of the hidden parts of the source
by examining the view (Miklau and Suciu, 2007)—i.e., views do not provide privacy—but they cannot access any
of data hidden by the view directly.
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and less-classiàed data. In order to give users with low clearances access to the portions of
documents they have sufàcient clearance to see, documents often have to be regraded: i.e., the
highly classiàed parts need to be erased or redacted, leaving behind a residual document—a se-
curity view—that can be reclassiàed at a lower level of clearance. Of course (since it is a wiki),
we would like the users of these views to be able to make updates—e.g., to correct errors or
add new information—and have their changes be propagated back to the original document.
Unfortunately, all of the lenses we have described so far do not deal adequately with security
issues. The critical issue that they fail to address is that many of the natural ways of propagating
view updates back to sources alter the source data in ways that violate expectations about its
integrity. For example, in the Intellipedia application, the natural way to propagate the deletion
of a section of a regraded document would be to delete the corresponding section of the original
document. But while doing so faithfully reáects the edit made to the view—formally, it satisàes
the PG law—it is not necessarily what we want: if the section in the original document
contains additional classiàed data in nested subsections, then deleting the section is almost
surely unacceptable—users should not be able to delete data they do not even have sufàcient
clearance to see!
It is tempting to require that propagating updates to the view must not lose any hidden
source data—i.e., require that lenses obey the PP law. However, as discussed in Chapter 3,
requiring that every lens be very well behaved is a draconian restriction that rules out many
transformations needed in practice—e.g., union and Kleene star.
So, because we want to allow untrusted users to modify hidden source data through the
view, under certain circumstances, we need a simple, declarative way to specify which parts of
the source can be affected by view updates and which parts cannot. Developing a framework
in which it is possible to formulate integrity policies like “these sections in the source can be
deleted” or “these sections in the view must not be altered (because doing so would have an
unacceptable effect on the source),” and verify that lenses obey them, is the goal of this chapter.
Our solution is to develop a new semantic space of secure lenses, in which the types of
lenses not only describe the sets of structures manipulated by the components of lenses, but
also capture the notion that certain parts of the source and view represent endorsed data while
other parts may be tainted. Semantically, we model these types as sets of structures together
with equivalence relations identifying structures that agree on endorsed data. Syntactically,
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we describe them using security-annotated regular types—regular expressions decorated with
annotations drawn from a set of labels representing static levels of integrity. We formulate a
condition ensuring the integrity of source data by stipulating a non-interference property for
the put function as an additional behavioral law. This law ensures that if the update to the
view does not change high-integrity data in the view then the put function does not modify
high-integrity data in the source.
We then develop security-enhanced variants of each of our string lens combinators. These
typing rules for these combinators use an information-áow analysis to track dependencies be-
tween data in the source and view and ensure the new non-interference properties. There are
some interesting details compared to information-áow type systems for general-purpose lan-
guages, since regular expressions describe data schemas at a high level of precision.
Of course, conàdentiality is also interesting in the context of security views: the whole
reason for deàning the view is to hide certain parts of the source. None of the previous work on
security views has provided a way to formally and statically verify that the information hidden
by the view adheres to a declarative conàdentiality policy—the query itself is the policy. But,
having developed the technical machinery for tracking integrity, it is easy to extend it to track
conàdentiality as well, and we do so in our information-áow type system for Boomerang. Thus,
our actual type system tracks áows of information in two directions, ensuring conàdentiality
in the forward direction and integrity in the reverse direction.
Tracking information áow using a static type system yields an analysis that is effective but
conservative. For example, if the put component of a lens ever produces a tainted result, then
the type systemmust classify the source as tainted to ensure the secure lens properties. However,
very often there are many inputs that the put function can propagate without tainting the source.
In the ànal technical section of this chapter, we extend secure lenses with dynamic checks that
allow us to test for and detect these situations. These lenses use a combination of static types
and dynamic tests to establish the same essential security properties and, in many cases, can be
assigned more áexible types.
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
1. We develop a new semantic space of secure lenses that extends our previous work on
lenses with a type system ensuring the conàdentiality and integrity of data in the source.
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This provides a framework for building reliable and updatable security views.
2. We design the syntax and semantics of security-annotated regular expressions, which de-
scribe sets of strings as well as equivalence relations that encode conàdentiality and in-
tegrity policies.
3. We reinterpret each of our string lens combinators as secure lenses.
4. We present an extension to secure lenses that ensures the integrity of source data but
replaces some of the static constraints on lens types with dynamic tests.
6.1 Example
To warm up, let us examine a very small example—simpler than the Intellipedia application
discussed in the introduction, but still rich enough to raise the same essential issues. Suppose
that the source string is an electronic calendar in which certain appointments, indicated by “*”,
are intended to be private.
*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Beauty Shop Cafe)
10:00 Meeting with Brett (My office)
12:00 PLClub Seminar (Seminar room)
*15:00 Run (Fairmount Park)
Next, suppose that we want to compute a security view where some of the private data is hid-
den—e.g., perhaps we want to redact the descriptions of the private appointments by rewriting
them to BUSY and, at the same time, we also want to erase the location of every appointment.
08:30 BUSY
10:00 Meeting with Brett
12:00 PLClub Seminar
15:00 BUSY
Or, perhaps, we want to go a step further and erase private appointments completely.
10:00 Meeting with Brett
12:00 PLClub Seminar
In either case, having computed a security view, we might like to allow colleagues make changes
to the public version of our calendar to correct errors and make amendments. For example,
here the user of the view has corrected a misspelling by replacing “Brett” with “Brent” and
added a meeting with Michael at four o’clock.
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08:30 BUSY
10:00 Meeting with Brent
12:00 PLClub
15:00 BUSY
16:00 Meeting with Michael
The put function of the redacting lens combines this new view with the original source and
produces an updated source that reáects both changes:
*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Beauty Shop Cafe)
10:00 Meeting with Brent (My office)
12:00 PLClub (Seminar room)
*15:00 Run (Fairmount Park)
16:00 Meeting with Michael
Although this particular update was handled in a reasonable way, in general, propagating view
updates can violate expectations about the handling of hidden data in the source. For example,
if the user of the view deletes some appointments,
08:30 BUSY
10:00 Meeting with Brent
then the source will also be truncated (as it must, to satisfy the PG law):
*08:30 Coffee with Sara (Beauty Shop Cafe)
10:00 Meeting with Brent (My office)
From a certain perspective, this is correct—the updated view was obtained by deleting appoint-
ments, and the new source is obtained by deleting the corresponding appointments. But if the
owner of the source expects the lens to both hide the private data and maintain the integrity
of the hidden data, then it is unacceptable for the user of the view to cause some of the hidden
data—the description and location of the three o’clock appointment and the location of the
noon appointment—to be discarded.
A similar problem arises when the user of the view replaces a private entry with a public
one. Consider a private appointment in the source
*15:00 Run (Fairmount Park)
which maps via get to a view:
15:00 BUSY
If user of the view replaces it with a public appointment (here, they have insisted an important
event has precedence)
15:00 Distinguished Lecture
then the description (Run) and location (Fairmount Park) associated with the entry in the original
source are both lost.
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15:00 Distinguished Lecture
As these examples demonstrate, to manage security views using lenses reliably, we need mech-
anisms for tracking the integrity of source data.
Let us consider an attractive—but impossible—collection of guarantees we might like to
have. Ideally, the get function of the lens would hide the the descriptions of private appointments
as well as the location of every appointment, and the put function would take any updated view
and produce an updated source where all of this hidden data is preserved. Sadly, this is not
possible: we either need to allow the possibility that certain updates will cause hidden data to
be lost, or, if we insist that this cannot happen, then we need to prevent the user of the view from
making those updates—e.g., deleting entries and replacing private entries with public ones—in
the àrst place.
Both alternatives can be expressed using the secure lens framework developed in this chapter.
To illustrate these choices precisely, we need a few deànitions. The source and view types of the
redacting and erasing lenses are formed out of regular expressions that describe timestamps,
descriptions, and locations (along with a few predeàned regular expressions, NUMBER, COLON,
SPACE, etc.) deàned in Boomerang as follows:
let TIME : regexp =
NUMBER{2} . COLON . NUMBER{2} . SPACE
let DESC : regexp =
[^\n()]* - (ANY . BUSY . ANY)
let LOCATION : regexp =
(SPACE . LPAREN . [^()]* . RPAREN)?
To specify the policy that prevents the user from applying updates to the view that would cause
hidden data to be lost, we pick a type that marks some of the data as endorsed by decorating
the bare regular expressions with annotations. Here is a type in which the private appointments
are endorsed, as indicated by annotations of the form (R :E), but the public appointments are
tainted, as indicated by annotations of the form (R :T):
( (SPACETIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):T
j (ASTERISKTIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):E)
.
.()
((TIMEDESCNEWLINE):T j (TIMEBUSYNEWLINE):E)
As described in the next section, before the owner of the source data allows the user of the
view to propagate their updates back to the source using the put function, they check that the
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original and updated views agree on endorsed data. In this case, since the private appointments
are endorsed, they will refuse to propagate views where the private appointments have been
modiàed. (The public appointments, however, may be freely modiàed.)
Alternatively, to specify the policy that provides weaker guarantees about the integrity of source
data but allows more updates, we pick a type that labels both public and private appointments
as tainted:
((SPACETIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):T j (ASTERISKTIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):T)
.
.() (((TIMEDESCNEWLINE) j (TIMEBUSYNEWLINE)):T)
With this type, the user of the view may update the view however they like—the whole view is
tainted—but the lens does not guarantee the integrity of any appointments in the source. The
fact that the entire source may be tainted is reáected explicitly in its type.
Here is the Boomerang code that implements these lenses.
let public : lens =
del SPACE .
copy ( TIME . DESC ) .
del LOCATION .
copy NEWLINE
let private : lens =
del ASTERISK .
copy TIME .
( ( DESC . LOCATION ) <-> "BUSY" ) .
copy NEWLINE
let redact : lens =
public* . ( private . public* )*
let erase : lens =
filter (stype public) (stype private);
public*
Note that there are no security annotations in these programs—the current implementation
only tracks basic lens types, leaving security annotations to be checked by hand. Also, the put
functions of the lenses we consider here operate positionally—e.g., the put function of l splits
the source and view into substrings and applies l:put to pairs of these in order. We defer an
investigation of secure resourceful lenses to future work.
Here is an example of the sort of property we will be able to show using the secure lens
framework developed in this chapter:
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Public
Secret
Public
Trusted
Tainted
Trusted
Tainted
Secret
Figure 6.1: Non-interference in Secure Lenses
6.1.1 Lemma: The redact lens is a secure lens at the following type:
((SPACETIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):T j (ASTERISKTIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):E)
.
.() ((TIMEDESCNEWLINE):T j (TIMEBUSYNEWLINE):E)
6.2 Semantics
The basic lenses ensure some fundamental sanity conditions on the handling of data in the
source and view, but, as we saw in the preceding section, to uses lenses reliably in security
applications we need additional guarantees. In this section, we describe the reàned semantic
space of secure lenses. These lenses obey new behavioral laws—formulated as non-interference
conditions—stipulating that the put function must not taint endorsed (high integrity) source
data and the get function must not leak secret (high conàdentiality) data—see Figure 6.1.
LetP (for “privacy”) andQ (for “quality”) be lattices of security labels representing levels of
conàdentiality and integrity, respectively. To streamline the presentation, we will mostly work
with two-point lattices P = fP;Sg (for “public” and “secret”) with P v S and Q = fE;Tg
(for “endorsed” and “tainted”) with E v T.
..P =
.S
.P
..Q =
.T
.E
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(Although we call endorsed data “high integrity” informally, it is actually the least element
in Q. This is standard—intuitively, data that is higher in the lattice needs to be handled more
carefully while data that is lower in the lattice can be used more áexibly.) Our results generalize
to arbitrary ànite lattices in a straightforward way.
Fix sets S (of sources) and V (of views). To formalize notions like “these two sources contain
the same public information (but possibly differ on their private parts),” we will use equivalence
relations on S and V indexed by both lattices of security labels. Formally, let Sk  S  S and
Vk  V  V be families of equivalence relations indexed by security labels in P , and let
Sk  S  S and Vk  V  V be families of equivalence relations indexed by labels in Q. In
what follows, when S and V are clear from context, we will suppress the superscripts to lighten
the notation. Typically, S and T will be equality, while P and E will be coarser relations
that identify sources and views containing the same public and endorsed parts, respectively.
These equivalences capture conàdentiality and integrity policies for the data.
6.2.1 Deànition [Secure Lens]: A secure lens l has the same components as a basic lens
l:get 2 S ! V
l:put 2 V ! S ! S
l:create 2 V ! S
that obey the following laws for every s in S, v in V , and k in Q or P as appropriate:
l:get (l:put v s) = v (PG)
l:get (l:create v) = v (CG)
v k l:get s
l:put v s k s
(GP)
s k s0
l:get s k l:get s0
(GNL)
The PG and CG laws here are identical to the basic lens version that we saw in
Chapter 3 and express the same fundamental constraint: updates to views must be translated
exactly.
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The GP law for secure lenses, however, is different. It ensures the integrity of source
data, expressed as a non-interference condition on the put function. Formally, it requires that if
the original view (i.e., the one computed from the original source) and the new view are related
by k, then the original source and the updated source computed by put must also be related
by k. For example, if the original and new view are related by E—i.e., they agree on the
endorsed data—then GP guarantees that the new source will also agree with the original
source on endorsed data. Note that we recover the basic lens law GP when k is equality,
as it typically is for T.
The GP law suggests a protocol for using secure lenses: before the owner of the source
allows the user of a view to invoke the put function, they check that the original and updated
views are related by k for every k that is lower in Q than the data the user is allowed to
edit—e.g., in the two-point lattice, a user whose edits are considered tainted would have the
checks performed using E. The owner of the source only performs the put if the test succeeds.
Secure lenses obey a variant of the PP law capturing a notion of lenses that are very
well behaved on endorsed data:
6.2.2 Lemma: Secure lenses admit the following inference rule:
v0 k l:get s k v
l:put v0 (l:put v s) k l:put v0 s
(PPE)
If k is equality (as it typically is for T) then PPE reduces to the GP law:
it says that applying put (twice) to the view obtained by invoking get on the source yields the
original source (both times). If, however, k relates strings that agree on endorsed data (as
it typically does for E) then PPE implies that put must preserve the endorsed
hidden data in the source. This law allows operators such as conditional and iteration whose
put functions do sometimes discard hidden source data in the reverse direction, and are therefore
not very well behaved lenses in the strict sense, as long as they indicate that they do so in their
type, by marking the source data that may be discarded as tainted.
Our main concern in this chapter is preserving integrity after updates, but it is worth notic-
ing that we can also tell an improved story about conàdentiality. In previous work on (non-
updatable) security views, the conàdentiality policy enforced by the view is not stated explic-
itly—the private information in the source is simply “whatever information is projected away
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in the view.” Our security lenses, on the other hand, have an explicit representation of con-
àdentiality policies, embodied in the choice of equivalence relations. Thus, we can add the
GNL law stipulating that the get function must not leak conàdential source informa-
tion source. This law is formulated as a non-interference condition stating that, if two sources
are related by k, then the results computed by get must also be related by k. For example,
whenP relates two sources, GNL ensures that the views computed from those sources
also agree on public data. Secure lenses provide a conàdentiality guarantee that can be under-
stood without having to look at the lens program.2 In the next section, we present a declarative
language for security annotations that can be used to describe many such equivalences.
6.3 Annotated Regular Expressions
The types of our secure string lens combinators are regular expressions annotated with labels
drawn from the two lattices of security labels. In this section, we deàne the precise syntax and
semantics of these annotated regular expressions.
Let K = (K;v) be a ànite lattice. To streamline the notation, we will describe annotations
from just one lattice of labels. Later, when we use these annotated regular expressions to denote
the types of secure string lenses, we’ll decorate them with labels from both P and Q. When we
calculate the semantics of a type—in particular, the equivalence relations it denotes—we will
consider each lattice separately, ignoring the labels in the other lattice.
6.3.1 Deànition [Security-Annotated Regular Expression]: The set of security-annotated regular
expressions over  and K is the smallest set generated by the following grammar
R ::= ; j u j RR j R jR j R j R :k
where u 2  and k 2 K.
Every security-annotated expression can be interpreted in two ways:
 As a regular language L(R), deàned in the usual way (after ignoring annotations).
2We treat conàdentiality and integrity as orthogonal—almost, see Section 6.5—so users can also choose SP to
be equality and our laws place no constraints on conàdentiality. This yields the same story as in previous systems,
where “what the view hides” is read off from the view deànition.
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 As a family of equivalence relations k (L(R)  L(R)) capturing the intuitive notion
that two strings differing only in high-security regions cannot be distinguished by a low-
security observer.
To lighten the notation, when it is clear from context we will often conáate R and L(R)—e.g.,
we will write u 2 R instead of u 2 L(R).
In many languages with security-annotated types, the type structure of the language is rela-
tively simple and so the deànition of the “observability relations” is straightforward. However,
annotated regular expressions have features like non-disjoint unions that make the intended se-
mantics less obvious—indeed, there seem to be several reasonable alternatives. We describe here
a simple semantics based on a notion of erasing inaccessible substrings that we ànd natural and
discuss alternatives toward the end of the section.
Formally, we deàne the equivalence relations using a function that erases substrings that are
inaccessible to a k-observer, and we take a pair of strings to be equivalent if their erased versions
are identical. For ease of exposition, we will describe the erasing function as the composition
of two functions: one that marks the inaccessible regions of a string and another that erases
marked regions. Let# be a fresh symbol, hash(R) the function that transforms strings in L(R)
by rewriting every character to #,
hash(R)(u) , #   #| {z }
juj times
and mark(R; k) a relation that marks inaccessible characters:
mark(;; k) , fg
mark(u; k) , f(u; u)g
mark(R1R2; k) , mark(R1; k)mark(R2; k)
mark(R1 jR2; k) , mark(R1; k) & (L(R1)   L(R2))
[ mark(R2; k) & (L(R2)   L(R1))
[ mark(R1; k) & mark(R2; k)
mark(R1; k) , mark(R1; k)
mark(R1:j; k) ,
8><>:
mark(R1; k) if k w j
hash(R1) otherwise
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The deànition ofmark uses the operations of union, concatenation, and iteration, which we lift
to relations in the obvious way. The most interesting case is for union. In general, the languages
denoted by a pair of annotated regular expressions can overlap, so we need to specify how to
mark strings that are described by both expressions as well as strings that are only described by
one of the expressions. There are three cases: To handle the strings described by only one of
the expressions, we use an intersection operator that restricts a marking relation Q to a regular
language L:
Q & L , f(u; v) j (u; v) 2 Q ^ u 2 Lg
To handle strings described by both expressions, we use an intersection operator that merges
markings
Q1 & Q2 , f(u;merge(v1; v2)) j (u; vi) 2 Qig;
where:
merge(; ) = 
merge(#v1; v2) = #merge(v1; v2)
merge( v1;#v2) = #merge(v1; v2)
merge(cv1; cv2) = cmerge(v1; v2):
The effect is that characters marked by either relation are marked in the result.
Although mark is a relation in general, we are actually interested in cases where it is a
function. Unfortunately, the operations of concatenation, and iteration used in the deànition
ofmark do not yield a function in general due to ambiguity. We therefore impose the following
condition:
6.3.2 Deànition [Well-Formed Security-Annotated Regular Expression]: R is well formed iff ev-
ery subexpression of the form R1R2 is unambiguously concatenable (L(R1)!L(R2)) and every
subexpression of the form R is unambiguously iterable (L(R)!).
6.3.3 Proposition: If R is well formed, then mark(R; k) is a function.
In what follows, we will tacitly assume that all annotated expressions under discussion are well
formed. (And when we deàne typing rules for our secure lens combinators, below, we will be
careful to ensure well-formedness.)
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Let erase be the function on ( [ f#g) that copies characters in  and erases # symbols.
We deàne k as the relation induced by marking and then erasing:
hidek(u) , erase(mark(R; k)(u))
k , f(u; v) j hidek(u) = hidek(v)g
It is easy to see that k is an equivalence relation.
6.3.4 Lemma: Let R1 and R2 be well-formed annotated regular expressions over a ànite lattice
K. It is decidable whether R1 and R2 are equivalent.
Proof sketch: Equivalence for the regular languagesL(R1) andL(R2) is straightforward. More-
over, each relation k is induced by hidek(), which is deànable as a rational function—a class
for which equivalence is decidable (Berstel, 1979, Chapter IV, Corollary 1.3). 
As examples to illustrate the semantics, consider a two-point lattice (fP;Sg;v) with P v S,
and take R1 to be the annotated expression [a-z]:S. Then for every string u in L(R1) we have
mark(R1;P)(u) = #, and so hideP(u) = , and P is the total relation. For the annotated
relation R1, the equivalence P is again the total relation because every u in L(R1) maps to
a sequence of # symbols by mark(R1;P), and so hideP(u) = . More interestingly, for R2
deàned as
([a-z]:P)([0-4]:S) j ([a-z]:P)([5-9]:S);
and any string cn in L(R2) we have mark(R2;P)(cn) = c# and so hideP(cn) = c. It follows
that cn P c0n0 iff c = c0. Finally, for R2 the equivalence P identiàes (c1n1    cini) and
(d1m1    dj mj) iff i = j and ci = di for i from 1 to n.
As we remarked above, there are other reasonable ways to deàne k. For example, in-
stead of marking and erasing, we could instead composemark with a function that compresses
sequences of # symbols into a single #. The equivalence induced by this function would al-
low low-security observers to determine the presence and location of high-security data, but
would obscure its content. We could even take the equivalence induced by the mark function
itself! This semantics would reveal the presence, location, and length of high-security data to
low-security observers. There may well be scenarios where one of these alternative semantics
more accurately models the capabilities of low-security observers. For simplicity, we will use
the erasing semantics in the rest of this chapter.
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6.4 Secure Lens Combinators
Having identiàed the semantic space of secure lenses and deàned the syntax and semantics of
annotated regular expressions, we now turn to syntax, developing deàning secure versions of
our core set of lens combinators. The functional components of these secure lenses are identical
to their basic lens versions, but their typing rules are enhancedwith an information-áow analysis
that guarantees the secure lens laws.
Copy The simplest lens, copy E, takes a well-formed annotated regular expression as an
argument. It copies strings belonging to E in both directions.
.
.
. E well-formed
copy E 2 E ..() E
.get s = sput v s = v
create v= v
6.4.1 Lemma: LetE 2 R be a security-annotated regular expression. Then (copy E) is a secure
lens in E ..() E.
The (copy E) lens trivially obeys the secure lens laws because the equivalence relations for
conàdentiality and integrity are identical for the source and view.
Const The const lens takes as arguments two well-formed annotated regular expressions E
and F , with F a singleton. It maps every source string in E to the unique element of F in the
get direction, and restores the discarded source string in the reverse direction.
.
.
.E;F well-formed jL(F )j = 1
const E F 2 E ..() F
.get s = representative(F )put v s = s
create v= representative(E)
6.4.2 Lemma: Let E and F be well-formed security-annotated regular expressions such that
jL(F )j = 1. Then (const E F ) is a secure lens in E ..() F .
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Typically F will just be a bare string u, but occasionally it will be useful to decorate it with
integrity labels (e.g., see the discussion following the union combinator below). The typing rule
for const places no additional labels on the source and view types. This is safe: the get function
maps every string in E to representative(F ), so GNL holds trivially. The put restores
the source exactly—including any high-integrity data—so GP also holds trivially.
Union The union combinator uses some new notation, which is explained below.
.
.
.
(S1 \ S2) = ;
l1 2 S1 ..() V1 l2 2 S2 ..() V2
q =
Wfk j k min obs. V1 6= V2 ^ V1 & V2 agreeg
p =
Wfk j k min obs. (S1 \ S2) = ;g
l1 j l2 2 (S1 jS2):q ..() (V1 jV2):p
.
get s =
(
l1:get s if s 2 S1
l2:get s if s 2 S2
put v s =
8>>>><>>>>:
l1:put v s if s 2 S1 ^ v 2 V1
l2:put v s if s 2 S2 ^ v 2 V2
l1:create v if s 2 S2 ^ v 2 (V1   V2)
l2:create v if s 2 S1 ^ v 2 (V2   V1)
create v=
(
l1:create v if v 2 V1
l2:create v if v 2 (V2   V1)
6.4.3 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 ..() V1 and l2 2 S2 ..() V2 be secure lenses such that (S1\S2) = ;.
Then (l1 j l2) is a secure lens in (S1 jS2): q ..() (V1 jV2): p where q =
Wfk j k min obs. V1 6=
V2 ^ V1 & V2 agreeg and p =
Wfk j k min obs. (S1 \ S2) = ;g.
Like the basic lens version, the union lens uses a membership test on the source string to select
a lens in the get direction. As is usual with conditionals, the typing rule for union needs to
be designed carefully to take implicit áows of conàdential information into account. As an
example illustrating why, consider the union of the following two lenses:
l1 , [0-4]:S$ A 2 ([0-4]:S) ..() A
l2 , [5-9]:S$ B 2 ([5-9]:S) ..() B
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We might be tempted to assign it the type obtained by taking the unions of the source and view
types of the smaller lenses:
(l1 j l2) 2 ([0-4]:S j [5-9]:S) ..() (A j B)
But this would be wrong: the get function leaks information about which branch was selected,
as demonstrated by the following counterexample to GNL. By the semantics of anno-
tated regular expressions, we have 0 P 5, since hideP maps both to the empty string. But:
(l1 j l2):get 0 = A 6P B = (l1 j l2):get 5
Most languages with information-áow type systems deal with these implicit áows by raising the
security level of the result. Formally, they escalate the label on the type of the result by joining
it with the label of the data used in the conditional test. Our typing rule for the union lens is
based on this idea, although the computation of the label is somewhat complicated because the
conditional test is membership in S1 or S2, so “the label of the data used in the conditional test”
is the least label that can distinguish strings in S1 from those in S2. Returning to our example
with (l1 j l2) and the two-point lattice, S is the only such label, so we label the entire view as
secret.
For annotated regular expressions, we can decide whether a given label distinguishes strings
in S1 from those in S2, and so we can compute the least such label (as P is ànite). Let k be a
label in P . We say that k observes (S1 \ S2) = ; iff for every string s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2 we
have s1 6k s2. Note that k observes (S1 \ S2) = ; iff the codomains of the rational function
hidek() for S1 and S2 are disjoint. As the codomain of a rational function is computable and a
regular language, we can decide whether k observes the disjointness of S1 and S2. In a general
lattice there may be several labels that observe the disjointness of S1 and S2. The label p we
compute for the view type is the join of the set of minimal labels that observe their disjointness.
In the put direction, the union lens selects a lens using membership tests on the source and
the view (the test on the view takes priority, with the test on the source breaking ties). Here
we need to consider the integrity of the source data, since modifying the view can result in l2
being used for the put function even though l1’s get function was used to generate the original
view, or vice versa. To safely handle these situations, we need to treat the source string as more
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tainted. For example, consider the union of:
l1 , (del [0-4]:E)(copy [A-Q]:T)
2 ([0-4]:E[A-Q]:T) ..() ([A-Q]:T)
l2 , (del [5-9]:E)(copy [F-Z]:T)
2 ([5-9]:E[F-Z]:T) ..() ([F-Z]:T)
This lens does not have secure lens type obtained by taking the union of the source and view
types
(l1 j l2) 2 ([0-4]:E[A-Q]:T) j ([5-9]:E[F-Z]:T)
.
.() ([A-Q]:T j [F-Z]:T)
because the put function sometimes fails to maintain the integrity of the number in the source,
as demonstrated by the following counterexample to GP. By the semantics of annotated
regular expressions, we have Z E A, since hideE maps both to the empty string. But
(l1 j l2):put Z 0A = 5Z 6E 0A
To obtain a sound typing rule for union, we need to raise the integrity label on the source—i.e.,
consider the source more tainted. We do this by annotating the source type with the least label
q such that we can transform a string belonging to (V1   V2) to a string belonging to V2 (or
vice versa) by modifying q-tainted data.
Formally, we compute q as the join of the minimal set of labels in Q that observe that V1
and V2 are not identical—e.g., for the lens above, T. For technical reasons—to ensure that
v 2 V1 and s 2 S1 and v (S1 jS2)k (l1 j l2):get s implies v S1k l1:get s—we also require that q
observe that V1 and V2 denote the same equivalence relations on strings in their intersection; we
write this condition as “V1 & V2 agree.” Both of these properties can be decided for annotated
regular expressions using elementary constructions.
An important special case arises when V1 and V2 coincide. Then, since both lenses are
capable of handling the entire view type, the same lens is always selected for put as was selected
for get. For example, the union of
l1 , (del [0-4]:E)(copy [A-Z]:T) 2 ([0-4]:E[A-Z]:T) ..() ([A-Z]:T)
l2 , (del [5-9]:E)(copy [A-Z]:T) 2 ([5-9]:E[A-Z]:T) ..() ([A-Z]:T)
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does have the type:
([0-4]:E[A-Z]:T) j ([5-9]:E[A-Z]:T) ..() [A-Z]:T
Our typing rule captures this case: if V1 = V2 then q is the join of the empty set, which is the
minimal element E. Annotating with E, the least element in Q, is semantically equivalent to
having no annotation at all.
Concatenation Somewhat surprisingly, the concatenation lens also has an interesting typing
rule as a secure lens.
.
. .
l1 2 S1 ..() V1 S1!S2
l2 2 S2 ..() V2 V1!V2
q =
Wfk j k min obs. V1!V2g
p =
Wfk j k min obs. S1!S2g
l1l2 2 (S1S2):q ..() (V1V2):p
.get (s1s2) = (l1:get s1)(l2:get s2)put (v1v2) (s1s2)= (l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s2)
create (v1v2) = (l1:create v1)(l2:create v2)
6.4.4 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 ..() V1 and l2 2 S2 ..() V2 such that S1!S2 and V1!V2. Then
(l1l2) is a secure lens in (S1S2): q ..() (V1V2): p where q =
Wfk j k min obs. V1!V2g and
p =
Wfk j k min obs. S1!S2g.
As with the union lens, the typing rule for concatenation also needs to be designed carefully to
take implicit áows of information into account. Here the implicit áows stem from the way that
the concatenation operator splits strings. As an example, consider a lens l1 that maps a0 to A
and a1 to a, and a lens l2 that maps b0 to B and b1 to b, where all of the source data is private
except for the 1, which is public:
l1 , ((a:S)(1:P)$ A) j ((a:S)(0:S)$ a) 2 (a:S(0:S j 1:P)) ..() (A j a)
l2 , ((b:S)(1:P)$ B) j ((b:S)(0:S)$ b) 2 (b:S(0:S j 1:P)) ..() (B j b)
The concatenation of l1 and l2 does not have the type obtained by concatenating their source
and view types,
l1l2 2 ((a:S(0:S j 1:P))(b:S(0:S j 1:P))) ..() ((A j a)(B j b));
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because the get function exposes the way that the source string was split, as demonstrated by a
counterexample to GNL:
a1b0 P a0b1
but (l1l2):get a1b0 = Ab 6P aB = (l1l2):get a0b1:
As with union, we deal with this implicit áow of information by raising the conàdentiality
level of the data in the view, annotating the view type with the least label that observes the
unambiguous concatenability of the source types.
Formally, we say k observes (S1!S2) iff for every s1s2 and s01s02 2 S1S2 with s1s2 k s01s02
we have s1k s01 and s2 k s02. We can effectively compute whether a given label observes
the unambiguous concatenability of two annotated regular expressions using an elementary
construction.
In the reverse direction, the concatenation lens splits the source and view strings in two,
applies the put components of l1 and l2 to the corresponding pieces of each, and concatenates
the results. An analogous problem now arises with integrity, so we escalate the label on the
source type with the least label that observes the unambiguous concatenability of the view
types.
Kleene Star The Kleene star lens is similar to concatenation.
.
.
.
l 2 S ..() V S! V !
q =
W fk j k min obs. V !g
p =
W fk j k min obs. S!g
l 2 (S):q ..() (V ):p
.
get (s1    sn) = (l:get s1)    (l:get sn)
put (v1    vn) (s1    sm)= s01    s0n
where s0i =

l:put vi si i 2 f1; : : : ;min(m;n)g
l:create vi i 2 fm+ 1; : : : ; ng
create (v1    vn) = (l:create v1)    (l:create vn)
6.4.5 Lemma: Let l 2 S ..() V be a secure lens such that S! and V !. Then l is a secure lens
in (S):q ..() (V ):p where q = W fk j k min obs. V !g and p = W fk j k min obs. S!g.
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As with union and concatenation, we need to escalate the conàdentiality label on the view side
and the integrity label on the source side. To see why, consider the following lens:
l , A:S$ B:P 2 A:S ..() B:P
It is not the case that
l 2 (A:S) ..() (B:P);
as demonstrated by the following counterexample to GNL:
AAA P AA
but l:get AAA = BBB 6P BB = l:get BB:
The problem is that get leaks the length of the source string, which is secret. Thus, we need to
escalate the conàdentiality label on the view type by the least label observing the unambiguous
iterability of the source type.
Likewise, if we consider integrity, it is not the case that the iteration of
l , [0-9]:E$ A:T 2 [0-9]:E ..() A:T
has type
l 2 ([0-9]:E) ..() (A:T);
as demonstrated by the following counterexample to GP:
A E AAA = l:get 123
but l:put A 123 = 1 6E 123:
Here the problem is that the update shortens the length of the view, which causes the iteration
operator to discard endorsed data in the source. Thus, we need to escalate the integrity label
by the join of the minimal label that observes the unambiguous iterability of V . These labels
can be computed from annotated regular expressions using elementary constructions.
Sequential Composition The sequential composition lens has a straightforward type.
.
.
.l1 2 S
.
.() T l2 2 T ..() V
l1;l2 2 S ..() V
.get s = l2:get (l1:get s)put v s = l1:put (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s
create v= l1:create (l2:create v)
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6.4.6 Lemma: Let l1 2 S ..() T and l2 2 T ..() V be secure lenses. Then (l1;l2) is a secure
lens in S ..() V .
It requires that the view type of the àrst lens and the source type of the second be identical. As
is usual for composition, this is essential for ensuring the secure lens laws.
Filter The secure version of the àlter lens allows us to hide information in a list of source
items.
.
.
.
E;F well-formed (L(E) \ L(F )) = ; (L(E) j L(F ))!
q =
W fk j k min obs. E!g
p w Wfk j k observes E!F and F !Eg
àlter E F 2 (E:q jF :p) ..() E
.get (s1    sn) = string lter E (s1    sn)put (v1    vn) (s1    sm)= string unlter F (v1    vn) (s1    sm)
create (v1    vn) = (v1    vn)
6.4.7 Lemma: Let E and F be well-formed security-annotated regular expressions such that
(L(E)\L(F )) = ; and (L(E) j L(F ))!. Then (àlter E F ) is a secure lens in (E:q jF:p) ..()
E where q = W fk j k min obs. E!g and p w Wfk j k observes E!F and F !Eg.
The typing rule for àlter captures the fact that none of the F s are leaked to the view, and so
the F s in the source can be assigned any conàdentiality label (that observes the unambiguous
concatenability of Es and F s). Since observers with clearance lower than p cannot distinguish
source strings that differ only in the F s, it is simple to show GNL: two source strings
are related by P exactly when their àlterings—i.e., the views computed by get—are related by
P. In the reverse direction, we need to escalate the integrity label on the Es by the join of
the minimal labels observing that E is unambiguously iterable. However, the F s are restored
exactly, so their integrity level does not need to be escalated.
Subsumption Secure lenses admit a rule of subsumption that allows us to escalate the integrity
level on the source and the conàdentiality level on the view.
..l 2 S
.
.() V q 2 Q p 2 P
l 2 (S:q) ..() (V :p)
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6.4.8 Lemma: Let l 2 S ..() V be a secure lens and let q 2 Q and p 2 P be labels. Then l is
also a secure lens in (S:q) ..() (V :p).
It may seem silly to escalate labels arbitrarily, but it is occasionally useful—e.g., to make the
types agree when forming the sequential composition of two lenses.
6.5 Dynamic Secure Lenses
Using the static type system to track tainted source data is effective, but conservative—it forces
us to label source data as tainted if the put function ever produces a tainted result, even if there
are many inputs for which it does not. In this section, we explore the idea of augmenting lenses
with dynamic tests to check whether put can preserve the integrity of the endorsed data in the
source for a particular view and source. This generalization makes it possible for lenses to make
very àne-grained decisions about which views to accept and which to reject, and allows us to
assign relaxed types to many of our lens primitives while still retaining strong guarantees about
integrity.
At the same time that we extend lenses with these dynamic tests, we also address a subtle
interaction between conàdentiality and integrity that we have ignored thus far. In the preceding
sections, we have assumed that the conàdentiality and integrity annotations are completely
orthogonal—the semantics of types treats them as independent, and each behavioral law only
mentions a single kind of label. However, the protocol for propagating updates to views, in
which the owner of the source data tests whether the original and updated views agree on
endorsed data, can reveal information—possibly conàdential—about the source to the user of
the view. In this section, we eliminate the possibility of such leaks by adding a new behavioral
law requiring that testing whether a given view can be handled (now using arbitrary dynamic
tests) must not leak conàdential information. (An analogous àx can be made in the purely static
type system described in the preceding section by placing extra constraints on the equivalence
relations denoted by security-annotated expressions.)
Formally, we let C  P  Q be a set of clearances. A user with clearance (j; k) is allowed
to access data at conàdentiality level j and modify data tainted at integrity level k. We extend
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lenses with a new function
l:safe 2 C ! L(V )! L(S)! B
that returns > iff a user with clearance (j; k) can safely put a particular view and source back
together. We replace the hypothesis that v k s in the GP law with safe, requiring, for all
(j; k) 2 C and s 2 S and v 2 V that
l:safe (j; k) v s
l:put v s k s
(GP)
and we revise the protocol for propagating updates to the view accordingly: before allowing
the user of a view to invoke put, the owner of the source checks that the original and updated
views are safe for the user’s clearance.
As discussed above, these safe functions, which are arbitrary functions, can reveal infor-
mation about source data. We therefore add a new law stipulating that safe must not reveal
conàdential data, formulated as a non-interference property for every (j; k) 2 C, every s; s0 2 S,
and v; v0 2 V :
v j v0 s j s0
l:safe (j; k) v s = l:safe (j; k) v0 s0
(SNL)
For technical reasons—to prove that the safe component of the sequential composition operator,
which is deàned in terms of the put function of one of its sublenses, satisàes SNL—we
also need a law stipulating that the put function must be non-interfering for all (j; k) 2 C and
for all s; s0 2 S and v; v0 2 V :
v j v0 s j s0
l:safe (j; k) v s l:safe (j; k) v s0
l:put v s j l:put v0 s0
(PNL)
With these reànements, we can now present revised versions of each of our secure string lens
combinators.
Copy For copy the safe function checks that the new view and original source agree on k-
trusted data.
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.
.
.
E well-formed 8 (j; k) 2 C: j  k
copy E 2 E ..() E
.safe (j; k) v s = v k s
6.5.1 Lemma: Let E be a well-formed security-annotated regular expression. Then (copy E) is
a secure lens in E ..() E.
To ensure that safe does not leak information, we add a hypothesis to the typing rule requiring
that j must reàne k for every (j; k) 2 C. This condition captures the essential interaction
between the conàdentiality and integrity lattices.
Const For const, the view type is a singleton, so there is only one possible update—a no-op.
Hence, we choose a safe function that always returns true.
.
.
.E;F well-formed jL(F )j = 1
const E F d 2 E ..() F
.safe (j; k) v s = >
6.5.2 Lemma: Let E and F be well-formed security-annotated regular expressions such that
jL(F )j = 1. Then (const E F ) is a secure lens in E ..() F .
Concatenation For the concatenation lens, we choose a safe function that tests if the unique
substrings of the source and view are safe for l1 and l2. It also checks whether j observes the
unambiguous concatenability of the source and view types—this is needed to prove PNL
and SNL.
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..
.
l1 2 S1 ..() V1 S1!S2
l2 2 S2 ..() V2 V1!S2
p =
Wfk j k min obs. S1!S2g
l1l2 2 (S1S2) ..() (V1V2):p
.safe (j; k) v1:v2 s1:s2 =
j observes S1!S2 and V1!V2
^ l1:safe (j; k) v1 s1 ^ l2:safe (j; k) v2 s2)
6.5.3 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 ..() V1 and l2 2 S2 ..() V2 such that S1!S2 and V1!V2. Then
(l1l2) is a secure lens in (S1S2) ..() (V1V2):p where p =
Wfk j k min obs. S1!S2g.
Union For the union lens, the safe function tests whether the source and view can be processed
by the same sublens. (Additionally, because safe can be used to determine whether the source
came from S1 or S2, it only returns true if j observes their disjointness and if V1 and V2 agree
in their intersection.)
.
.
.
(S1 \ S2) = ;
l1 2 S1 ..() V1 l2 2 S2 ..() V2
p =
Wfk j k min obs. (S1 \ S2) = ;g
l1 j l2 2 (S1 jS2) ..() (V1 jV2):p
.
safe (j; k) v s=
j observes (S1 \ S2) = ; and V1 & V2 agree
V8><>:
l1:safe (j; k) v s if v 2 V1 ^ s 2 S1
l2:safe (j; k) v s if v 2 V2 ^ s 2 S2
? otherwise
6.5.4 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 ..() V1 and l2 2 S2 ..() V2 be secure lenses such that (L(S1) \
L(S2)) = ;. Then (l1 j l2) is a secure lens in (S1 jS2) ..() (V1 jV2):p where
p =
_
fk j k min obs. (S1 \ S2) = ;g:
Kleene Star For the Kleene star lens, safe checks that the view is the same length as the one
generated from the source. Because safe can be used to determine the length of the source, we
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require that j observe the unambiguous concatenability of S and V (which implies that j can
distinguish strings of different lengths).
.
.
.
l 2 S ..() V
p =
W fk j k min obs. S!g
l 2 S ..() (V ):p
.safe (j; k) (v1    vn) (s1    sm) =
j observes S! and V !
^n = m ^ l:safe (j; k) vi si for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
6.5.5 Lemma: Let l 2 S ..() V be a secure lens such that S! and V !. Then l is a secure lens
in (S) ..() (V ):p where p = W fk j k min obs. S!g.
Sequential Composition For sequential composition, the safe function requires the conditions
implied by l1’s safe function on the intermediate view computed by l2’s put on the view and the
original source.
.
.
.l1 2 S
.
.() T l2 2 T ..() V
l1; l2 2 S ..() V
.safe (j; k) s v = l1:safe (j; k) (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s
6.5.6 Lemma: Let l1 2 S ..() T and l2 2 T ..() V be secure lenses. Then (l1;l2) is a secure
lens in S ..() V .
Note that the composition operator is the reason we need the PNL law and that
SNL needs to require that safe be non-interfering in both its source and view argu-
ments (rather than just its source argument). We could relax these conditions by only requiring
PNL of lenses used as the second argument to a composition operator and the full ver-
sion of SNL of lenses used as the àrst argument. This would give us yet more áexibility
in designing safe functions (at the cost of complicating the type system since we would need to
track several different kinds of lens types). We defer this extension to future work.
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Filter Finally, the safe function for the àlter lens checks that the new view and àltered source
agree on k-endorsed data. Additionally, to ensure that safe does not leak information about the
source, safe also checks that j observes the way the way that Es and F s are split in the source,
as well as the unambiguous iterability of E.
.
.
.
E;F well-formed L(E) \ L(F ) = ; (L(E) j L(F ))!
p w Wfk j k observes E!F and F !Eg
8 (j; k) 2 C: Ej  Ek
àlter E F 2 (E jF :p) ..() E
.safe (j; k) (v1    vn) (s1    sm) =
j observes E!F and F !E ^ j and k observe E!
^ (v1    vn) k (string lter E (s1    sm))
6.5.7 Lemma: Let E and F be well-formed security-annotated regular expressions such that
(L(E)\L(F )) = ; and (L(E) j L(F ))!. Then (àlterE F ) is a secure lens in (E jF:p) ..() E
where p w Wfk j k observes E!F and F !Eg.
The revised lens deànitions in this section illustrate how dynamic tests can be incorporated
into the secure lens framework, providing àne-grained mechanisms for updating security views
and relaxed types for many of our secure string lens combinators. However, they represent just
one point in a large design space. We can imagine wanting to equip lenses with several differ-
ent safe functions—e.g., some accepting more views but offering weaker guarantees about the
integrity of source data, and others that accept fewer views but offer correspondingly stronger
guarantees. It would be interesting investigate the tradeoffs along these axes in the future.
6.6 Summary
Secure lenses provide a powerful mechanism for doing àne-grained data sharing across trust
boundaries. The views built using secure lenses are robust, since they make it impossible to
leak source information hidden by the view, and reliable, since they come equipped with strong
integrity guarantees.
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Chapter 7
Boomerang
“Purely applicative languages are poorly applicable.”
—Alan J. Perlis
Our technical development in the preceding chapters has focused exclusively on the syntax and
semantics of core set of string lens combinators. These combinators are powerful enough to
express a large class of useful transformations, but they are not very good tools for programming
in the large—i.e., writing substantial lens programs only using low-level combinators would be
extremely tedious. We don’t do this. Instead, we have embedded the lens combinators into a
full-blown programming language called Boomerang. This chapter highlights the main features
of Boomerang, focusing on high-level syntax, typechecking, and engineering issues.
7.1 Syntax
The most critical needs in a language for writing large lens programs are abstraction facili-
ties—i.e., mechanisms for factoring out common patterns into generic deànitions, assigning
intuitive names to the various components of the program, and so on. Boomerang is organized
as a functional language, so it comes equipped with rich mechanisms for programming with
lenses.
More concretely, Boomerang is based on the polymorphic -calculus, also called System
F (Girard, 1972; Reynolds, 1974), extended with subtyping, dependent types, and reànement
types. Figure 7.1 presents the core syntax of the language. Since the language is based on a
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..
m ::= module x = d Modules
d ::= Declarations
type 0a x = (| x of t)+ type
j let p : t = e let
j test e = e unit test
j test e : t type test
t ::= Types
forall 0a => t universal
j 0a variable
j x:t -> t dependent function
j (x:t where t) reànement
j t * t product
j t X data
j unit j int j bool j char j string j regexp j canonizer j lens base
e ::= Expressions
x variable
j k constant
j fun (x:t) : t -> e function
j e e application
j fun 0a -> e type function
j e{e} type application
j let p : t = e in e let
j match e with (| p -> e) + : t case
j e,e pair
j < (e:)? e > match
j e o e? operator
p ::= _ j x j k j p,p j X p Patterns
k ::= 'c' j "s" j n j b j () j [^?c-c] Constants
o ::= <-> j | j . j ~ j * j + j ? j {n,n?} j ; j & j - j && j || j < j > j <= j >= Operators
Figure 7.1: Core Boomerang Syntax
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standard formalism, we will highlight its main features by example, rather than giving a full
formal deànition (see Pierce 2002, Chapter 23 for a textbook description of System F).
A Boomerang program is a functional program over base types string, regexp, canonizer,
lens, etc. The standard library includes primitives for each lens combinator. To use a lens
deàned in a Boomerang program to manipulate string data, we àrst evaluate the program to
obtain a lens value, and then apply the lens to the string itself. As an example, recall the xml_elt
helper used to deàne the composers lens. It takes a string tag and a lens body as arguments and
builds a lens that transforms XML elements named tag using body to process the children of the
element:
let xml_elt (tag:string) (body:lens) : lens =
del WHITESPACE*
. del ("<" . tag . ">")
. body
. del WHITESPACE*
. del ("</" . tag . ">")
Having deàned xml_elt, we can easily instantiate it with appropriate arguments obtain lenses
for processing particular elements. For example,
let name : lens = xml_elt "name" (copy (ALPHA . SPACE . ALPHA) )
let lived : lens = xml_elt "lived" (copy (YEAR . DASH . YEAR) )
handle strings of the form <name>Jean Sibelius</name> and <lived>1865-1957</lived> respectively.
Compare the versions of these lenses written in terms of xml_elt to the programs we would need
to write using combinators:
let name : lens =
del WHITESPACE*
. del "<name>"
. copy (ALPHA . SPACE . ALPHA)
. del WHITESPACE*
. del "</name>"
and
let lived : lens =
del WHITESPACE*
. del "<lived>"
. copy (YEAR . DASH . YEAR)
. del WHITESPACE*
. del "</lived>"
It should be clear that the àrst versions are simpler to write, reason about, and maintain. More-
over, we can assign them intuitive names, allowing the programmer can work at an appropriate
level of abstraction. For example, to build a lens that handles the name and dates for a com-
poser, we can simply write,
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name
. ins (COMMA . SPACE)
. lived
which reáects the essential nature of the transformation, rather than
del WHITESPACE*
. del "<name>"
. copy (ALPHA . SPACE . ALPHA)
. del WHITESPACE*
. del "</name>"
. ins (COMMA . SPACE)
. del WHITESPACE*
. del "<lived>"
. copy (YEAR . DASH . YEAR)
. del WHITESPACE*
. del "</lived>"
which exposes all of the low-level details of the lens and obscures the actual transformation
being done on data.
Boomerang has many other features designed to simplify lens development. A simple mod-
ule system provides a way to separate deànitions into distinct name spaces:
module M =
let l : lens = copy [A-Z] . del [0-9]
let x : string = "A"
let y : string = "1"
end
Built-in tests gives programmers an easy way to test the behavior of their program during de-
velopment and also provides helpful documentation:
test (M.l).get (M.x . M.y) = M.x
Unit tests can also be used to check errors:
test (M.l).get M.x = error (* type error: M.x not in (stype M.l) *)
User-deàned data types, polymorphism, and pattern matching, make it possible to write lenses
parameterized on data structures such as lists. As an example, let us construct a generic lens for
escaping characters as strings. To represent the escape codes for a particular format, we will
use lists. The Boomerang List module contains the standard polymorphic deànition lists:
type 'a t = Nil | Cons of 'a * 'a t
We can represent the escape codes for XML PCDATA as the following list:
let xml_escs : (char * string) List.t =
#{char * string}[ ('>',"&gt;"); ('<',"&l;"); ('&',"&amp;") ]
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The characters represents symbols that need to be escaped and the strings represent the escaped
versions. Note that Boomerang requires that programmers instantiate polymorphic deànitions
explicitly—the language does not (yet) support type inference (we plan to extend the language
with inference in the future, after we better understand some of the other features of the lan-
guage—see the discussion of dependent and reànement types in the next section). The unescaped
function take a list of escape codes and builds a regular expressions that describes the set of
unescaped characters using a fold:
let unescaped (escs : (char * string) List.t) : regexp =
List.fold_left{char * string}{regexp}
(fun (r:regexp) (p:char * string) -> r | fst{char}{string} p)
EMPTY
escs
The lens for escaping a single character,
let escape_char (escs : (char * string) List.t) : lens =
List.fold_left{char * string}{lens}
(fun (l:lens) (p : char * string) ->
let from,to : char * string = p in
from <-> to | l)
(copy (ANYCHAR - (unescaped escs))) escs
is deàned by folding down the list of escape codes and, at each step, taking the union of the
accumulated lens and the rewriting between the unescaped character and the concatenation of
the escape character and the escaped string—e.g., (0<0 <-> 0&0 . "lt;"). The initial lens supplied
to the fold copies characters that do not need to be escaped. By iterating escape_char using
Kleene star, we obtain a lens that escapes arbitrary strings, not just single characters:
let escape (escs : (char * string) List.t) : lens = (escape_char escs)*
The xml_esc lens is a straightforward instantiation of escape with the escape character & and
xml_esc:
let xml_esc : lens = escape xml_escs
test xml_esc.get "Duke Ellington & His Orchestra" = "Duke Ellington &amp; His Orchestra"
For comparison, here is the same lens written directly using combinators:
let xml_esc : lens =
( '>' <-> "&gt;"
'<' <-> "&lt;"
'&' <-> "&amp;"
copy [^<>&] )*
This is not so bad, but it only handles XML PCDATA. If we need to escape strings in CSV àles,
we need to write another lens from scratch whose structure is essentially the same:
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let csv_esc : lens =
( ',' <-> "\\,"
'\n' <-> "\\n"
'\\' <-> "\\\\"
copy [^,\n\\] )*
By deàning escape generically, we avoid having to repeat the deànition.
Most functional languages are used to describe general-purpose computations. However,
Boomerang is a language speciàcally designed for transforming strings. As a result, we have
equipped it with a number of features aimed at making it easier to describe strings, regular
expressions, and functions on strings. For example, rather than handling regular expressions
by an external library as in many other languages, standard POSIX notation is built into the
syntax of the language. This lets programmers manipulate regular expressions directly, rather
than having to wrap them up into string literals and pass them off to a library function (this
quickly gets complicated when the strings need to be escaped). For example:
test matches [a-z]* "abc" = true
test matches [^a-z]* "abc" = false
test matches ([^a-z]* | [a-z]{3}) "abc" = true
(The function matches checks if a string belongs to the language denoted by a regular expression.)
Another important language feature is overloading: we use the same symbols to denote
operations such as concatenation, union, Kleene star, difference, etc. on characters, strings,
regular expressions, lenses, and so on. The Boomerang type checker automatically resolves
overloaded symbols and selects the appropriate operator. This allows programmers to describe
transformations using whatever syntax is most convenient. For example:
test 'a' . 'b' : string
test "a" . "b" : string
test [a] . [b] : regexp
test (copy "a" . copy "b") : lens
Boomerang also recognizes the following subtype relationships between base types:
char <: string <: regexp <: lens
This simpliàes many programs—e.g., strings can be directly treated like regular expressions and
lenses. When the subsumption rule is used in the typechecker, it inserts explicit coercions to
promote run-time values (Breazu-Tannen et al., 1991). For example, to concatenate a character
with a string (here, the . resolves to the string concatenation operation),
test 'a' . "b" = "ab"
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the typechecker àrst inserts a coercion that converts 0a0 to a string, and then performs the ac-
tual concatenation on strings—i.e., the expression essentially desugars into the following more
explicit version:
test string_concat (string_of_char 'a') "b" = "ab"
More interesting—and more useful—is the coercion from regular expressions to lenses: it uses
copy to produce a lens that copies strings belonging to the regular expression from source to
view. This turns out to be quite convenient—omitting copy makes the description of many
lens programs much shorter. As examples to illustrate subtyping in Boomerang, consider the
following:
test 'a'.get 'a' = "a"
test [^a].get "b" = "b"
test "a"*.get "aaa" = "aaa"
We do not treat lens as a subtype of canonizer, even though every lens can be used as a canonizer.
This ensures that the treatment of subtyping is coherent (Breazu-Tannen et al., 1991).
7.2 Typechecking
Boomerang comes equipped with a very expressive type system: in addition to the standard
types found in the polymorphic -calculus—sums, products, functions, and polymorphism—it
includes dependent function types and reànement types. A dependent function type “x:t1 -> t2”
generalizes the ordinary function type “t1 -> t2” by allowing the t2 to depend on the value of
the argument supplied for x. This feature most useful in the presence of reànement types. A
reànement type “(x:t where p)” further constraints values of type t by requiring that the pred-
icate p be satisàed.
Together, these precise types are capable of expressing extremely detailed properties of pro-
grams. In Boomerang, their primary use is for encoding the typing rules for our lens combi-
nators. For example, here is the type of the concatenation lens as declared in the Boomerang
standard library:
test lens_concat :
(l1:lens ->
(l2:lens where splittable l1.stype l2.stype
&& splittable l1.vtype l2.vtype) ->
(lens in (l1.stype . l2.stype) <-> (l1.vtype . l2.vtype)))
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It requires that the source and and view types each be unambiguously concatenable and guar-
antees that the source and view types of the lens it constructs are the concatenations of the
respective types from l1 and l2. Reànement types make it possible to state the requirement
on the types of the two lenses while dependent function types make it possible for the re-
ànement on l2 to refer to l1. The splittable function used in the reànement on l2 is a bi-
nary predicate that tests if two regular expressions are unambiguously concatenable. The
notation used in the return type, “lens in S <-> V”, desugars to an ordinary reànement type
“(l:lens where l.stype = S && l.vtype = V)” where l is fresh. Another example is the union
lens:
test lens_union :
(l1:lens ->
(l2:lens where disjoint l1.stype l2.stype) ->
(lens in (l1.stype | l2.stype) <-> (l1.vtype | l2.vtype)))
As with the concatenation lens, it uses a reànement type to express a constraint on its argu-
ments—here, that the source types are disjoint. The default lens has the following type:
test default :
(l:lens ->
((string in l.vtype) -> (string in l.stype)) ->
(lens in l.stype <-> l.vtype))
This type requires that the function map strings belonging to the view type of l to strings belong-
ing to the source type of l. The notation “string in R” desugars to “(x:string where matches R x)”
where x is fresh. The get, put and create functions, which extract the component functions of
a lens have the following types,
test get : (l:lens -> (string in l.stype) -> (string in l.vtype))
test put : (l:lens -> (string in l.vtype) -> (string in l.vtype) -> (string in l.stype))
test create : (l:lens -> (string in l.vtype) -> (string in l.stype))
which check that the strings supplied as the source and view have the correct type.
An early version of Boomerang did not support dependent and reànement types. Instead,
the language only had the types of standard polymorphic -calculus—the native function im-
plementing each lens primitive had to check the conditions mentioned in the typing rule for the
combinator. Because of the two-tier evaluation strategy usedwith lenses in Boomerang—evaluate
the functional program to obtain a lens value, and then apply this lens to strings—this approach
was safe. That is, the conditions mentioned in the typing rule of a lens were always veriàed
before we used the lens. However, as we began to develop larger libraries of lens code, we
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discovered a practical áaw in this approach—because it checked typing rules in native code,
errors were reported quite late, and it was very inconvenient for programmers to have to trace
back through their program to discover the source of the error.
As an example illustrating this problem, recall the escape_char function deàned above:
let escape_char (escs : (char * string) List.t) : lens =
List.fold_left{char * string}{lens}
(fun (l:lens) (p : char * string) ->
let from,to : char * string = p in
from <-> to | l)
(copy (ANYCHAR - (unescaped escs))) escs
It takes an escape character and a list of escape codes and constructs a lens—the union of all of
the lenses that handle individual characters—that does the escaping. Because it is deàned using
union, there is a subtle constraint on the type of escs—the list of escape codes must not contain
repeated characters. For example, consider the following instantiation of escape_char
escape_char #{char * string}[('&',"&amp;"); ('<',"&lt;"); ('<',"&lt;")]
where < appears twice in the list of unescaped characters. Evaluating this expression will trigger
an error because the source types of the two lenses combined using union lens in the last iteration
of the fold,
'<' <-> "&lt;"
and
( '<' <-> "&" | '&' <-> "&amp;" | copy (ANYCHAR - [^&<]) )
are not disjoint. However, the union lens is not a good place to report the error to the pro-
grammer—it forces them to trace backward through the entire execution of their program to
determine the cause of the error. This is so bad for this program, which is a simple fold, but
rapidly becomes impractical as programs grow in size. It also breaks modularity—in general,
programmers will need to examine code referenced from other modules when things go wrong.
Our original motivation for adding reànement and dependent types to Boomerang was to
provide programmers with a way to express the precise conditions needed to guarantee that
evaluation of the program will not go wrong. These types make it possible to detect errors
early, and not just in the constructors for lenses. For example, they can assign escape_char a
type type that accurately reáects the properties needed of the list of escape codes:
let escape_char
(escs : (char * string) List.t where
disjoint_chars (List.map{char * string}{char} fst{char}{string} escs)) : lens =
142
List.fold_left{char * string}{lens}
(fun (l:lens) (p : char * string) ->
let from,to : char * string = p in
from <-> to | l)
(copy (ANYCHAR - (unescaped escs))) escs
The predicate disjoint_chars is the obvious predicate on lists of characters:
let disjoint_chars (cs : char List.t) : bool =
let _,res : regexp * bool =
List.fold_left{char}{regexp * bool}
(fun (p:regexp * bool) (c:char) ->
let r,b : regexp * bool = p in
(r|c, b && not (matches r c)))
(EMPTY,true)
cs in
res
With these deànitions, the error in the above example will be detected early—i.e., as soon as
escape_char is applied to a list of non-disjoint escape codes.
Boomerang’s typechecker is implemented in the hybrid style, using contracts (Flanagan,
2006; Wadler and Findler, 2007; Findler and Felleisen). That is, the static typechecker uses
a coarse analysis to rule out obviously ill-formed programs and dynamic assertions to verify
the constraints expressed by precise types. Greenberg, Pierce, and Weirich (2009) are currently
developing the foundations of this hybrid approach.
7.3 Implementation
We have developed a prototype implementation of the Boomerang language. This system in-
cludes an interpreter for the surface language, native implementations of the core basic, re-
sourceful, and quotient lens combinators, and several generic lens libraries for handling escap-
ing, lists, sorting, and XML. (The type system of secure lenses is not yet implemented.)
The core combinators in Boomerang rely on functions drawn from a regular expression
library. These combinators make heavy use of several slightly non-standard operations includ-
ing operations to decide whether concatenations and iterations are unambiguous. We have
implemented an efàcient regular expression library in OCaml based on Brzozowski deriva-
tives Brzozowski (1964). The library makes heavy use of hash consing and memoization to
avoid recomputing results, and a clever algorithm for deciding ambiguity due to Mller (2001).
Almost all of the examples typeset in a typewriter font in this dissertation have been gener-
ated from a literate source àle and checked against the Boomerang implementation.
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7.4 Augeas
Lenses has recently been adopted in industry. Red Hat Linux, Inc., has released a tool for man-
aging operating system conàgurations called Augeas that is directly based on Boomerang (Lut-
terkort, 2008). The main use of lenses in Augeas is to map textual conàguration àles of the
kind typically found under the /etc directory in most Unix systems to simpliàed tree structures
that are easily to manipulate using scripts. The language that Augeas programmers used to
write lenses is directly based on an early version of Boomerang—it uses the same set of core
combinators, and the same surface syntax (based on OCaml), and the an early version of the
mechanisms described in Chapter 5 for handling ordered data. It also extends the language
with some new combinators for indicating the tree structure of the view.
Here is a lens developed by Pinson (2009) that builds an updatable view over preference
àles for the APT package management tool. The source àles for this lens are blocks of text
separated by blank lines, where each block is a list of key-value pairs
Explanation: Backport packages have lowest priority
Package: *
Pin: release a=backports
Pin-Priority: 100
Explanation: My packages have highest priority
Package: *
Pin: release l=Raphink, v=3.0
Pin-Priority: 700
and the view are trees (or in this case, sequences of trees) representing the same information:
"1"
"Explanation" = "Backport packages have lowest priority"
"Package" = "*"
"Pin" = "release"
"a" = "backports"
"Pin-Priority" = "100"
"2"
"Explanation" = "My packages have highest priority"
"Package" = "*"
"Pin" = "release"
"l" = "Raphink"
"v" = "3.0"
"Pin-Priority" = "700"
In this simple ASCII notation for trees nodes are indicated using curly braces, and ever node
has a label (which can be the empty string), an optional value, and a sequence of children. For
example, the subtree
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"Pin" = "release"
"a" = "backports"
has the label “Pin”, value “release”, and a single child.
Here is the deànition of the lens that computes this view in Augeas’s lens language:
module AptPreferences =
autoload xfm
(* helpers *)
let colon = del /:[ \t]*/ ": "
let eol = del /[ \t]*\n/ "\n"
let value_to_eol = store /([^ \t\n].*[^ \t\n]|[^ \t\n])/
let value_to_spc = store /[^, \t\n]+/
let comma = del /,[ \t]*/ ", "
let equal = Util.del_str "="
let spc = Util.del_ws_spc
let empty = [ del /[ \t]*\n/ "" ]
let simple_entry (kw:string) = [ key kw . colon . value_to_eol . eol ]
let key_value (kw:string) = [ key kw . equal . value_to_spc ]
let pin_keys = key_value "a"
key_value "c"
key_value "l"
key_value "o"
key_value "v"
let pin = [ key "Pin" . colon . value_to_spc . spc . pin_keys . ( comma . pin_keys )*. eol ]
let entries = simple_entry "Explanation"
simple_entry "Package"
simple_entry "Pin-Priority"
pin
let record = [ seq "record" . entries+ ]
let lns = empty* . ( record . empty )* . record?
let filter = incl "/etc/apt/preferences"
. Util.stdexcl
let xfm = transform lns filter
This Augeas program uses many of the same primitives as Boomerang—e.g., the del, (.), (|),
and (*) lenses—as well as some new primitives for building the tree structure of the view. The
(store E) primitive matches a string described by E and stores it as the value of the enclosing
subtree. The (key E) primitive matches a string described by E and stores it as the label of
the enclosing subtree. The (seq x) primitive provides a way to generate sequential labels—it
labels the enclosing subtree with the next value from a counter identiàed by x. The [l] primitive
builds a tree node. It uses the key or seq primitive in l (which must be unique) to generate the
label, the store primitive (which also must be unique) to generate the value, and l to generate
the children. For example, the record lens, declared above as
let record = [ seq "record" . entries+ ]
generates a single tree labeled by the current value of the record counter and containing a non-
empty list of children, each generated by entries.
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Augeas contributors have developed a large number of lenses—one for each of the following
conàguration àle formats:
aliases.aug exports.aug logrotate.aug puppet.aug sudoers.aug
aptpreferences.aug fstab.aug monit.aug rsyncd.aug sysctl.aug
aptsources.aug gdm.aug ntp.aug samba.aug util.aug
bbhosts.aug group.aug openvpn.aug services.aug vsftpd.aug
crontab.aug grub.aug pam.aug shellvars.aug webmin.aug
darkice.aug hosts.aug passwd.aug slapd.aug xinetd.aug
dhclient.aug inifile.aug php.aug soma.aug xorg.aug
dnsmasq.aug inittab.aug phpvars.aug spacevars.aug yum.aug
dpkg.aug interfaces.aug postfix_main.aug squid.aug
dput.aug limits.aug postfix_master.aug sshd.aug
Augeas is also starting to be used more widely—e.g. in the Puppet conàguration management
tool (Pup, 2009) and in the Netcf network interface conàguration tool (Lutterkort, 2009).
7.5 Grammars
This ànal describes an extension to Boomerang we have recently implemented. Boomerang’s
functional infrastructure goes a long way toward making high-level lens programming con-
venient. But, ultimately, it still forces programmers to describe lenses using combinators.
For some transformations—in particular lenses that rearrange data in going from source to
view—this is tedious. This section describes an extension to Boomerang for describing lenses
using grammars. Rather than having to use combinators to massage source data into the cor-
rect position in the view, programmers can bind pieces of the source to variables and place data
directly in the view. Our design for grammars is directly inspired by XSugar (Brabrand et al.,
2008). To illustrate, here is the composer lens written as a grammar:
let composer : lens =
grammar composer ::=
WS
"<composer>" WS
"<name>" n:(key (ALPHA . SPACE . ALPHA)) "</name>" WS
"<lived>" d:(YEAR . DASH . YEAR) "</lived>" WS
"<nationality>" ALPHA "</nationality>" WS
"</composer>"
<->
n COMMA SPACE d
end
The grammar contains a single production named composer with one rule. It transforms strings
by parsing them according to the pattern on one side of the <-> symbol and pretty printing the
resulting parse tree—i.e., the bindings of variables to strings—using the pattern on the other
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side as a template. For example, in the get direction, the left-hand side of composers parses
the XML source, binding the name of the composer to n and the dates to d, and produces the
view by concatenating n and d with a comma and a space between them. The XML formatting
and nationality are discarded as they are not bound to any variables. In the put direction, it
parses the view using the right-hand side of the grammar and produces the new source by pretty
printing the bindings for n and d using the left-hand side as a template.
We can deàne a grammar that handles a non-empty list of composers using a recursive
production:
let composer_list : lens =
grammar composer_list :: =
c:< composer > <-> c
| c:< composer > cs:composer_list <-> c NEWLINE cs
end
The production has two rules: the àrst handles lists with a single composer while the second
handles lists with more than one composer. Note that the mechanisms of resourceful lenses can
be used with grammars—both rules treat each composer as a reorderable chunk. This allows
the grammar version of the lens to handle updates to views that involve reorderings, just like
the combinator version.
The ànal grammar describes a lens that does the complete transformation:
let composers : lens =
grammar composers ::=
"<composers>" WS "</composers>" <-> EPSILON
| "<composers>" cs:composer_list WS "</composers>" <-> cs
end
It has two rules: one for the empty case and another for the non-empty case.
This lens behaves the same as the version described using combinators. For example, when
we apply the get function to the original XML source, we get it produces the view
Jean Sibelius, 1865-1956
Aaron Copland, 1910-1990
Benjamin Briten, 1913-1976
as expected.
To some extent, the choice of whether to describe the lens using combinators or grammars
is a matter of taste. However, the advantages of the grammar approach become more evident
when we want to reorder data in going from source to view. For example, suppose that we
wanted to swap the order of the name and dates for each composer in the view. As described
147
in Chapter 3, we can do this using the swap lens, but the combinator program becomes much
more complicated—we need to place the swap carefully to lift the dates over the names:
let composer : lens =
xml_elt "composer"
( ( xml_elt "name" (copy (ALPHA . SPACE . ALPHA) )
~ ( xml_elt "lived" (copy (YEAR . DASH . YEAR) )
. ins (COMMA . SPACE) ) )
. xml_elt "nationality" ( default (del ALPHA) (fun (x:string) -> "Unknown") ) )
This approach rapidly becomes complicated in situations where the transformation reorders
multiple pieces of information in the source (and even using the n-ary generalization of swap,
permute, described in Chapter 3). By contrast, the grammar version of the lens can be easily
modiàed to obtain the behavior we want—we just need to invert the order of the variables n and
d on the right-hand side of the rule, replacing “n COMMA SPACE D” with “d COMMA SPACE n”. Thus,
grammars and variables provide a much more natural way to describe many transformations
on strings—in particular, lenses that reorder information in going from source to view.
Grammar are fully-integrated into the Boomerang system, and can be freely combined with
all of the language’s other features. They are implemented by a compilation that maps produc-
tions to combinator expressions. Formally, the syntax of grammars is given by the following
extension to the Boomerang syntax shown in Figure 7.1:
..
e ::= ::: j grammar (and p) end
p ::= x ::= (| r)
r ::= aL <-> aR
aL ::= x : e j e
aR ::= x j e
That is, a grammar g is a list of productions; a production p consists of a name x and a set
of rules (separated by |); a rule r consists of two lists of atoms, one on the left-hand side
and another on the right-hand side; an atom aL on the left is either a bare expression or an
expression labeled with a variables; and an atom on the right is either a bare expression or a
variable (we do not need to bind variables to expressions on the right because each variable will
have a binding on the left). We impose several well-formedness conditions on grammars: First,
we require that variables be used linearly—i.e., every variable occurring in a rule must be used
exactly once on each side of the rule. Second, we require that grammars be right-recursive. This
condition is essential—without it, grammars could be used to describe context-free languages
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and Boomerang’s type system is based on regular languages. It turns out that imposing linearity
on variables and right-linearity separately on the left and right-hand sides of rules ensures a kind
of joint right-linearity: every well-formed rule has one of two forms
a1 : : : ak <-> b1 : : : bl or
a1 : : : ak x:ek+1 <-> b1 : : : bl x
where each of the ai and bj atoms are not recursive.
The àrst step in the compilation is transforming individual rules to lenses. There are two
cases. For non-recursive rules, we construct a lens that maps between the left and right-hand
sides directly. For example, the rule in the composer production compiles to the following lens:
permute
#{int}[1;2;3;4;5]
#{lens}[ del ( WS . "<composer>" . WS . "<name>" )
; key (ALPHA . SPACE . ALPHA)
; "</name>" . WS . "<lived>" <-> COMMA . SPACE
; copy (YEAR . DASH . YEAR)
; del ( "</lived>" . WS . "<nationality>" . ALPHA .
"</nationality>" . WS . "</composer>") ]
The list of integers represents a permutation (the “#{int}” is a type argument that instantiates
the polymorphic list type). In this case, it is just the identity permutation—the variables n and d
appear in the same order on the left and right-hand sides of the rule. However, more generally,
we need to permute the views produced by each lens. We calculate the appropriate permutation
by comparing the list of variables mentioned in each rule. In the same way, we compile the non-
recursive preàxes of recursive rules—i.e., all but the ànal atom—and associate the resulting lens
with the variable named in the right-most position. The result after compiling each rule, is a
right-linear grammar with lenses as non-terminals. For example compiling the composer_list
production yields the following:
composer list ::= (permute #{int}[1] #{lens}[< composer >])
j (permute #{int}[1] #{lens}[< composer >]) composer list
To complete the compilation, we eliminate recursion by transforming it into iteration, using a
generalization of the standard construction on ordinary grammars. There are again two cases.
If xi ::= p1 : : : pk is the only production, then we partition its rules into two sets: recursive rules
go into S1, and non-recursive rules into S2. We then construct the following lens for xi:
xi =
 j(k xi)2S1 k  (jl2S2 l)
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It is straightforward to verify that this lens describes the same transformation as ri. If there are
multiple productions, we eliminate one by replacing references to it with a similarly constructed
lens, and repeat the compilation.
There is one restriction of the compilation that bears mentioning. The typing rules for our
lens combinators check unambiguity locally—i.e., for every concatenation and iteration. Our
compilation only produces well-typed lenses for grammars that are “locally unambiguous” in
this sense.
7.6 Summary
The Boomerang language provides convenient high-level notation for programming with lenses
and an expressive type system for establishing correctness. In our experience, these features
make it possible to develop lens programs of substantial size. We have developed a number of
lenses for real-world data formats including electronic address books, calendars, bibliographies,
and scientiàc data. Our design has also been validated in industry: the Augeas tool uses a
language directly based on Boomerang. Finally, we have also developed an extension to the
language makes it possible to describe lenses using grammars instead of combinators.
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Chapter 8
Related Work
This chapter discusses previous work on view update and bidirectional languages. The founda-
tional structures described in this dissertation—lenses and their associated behavioral laws—are
not completely new: similar structures that have been studied for decades in the database com-
munity. The idea of programming languages that can be interpreted in two directions has also
been explored previously in the programming language community.
Broadly speaking, our work on lenses has several features that distinguish it from previ-
ous work. One is that lenses transform whole states rather than “update functions”. Another
is that they treat well-behavedness as a form of type assertion. Lenses are also novel in ad-
dressing the issues of totality—i.e., offering static guarantees that propagating updates will not
fail at run time. On the linguistic side, lenses appear to be the àrst language to take totality
as a primary goal (while connecting the language with a formal semantic foundation, choosing
primitives that can be combined into composite lenses where totality is guaranteed by construc-
tion), and the àrst to emphasize types—i.e., compositional reasoning about well-behavedness
and totality—as an organizing design principle.
8.1 Foundations
The foundations of view update translation were studied intensively by database researchers
in the late ’70s and ’80s. This thread of work is closely related to our semantics of lenses.
We discuss here the main similarities and differences between our work and these classical ap-
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proaches to view update—in particular Dayal and Bernstein’s notion (1982) of “correct update
translation,” Bancilhon and Spyratos’s (1981) notion of “update translation under a constant
complement,” Gottlob, Paolini, and Zicari’s “dynamic views” (1988), and the basic view up-
date and “relational triggers” mechanisms offered by commercial database systems such as
Oracle (Fogel and Lane, 2005; Lorentz, 2005)
The view update problem concerns translating updates on a view into “reasonable” updates
on the underlying database. It is helpful to structure the discussion by breaking this broad
statement of the problem into more speciàc questions: First, what is a “reasonable” translation
of an update? Second, how should we handle the possibility that, for some updates, there may
be no reasonable way of translating its effect to the underlying source? And third, how do we
deal with the possibility that for some updates there may be many reasonable translations to
choose from? We consider these questions in order.
One can imagine many possible ways of assigning a precise meaning to “reasonable up-
date translation,” but in fact there is a remarkable degree of agreement in the literature, with
most approaches adopting one of two basic positions. The stricter of these is enunciated in
Bancilhon and Spyratos’s (1981) notion of complement of a view, which must include at least
all information missing from the view. When a complement is àxed, there exists at most one
update of the database that reáects a given update on the view while leaving the complement
unmodiàed—i.e., that “translates updates under a constant complement.” The constant com-
plement approach has ináuenced numerous later works in the area, including recent papers by
Lechtenborger (2003) and Hegner (2004).
The other, more permissive, deànition of “reasonable” is elegantly formulated by Gottlob,
Paolini, and Zicari, who call it “dynamic views” (1988). They present a general framework and
identify two special cases, one being formally equivalent to Bancilhon and Spyratos’s constant
complement translators and the other—which they advocate on pragmatic grounds—being their
own dynamic views.
Our notion of lenses adopts the same, more permissive, attitude towards reasonable behav-
ior of update translation. Indeed, modulo some technical reànements: the set of well-behaved
lenses is isomorphic to the set of dynamic views in the sense of Gottlob, Paolini, and Zicari.
Moreover, the set of very well-behaved lenses is isomorphic to the set of translators under con-
stant complement in the sense of Bancilhon and Spyratos.
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Dayal and Bernstein’s (1982) seminal theory of “correct update translation” also adopts the
more permissive position on “reasonableness.” Their notion of “exactly performing an update”
corresponds, intuitively, to our PG law.
The pragmatic tradeoffs between these two perspectives on reasonable update translations
are discussed by Hegner (1990; 2004), who introduces the term closed view for the stricter
constant complement approach and open view for the looser approach adopted by dynamic
views and in the present work. Hegner adopts a closed-world approach, but notes that both
choices may have pragmatic advantages in different situations. In particular, the open-view
approach is useful when the users are aware that they are actually using a view as a convenient
way to edit an underlying database, while closed-world is preferable when users need views
that are robust abstractions, even this means that the set of possible updates to the view must
be restricted.
Hegner (2004) also formalizes an additional condition (which has also been noted by oth-
ers—e.g., by Dayal and Bernstein) called monotonicity of update translations. It states that
an update that only adds records to the view should be translated just into additions to the
database, and that an update that adds more records to the view should be translated to a
larger update to the database and similarly for deletions.
Commercial database systems such as Oracle (Fogel and Lane, 2005; Lorentz, 2005), Mi-
crosoft’s SQL Server Server (2005), and IBM’s DB2 (IBM, 2004) typically provide two quite
different mechanisms for building updatable views. First, very simple views deàned using se-
lect, project, and a very restricted form of join (i.e., where the key attributes of one relation
are a subset of those in the other) are considered inherently updatable. For these, the notion
of reasonableness is essentially the constant complement position. Alternatively, programmers
can support updates to arbitrary views by adding relational triggers that are invoked whenever
an update is attempted on the view. These triggers can execute arbitrary code to update the
underlying database and the notion of reasonableness is left entirely to the programmer.
The second question posed at the beginning of the section was how to deal with the possi-
bility that there are no reasonable translations for some update. The simplest response is just
to let the translation of an update fail, if it sees that its effect is going to be unreasonable. The
advantage of this approach is that we can determine reasonableness on a case-by-case basis,
allowing translations that usually give reasonable results but that might fail under rare condi-
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tions. The disadvantage is that we lose the ability to perform ofáine updates to the view—we
need the underlying database in order to test if a particular view update is allowed. Another
possibility is to restrict the set of operations to just the ones that can be guaranteed to cor-
respond to reasonable translations; this is the position taken by most papers in the area. A
different approach—the one we have taken in this work—is to restrict the type of the view so
that arbitrary (type-respecting) updates are guaranteed to succeed.
The third question posed above was how to deal with the possibility that there may be
multiple reasonable translations for a given update.
One attractive idea is to somehow restrict the set of reasonable translations so that this
possibility does not arise—i.e., so that every translatable update has a unique translation. For
example, under the constant complement approach, for a particular choice of complement,
there will be at most one translation. Hegner’s additional condition of monotonicity (Hegner,
2004) ensures that (at least for updates consisting of only inserts or only deletes), the translation
of an update is unique, independent of the choice of complement.
Another possibility is to place an ordering on possible translations of a given update and
choose one that is minimal in this ordering. This idea plays a central role, for example, in
Johnson, Rosebrugh, and Dampney’s account of view update in the Sketch Data Model (2001).
Buneman, Khanna, and Tan (2002) have established a variety of intractability results for the
problem of inferring minimal view updates in the relational setting for query languages that
include both join and either project or union.
One way of understanding the main idea explored in this dissertation is that it provides pro-
grammers with a way to describe the update policy at the same time as the view is deàned—i.e.,
by enriching the primitives of the language so that the programmer can pick a reasonable policy
for propagating updates to views.
8.2 Programming Languages
At the level of syntax, different forms of bidirectional programming have been explored across a
surprisingly diverse range of communities, including programming languages, databases, pro-
gram transformation, constraint-based user interfaces, and quantum computing. One useful
way of classifying these languages is by the “shape” of the semantic space in which their trans-
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formations live. We identify three major classes:
Bidirectional languages pair a get function of type S ! V with a put function of type
V ! S ! S. In general, the get function can project away some information
from the source, which must then be restored by the put function.
Bijective languages have put functions with the type V ! S—i.e., there is no source
argument to refer to. To avoid loss of information, the get and put functions
must form a (perhaps partial) bijection between S and V .
Reversible languages go a step further, demanding only that the work performed by
any function to produce a given output can be undone by applying the function
“in reverse” working backwards from this output to produce the original input.
Here, there is no separate put function at all: instead, the get function itself is
constructed so that each step can be reversed.
In the àrst class, the work that is fundamentally most similar to ours is Meertens’s formal treat-
ment of constraint maintainers for constraint-based user interfaces (1998). Meertens’s semantic
setting is actually even more general: he takes get and put to be relations, not just functions,
and his constraint maintainers are symmetric: get relates pairs from S  V to elements of V
and put relates pairs in V S to elements of S. The idea is that a constraint maintainer forms a
connection between two graphical objects on the screen so that, whenever one of the objects is
changed by the user, the change can be propagated by the maintainer to the other object such
that some desired relationship between the objects is always maintained. Taking the special
case where the get relation is actually a function (which is important for Meertens because this
is the case where composition [in the sense of our “;” combinator] preserves well behavedness),
yields essentially our well behaved lenses.
Meertens proposes a variety of combinators for building constraint maintainers, most of
which have analogs among our lenses, but some of his combinators do not support composi-
tional reasoning about well-behavedness. He considers constraint maintainers for ordered data
such as lists, but here adopts a rather different point of view from our approach in resourceful
lenses, focusing on constraint maintainers that work with structures not directly but in terms
of the “edit scripts” that might have produced them—i.e., he switches from a state-based to an
operation-based treatment at this point.
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Bidirectional languages capable of duplicating data in the get direction, either by explicit
combinators or implicitly by non-linear uses of variables, have been the focus of recent work
by the Programmable Structured Documents group at Tokyo.
Early work by Mu, Hu, and Takeichi on “injective languages” for view-update-based struc-
ture editors (2004b) adopted a semantic framework similar to lenses. Although their transfor-
mations obey our GP law, their notion of well-behaved transformations is informed by
different goals than ours, leading to a weaker form of the PG law. A primary concern is
using the view-to-view transformations to simultaneously restore invariants within the source
view as well as update the source. For example, an view may maintain two lists where the name
àeld of each element in one list must match the name àeld in the corresponding element in the
other list. If an element is added to the àrst list, then not only must the change be propagated
to the source, it must also add a new element to the second list in the view. It is easy to see
that PG cannot hold if the view is modiàed by put. Similarly, they assume that edits to
the view mark modiàed àelds as “updated.” These marks are removed when the put lens com-
putes the modiàcations to the concrete view—another change to the view that violates PG.
Consequently, to support invariant preservation within the abstract view, and to support edit
lists, their transformations only obey a much weaker variant of PG called PGP (see
Chapter 4).
Another line of work by Hu, Mu, and Takeichi (2004; 2006) applies a bidirectional pro-
gramming language quite closely related to ours to the design of “programmable editors” for
structured documents. As in the earlier work by Mu, Hu, and Takeichi (2004b), they support
preservation of local invariants in the put direction. Here, instead of annotating the view with
modiàcation marks, they assume that a put or a get occurs after every modiàcation to either
view. They use this “only one update” assumption to choose the correct inverse for the lens that
copied data in the get direction—because only one branch could have been modiàed. Conse-
quently, they can put the data from the modiàed branch and overwrite the unmodiàed branch.
Here, as in the work by Mu, Hu, and Takeichi (2004b), the notion of well behavedness must
be weakened to PGP.
Yet another line of work by the same group investigated bidirectional languages with vari-
able binding. Languages that allow unrestricted occurrences of variables implicitly support
duplication, since data can be copied by programs that use a variable several times. The goal
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of this work is to develop a bidirectional semantics for XQuery (Liu et al., 2007). As in the
earlier work, they propose relaxed variants of the lens laws and develop a semantics based on
sophisticated propagation of annotated values.
One possible connection between their work and our quotient lenses is an condition pro-
posed in the journal version of a paper by Hu, Mu, and Takeichi (2004). This is formulated
in terms of an ordering on edited values that captures when one value is “more edited” than
another. They propose strengthening the laws to require that composing put and get produce
an abstract structure that is more edited in this sense, calling this property update preservation.
We hope to investigate the relationship between our q-lens PG law and their PGP
plus update preservation. (The comparison may prove difàcult to make, however, because our
framework is “state based”—the put function only sees the state of the data structure resulting
from some set of edits, not the edits themselves—while theirs assumes an “operation-based”
world in which the locations and effects of edit operations are explicitly indicated in the data.)
Languages for Bijective Transformations
An active thread of work in the program transformation community concerns program inver-
sion and inverse computation—see, for example, Abramov and Gluck (2000; 2002) and many
other papers cited there. Program inversion (Dijkstra, 1979) derives the inverse program from
the forward program. Inverse computation (McCarthy, 1956) computes a possible input of a
program from a particular output. One approach to inverse computation is to design languages
that produce easily invertible expressions—for example, languages that can only express injec-
tive functions, where every program is trivially invertible. These languages bear some intriguing
similarities to ours, but differ in a number of ways, primarily in their focus on the bijective case.
In the database community, Abiteboul, Cluet, and Milo (1997) deàned a declarative lan-
guage of correspondences between parts of trees in a data forest. In turn, these correspondence
rules can be used to translate one tree format into another through non-deterministic Prolog-
like computation. This process assumes an isomorphism between the two data formats. The
same authors later deàned a system for bidirectional transformations based around the con-
cept of structuring schemas—i.e., parse grammars annotated with semantic information (1998)
. Their get functions involve parsing, while put functions involve unparsing. Again, to avoid
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ambiguous abstract updates, they restricted themselves to lossless grammars that deàne an iso-
morphism between concrete and abstract views.
A number of other systems provide some linguistic mechanisms for describing essentially
bijective transformations. XSugar (Brabrand et al., 2008) is a bidirectional language that tar-
gets the case where one structure is represented in XML and the other structure is a string.
Transformations in XSugar are speciàed using pairs of intertwined grammars. Our design for
grammars in Boomerang discussed in Chapter 7 was inspired by XSugar. A similar language
biXid (Kawanaka and Hosoya, 2006) also speciàes bidirectional conversions between pairs of
XML documents. However, unlike XSugar, biXid allows ambiguous productions and non-
linear variables.
The PADS system (Fisher and Gruber, 2005) generates a data type, parser, and pretty printer
for an ad-hoc data from a single, declarative description of the data format. PADS comes with
a rich collection of primitives for handling a wide variety of data including characters, strings,
àxed-with integers, áoating point values, separated lists, etc. Recent work on PADS has focused
on developing mechanisms for learning data descriptions automatically (Fisher et al., 2008).
Kennedy’s pickling combinators (2004) describe serializers and deserializers. Benton (2005)
and Ramsey (2003) each proposed systems for mapping between the values in a host language
and the run-time values manipulated by an embedded interpreter.
JT (Ennals and Gay, 2007) synchronizes programs written in different high level languages,
such as C and Jekyll, an extension of C with features fromML. JT relies on a notion of distance
to decide how to propagate modiàcations, allowing the detection of non local edits such as the
swap of two functions. The synchronization seems to work well in many cases but there is no
claim that the semantics of the synchronized programs are the same.
In the functional programming community, Wadler’s notion of views (1987), extends alge-
braic pattern matching to abstract data types. Programmers supply explicit in and out functions
to map between views and the underlying structures they are generated from.
Languages for Reversible Transformations
Lenses are the àrst work we are aware of in which totality and compositional reasoning about
totality are taken as primary design goals. Nevertheless, in all of the languages discussed
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above there is an expectation that programmers will want their transformations to be “to-
tal enough”—i.e., that the sets of inputs for which the get and put functions are deàned should
be large enough for some given purpose. In particular, we expect that put functions should
accept a suitably large set of views for each source, since the whole point of these languages
is to allow editing through a view. A quite different class of languages have been designed to
support reversible computation, in which the put functions are only ever applied to a result of
the corresponding get functions. While the goals of these languages are quite different from
ours—they have nothing to do with view update—there are intriguing similarities in the basic
approach.
Landauer (1961) observed that non-injective functions were logically irreversible, and that
this irreversibility requires the generation and dissipation of some heat per machine cycle.
Bennet (1973) demonstrated that this irreversibility was not inevitable by constructing a re-
versible Turing machine, showing that thermodynamically reversible computers were plausible.
Baker (1992) argued that irreversible primitives were only part of the problem; irreversibility at
the “highest levels” of computer usage cause the most difàculty due to information loss. Con-
sequently, he advocated the design of programs that “conserve information.” Because deciding
reversibility of large programs is unsolvable, he proposed designing languages that guaranteed
that all well-formed programs are reversible, i.e., designing languages whose primitives were
reversible and whose combinators preserved reversibility. A considerable body of work has
developed around these ideas (2004a).
8.3 Databases
Research on view update translation in the database literature has tended to focus on taking
an existing language for deàning get functions (e.g., relational algebra) and then considering
how to infer corresponding put functions, either automatically or with some user assistance.
By contrast, we have designed a new language in which the deànitions of get and put go hand-
in-hand. Our approach also goes beyond classical work in the relational setting by directly
transforming and updating arbitrary structures rather than just relations.
Work by Bohannon, Pierce, and Vaughan (2006) extends the lens framework described
here to obtain lenses that operate natively on relational data. Their lenses are based on the
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primitives of classical relational algebra, with additional annotations that specify the desired
“update policy” in the put direction. They develop a type system, using record predicates and
functional dependencies, to aid compositional reasoning about well-behavedness. The chap-
ter on view update in Date’s textbook (2003) articulates a similar perspective on translating
relational updates.
Masunaga (1984) described an automated algorithm for translating updates on views de-
àned by relational algebra. The core idea was to annotate where the “semantic ambiguities”
arise, indicating they must be resolved either with knowledge of underlying database semantic
constraints or by interactions with the user.
Keller (1985) catalogued all possible strategies for handling updates to a select-project-join
view and showed (in his thesis) that these are exactly the set of translations that satisfy a small
set of intuitive criteria: no side effects, one-step changes, no unnecessary changes, simplest
replacements, and no delete-insert pairs. He later (1986) proposed allowing users to choose an
update translator at view deànition time by engaging in an interactive dialog with the system
and answering questions about potential sources of ambiguity in update translation. Building
on this foundation, Barsalou, Siambela, Keller, and Wiederhold (1991) described a scheme for
interactively constructing update translators for object-based views of relational databases.
Medeiros and Tompa (1985) presented a design tool for exploring the effects of choosing
a view update policy. This tool shows the update translation for update requests supplied by
the user; by considering all possible valid sources, the tool predicts whether the desired update
would in fact be reáected back into the view after applying the translated update to the concrete
database.
Miller et al. (2001) describe Clio, a system for managing heterogeneous transformation
and integration. Clio provides a tool for visualizing two schemas, specifying correspondences
between àelds, deàning a mapping between the schemas, and viewing sample query results.
They only consider the get direction of our lenses, but their system is somewhat mapping-
agnostic, so it might eventually be possible to use a framework like Clio as a user interface for
incremental lens programming.
Atzeni and Torlone (1997; 1996) described a tool for translating views and observed that
if one can translate any source view to and from a meta-model (shared view), one then gets
bidirectional transformations between any pair of sources. They limited themselves tomappings
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where the source and view are isomorphic.
Complexity bounds have also been studied for various versions of the view update infer-
ence problem. Cosmadakis and Papadimitriou (1984) considered the view update problem for
a single relation, where the view is a projection of the underlying relation, and showed that
there are polynomial time algorithms for determining whether insertions, deletions, and tuple
replacements to a projection view are translatable into concrete updates. As mentioned above,
Buneman, Khanna, and Tan (2002) established a variety of intractability results for the problem
of inferring “minimal” view updates in the relational setting for query languages that include
both join and either project or union.
In the context of XML data, Braganholo, Heuser, and Vittori (2001), and Braganholo,
Davidson, and Heuser (2003) and others studied the problem of updating relational databases
“presented as XML.” Their solution requires a 1:1 mapping between XML view elements and
objects in the database, to make updates unambiguous.
Tatarinov, Ives, Halevy, and Weld (2001) described a mechanism for translating updates
on XML structures that are stored in an underlying relational database. In this setting there
is again an isomorphism between the relational source and the XML view, so updates are un-
ambiguous—rather, the problem is choosing the most efàcient way of translating a given XML
update into a sequence of relational operations.
The view update problem has also been studied in the context of object-oriented databases.
Scholl, Laasch, and Tresch (1991) restrict the notion of views to queries that preserve object
identity. The view update problem is greatly simpliàed in this setting, as the objects contained
in the view are the objects of the database, and an update on the view is directly an update on
objects of the database.
Another problem that is sometimes mentioned in connection with view update translation
is that of incremental view maintenance (Gupta et al., 1993)—efàciently recalculating an ab-
stract view after a small update to the underlying concrete view. Although the phrase “view
update problem” is sometimes, confusingly, used for work in this domain, these problems are
fundamentally different.
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8.4 Model Transformations
In the model-driven approach to software development, formal models are used to derive im-
plementations from speciàcations. In systems with many kinds of models developers need to
maintain complex relationships among the models and code—e.g., reànement of design mod-
els to code and the conformance of models to respective metamodels. Model transformations
are mechanisms for establishing—and re-establishing, in the presence of change—relationships
among models and between models and code (Czarnecki and Helsen, 2006). Bidirectional
model transformations are of particular interest if the related artifacts can be edited inde-
pendently (Antkiewicz and Czarnecki, 2008). Formalisms such as triple graph grammars can
be used to describe bidirectional transformations between models (Schurr, 1995). Recently,
Stevens (2008a; 2008b; 2007) has applied lenses to model transformations. Similar ideas have
also been pursued by Xiong, Liu, Hu, Zhao, Takeichi, and Mei (2007) and Hidaka, Hu, Kato,
and Nakano (2009).
8.5 Security
Views have long been used in relational systems as a mechanism for enforcing conàdentiality.
They were àrst proposed as a security mechanism for XML data by Stoica and Farkas (2002)
and were later studied extensively by Fan and his colleagues in a series of papers (2004; 2006;
2007). The key difference between previous work on security views and the framework pro-
posed in Chapter 6, of course, is support for updates. Additionally, previous systems do not
provide a way to formally characterize the data kept conàdential by the view—the query that
deànes the view essentially is the privacy policy. Lastly, views in previous systems have typically
been virtual, while the views constructed using lenses are materialized. Fan (2004) has argued
that materializing views is not practical, because many different security views are often needed
when policies are complex. We ànd this argument compelling in the traditional database setting,
where data sources are typically very large, but believe that there are also many applications
where building materialized security views will be practical. Moreover, in at least some appli-
cations, views must be materialized—e.g., in the Intellipedia system discussed in Chapter 6, the
regraded documents need to be sent over the network and displayed in a web browser.
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The idea of using static analyses to track áows of information in programs was originally
proposed by Denning and Denning (1977) and has since been applied in a variety of languages,
including Jif (Myers, 1999), a secure variant of Java, and FlowCaml (Pottier and Simonet,
2003), a secure variant of OCaml. The excellent survey article by Sabelfeld and Myers (2003)
gives a general overview of the entire area and provides numerous citations.
Rather less work has focused on applying information-áow analyses to data processing lan-
guages. The developers of CDuce, a functional language for processing XML data, studied an
extension of the language where labels corresponding to security levels are propagated dynam-
ically (Benzaken et al., 2003). Foster, Green, and Tannen proposed a mechanism for ensuring
non-interference properties of tree transformations using a semantics that propagates dynamic
provenance annotations (Foster et al., 2008a). The Fable language also propagates security
labels dynamically (Swamy et al., 2008; Corcoran et al., 2007). Fable does not àx a particular
semantics for label propagation, but instead provides a general framework that enforces a strict
boundary between ordinary program code, which must treat labels opaquely, and security code,
which may manipulate labels freely. Thus, it can be used to implement a variety of static and
dynamic techniques for tracking information áows in programs. Cheney, Ahmed, and Ucar
have introduced a general framework for comparing static and dynamic approaches to many
dependency analyses including information áow (Cheney et al., 2007).
Integrity can be treated as a formal dual to conàdentiality, as was àrst noted by Biba (1977).
Thus, most of the languages discussed above can also be used to track integrity properties
of data. However, as noted by Li, Mao, and Zdancewic (2003), information-áow analyses
provide weaker guarantees for integrity compared to conàdentiality when code is untrusted.
Speciàc mechanisms for tracking integrity have also been included in a variety of languages:
Perl has a simple taint tracking mechanism for data values (Wall et al., 2000). Wassermann
and Su proposed a more powerful approach based on a dynamic analysis of generated strings
that tracks tainted data in PHP scripts (2007). Shankar, Talwar, Foster, and Wagner (2001)
developed a taint analysis for C code using the cqual system. Finally, researchers at IBM
have recently implemented a taint analysis tool for Java designed to scale to industrial-size web
applications (2009).
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Chapter 9
Summary and Future Work
This dissertation demonstrates that bidirectional programming languages are an effective and
elegant way of deàning updatable views. Starting with foundations, we proposed lenses as a
theoretical foundation for bidirectional languages. We then developed a concrete language for
building lenses that operate on strings, with natural syntax based on the regular operators. We
studied the special complications that arise when lenses are used with data containing extrane-
ous details, ordered data, and conàdential data. We described the practical implementation of
our ideas in Boomerang.
These results do not come close to ànishing the story on bidirectional languages. On the
contrary, our work can be extended in many directions. We discuss several possibilities in this
section.
9.1 Data Model
All of the lenses discussed in this dissertation manipulate strings. However, the semantic frame-
work of lenses is completely generic—it can be instantiated with arbitrary structures. Basic
lenses have been been applied to tree-structured (Foster et al., 2007b) and relational data (Bo-
hannon et al., 2006). We are interested in continuing to instantiate the framework with other
structures—e.g., complex values, objects, graphs, etc. Particular topics of interest include ex-
tending concepts such as chunks, which are central to the semantics of resourceful lenses in
these richer settings. Another challenge will be developing type systems for that are powerful
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enough to express the conditions necessary to ensure well behavedness.
9.2 Syntax
At the level of syntax, our investigation has focused exclusively on combinators. This low-
level approach to language design has worked well as we explore fundamental issues (e.g., how
standard constructs such as conditionals, products, iteration operators, etc. should work as
lenses), but programmers ànd writing lenses in “point-free” style unnatural. We are interested
in developing new lens languages based onmore familiar forms of syntax. One promising idea is
to start from the nested relational calculus (NRC) (Buneman et al., 1995). NRC has a rich data
model that can represent many different structures and has a programming model that includes
a powerful collection primitives based on comprehensions. The key technical challenge will
be developing the machinery for interpreting NRC bidirectionally. We have several ideas for
making progress: a semantic approach, similar to the one we have pursued in Boomerang, and
an operational approach based on explicitly constructing complements—i.e., structures that
contain all of the source information not reáected in the view.
A related topic is exploring the connections between view update and view maintenance.
The goal of view maintenance systems is to propagate source updates to the view efàciently.
Intuitively, many updates only affect a small portion of the view, so they can be translated to
small incremental updates. Complements closely resemble the “trace” artifacts that have been
proposed in the context of self-adjusting computation (Acar et al., 2006). We are interested
in making the connection between bidirectional and self-adjusting computation explicit. This
will be interesting in its own right, and will also have a signiàcant practical beneàt, leading to
mechanisms for efàciently maintaining views constructed using lenses.
9.3 Optimization
Another area for further work is algebraic optimization. We are interested in developing a
theory of our lens combinators that could serve as the basis for an optimizing compiler. For
example, (l1; l2) and (l1; l2) behave the same as basic lenses (when both are well typed), but
the second lens should run substantially faster. We would also like to explore streaming lenses.
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This is motivated by large examples such as our lens for scientiàc data, where the size of sources
is on the order of 1GB! We would like to develop a variant of the iteration combinator whose
get function processes elements one at a time, rather than operating on a string representing
the whole sequence. Similarly, the put function would operate on elements of the view one
at a time. To optimize memory requirements, we would like to explore lenses that maintain
minimal complements.
9.4 Security
Our secure lenses use static and dynamic mechanisms to ensure security properties of lenses.
We would like to explore connections with other dynamic approaches—e.g., languages that
propagate dynamic labels (Zheng and Myers, 2007; Shroff et al., 2007) as well as provenance
metadata (Buneman et al., 2001; Foster et al., 2008a). We hope that these languages will suggest
mechanisms for enforcing security properties at àner levels of granularity than our current,
static, approach can track. We would also like to explore declassiàcation operators (Myers and
Liskov, 1997), quantitative measures of information áow (McCamant and Ernst, 2008), and
formal notions of privacy (Miklau and Suciu, 2007) in the context of lenses.
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Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs for each of the results in our technical development, including
well-behavedness proofs for each of our primitives.
Basic Lens Proofs
.. E 2 Rcopy E 2 [[E]]() [[E]]
3.3.1 Lemma: LetE 2 R be a regular expression. Then (copy E) is a basic lens in [[E]]() [[E]].
Proof:
I GetPut: Let e be a string in [[E]]. We calculate as follows
(copy E):put ((copy E):get e) e
= (copy E):put e e by deànition (copy E):get
= e by deànition (copy E):put
and obtain the required result.
I PutGet: Let e and e0 be strings in [[E]]. We calculate as follows
(copy E):get ((copy E):put e0 e)
= (copy E):get e0 by deànition (copy E):put
= e0 by deànition (copy E):get
and obtain the required result.
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I CreateGet: Let e be a string in [[E]]. We calculate as follows
(copy E):get ((copy E):create e)
= (copy E):get e by deànition (copy E):create
= e by deànition (copy E):get
and obtain the required result, which completes the proof. 
..E 2 R [[E]] 6= ; u 2 

const E u 2 [[E]]() fug
3.3.2 Lemma: Let E 2 R be a regular expression and u 2  a string. Then (const E u) is a
basic lens in [[E]]() fug.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let e 2 [[E]]. We calculate as follows
(const E u):put ((const E u):get e) e
= (const E u):put u e by deànition (const E u):get
= e by deànition (const E u):put
and obtain the required result.
I PutGet: Let u 2 fug and e 2 [[E]]. We calculate as follows
(const E u):get ((const E u):put u e)
= (const E u):get e by deànition (const E u):put
= u by deànition (const E u):get
and obtain the required result.
I CreateGet: Let u 2 fug. We calculate as follows
(const E u):get ((const E u):create u)
= (const E u):get representative(E) by deànition (const E u):create
= u by deànition (const E u):get
and obtain the required result, which completes the proof. 
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..l 2 S () V f 2 V ! Sdefault l f 2 S () V
3.3.3 Lemma: Let l 2 S () V be a basic lens and f 2 V ! S a function from S to V . Then
default l f is a basic lens in S () V .
Proof:
I GetPut: Immediate by GP for l.
I PutGet: Immediate by PG for l.
I CreateGet: Immediate by PG for l. 
.
.
S1!S2 V1!V2
l1 2 S1 () V1 l2 2 S2 () V2
(l1l2) 2 (S1S2)() (V1V2)
3.3.4 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 () V1 and l2 2 S2 () V2 be basic lenses such that (S1!S2) and
(V1!V2). Then (l1l2) is a basic lens in (S1S2)() (V1V2).
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 (S1S2). As S1!S2 there exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2 such
that s = s1s2. Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):put ((l1l2):get s) s
= (l1l2):put ((l1l2):get (s1s2)) (s1s2) by deànition s1 and s2
= (l1l2):put ((l1:get s1)(l2:get s2)) (s1s2) by deànition (l1l2):get
= (l1:put (l1:get s1) s1)(l2:put (l2:get s2) s2) by deànition (l1l2):put with cod(l1:get) = V1
and cod(l2:get) = V2 and V1!V2
= (s1s2) by GP for l1 and l2
= s by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equality.
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I PutGet: Let v 2 (V1V2) and s 2 (S1S2). As V1!V2 there exist unique strings v1 2 V1 and
v2 2 V2 such that v = v1v2. Similarly, as S1!S2 there exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2
such that s = s1s2. Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):get ((l1l2):put v s)
= (l1l2):get ((l1l2):put (v1v2) (s1s2)) by deànition v1, v2, s1, and s2
= (l1l2):get ((l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s2)) by deànition (l1l2):put
= (l1:get (l1:put v1 s1))(l2:get (l2:put v2 s2)) by deànition (l1l2):get with cod(l1:put) = S1
and cod(l2:put) = S2 and S1!S2
= (v1v2) by PG for l1 and l2
= v by deànition v1 and v2
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
.
.
S1 \ S2 = ;
l1 2 S1 () V1 l2 2 S2 () V2
(l1 j l2) 2 (S1 [ S2)() (V1 [ V2)
3.3.5 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 () V1 and l2 2 S2 () V2 be basic lenses such that (S1 \ S2) = ;.
Then (l1 j l2) is a basic lens in (S1 [ S2)() (V1 [ V2).
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 (S1 [ S2). We analyze two cases.
Case s 2 S1: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):put ((l1 j l2):get s) s
= (l1 j l2):put (l1:get s) s by the deànition of (l1 j l2):get with s 2 S1
= l1:put (l1:get s) s by the deànition of (l1 j l2):put with cod(l:get) = V1
and s 2 S1
= s by PG for l1
and obtain the required equality, which ànishes the case.
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Case s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
I PutGet: Let v 2 (V1 [ V2) and s 2 (S1 [ S2). We analyze several cases.
Case v 2 V1 and s 2 S1: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):get ((l1 j l2):put v s)
= (l1 j l2):get (l1:put v s) by deànition (l1 j l2):put with v 2 V1 and s 2 S1
= l1:get (l1:put v s) by deànition (l1 j l2):get with cod(l1:put) = S1
= v by PG for l
and obtain the required equality.
Case v 2 V1 and s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
Case v 2 (V1   V2) and s 2 S2: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):get ((l1 j l2):put v s)
= (l1 j l2):get (l1:create v) by deànition (l1 j l2):put with v 2 (V1   V2)
and s 2 S2
= l1:get (l1:create v) by deànition (l1 j l2):get with cod(l1:create) = S1
= v by CG for l
and obtain the required equality.
Case v 2 (V2   V1) and s 2 S1: Symmetric to the previous case, using l2 instead of l1.
I CreateGet: Let v 2 (V1 [ V2). We analyze two cases.
Case v 2 V1: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):get ((l1 j l2):create v)
= (l1 j l2):get (l1:create v) by deànition (l1 j l2):create with v 2 V1
= l1:get (l1:create v) by deànition (l1 j l2):get with cod(l1:create) = S1
= v by CG for l
and obtain the required equality.
Case v 2 (V2   V1): Symmetric to the previous case. 
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..l 2 S () V S
! V !
l 2 S () V 
3.3.6 Lemma: Let l 2 S () V be a basic lens such that S! and V !. Then l is a basic lens
in S () V .
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 S. As S! there exist unique strings s1 to sn in S such that s = (s1    sn).
Using these facts, we calculate as follows
l:put (l:get s) s
= l:put (l:get (s1    sn)) (s1    sn) by deànition s1 to sn
= l:put ((l:get s1)    (l:get sn)) (s1    sn) by deànition l:get
= l:put (l:get s1) s1    l:put (l:get sn) sn by deànition l:put with V ! and cod(l:get) = V
= s1    sn by GP for l
= s by deànition s1 to sn
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let v 2 V  and s 2 S. As V ! there exist unique strings v1 to vn in V such that v =
(v1    vn). Similarly, as S! there exist unique strings s1 to sm in S such that s = (s1    sm).
Using these facts, we calculate as follows
l:get (l:put v s)
= l:get (l:put (v1    vn) (s1    sm)) by the deànitions of v1 to vn and s1 to sm
= l:get (s01    s0n) by the deànition of l:put
where s0i =
8<:l:put vi si i 2 f1; : : : ;min(n;m)gl:create vi i 2 fm+ 1; : : : ; ng
= (l:get s01)    (l:get s0n) by the deànition of l:get with V !
and cod(l:put) = cod(l:create) = V
= v1    vn by PG and CG for l
= v by the deànition of v1 to vn
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
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..l1 2 S () U l2 2 U () V
(l1;l2) 2 S () V
3.3.7 Lemma: Let l1 2 S () U and l2 2 U () V be basic lenses. Then (l2;l2) is a basic lens
in S () V .
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 S. We calculate as follows
(l1;l2):put ((l1;l2):get s) s
= (l1;l2):put (l2:get (l1:get s)) s by deànition (l1;l2):get
= l1:put (l2:put (l2:get (l1:get s)) (l1:get s)) s by deànition (l1;l2):put
= l1:put (l1:get s) s by GP for l2
= s by GP for l1
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let v 2 V and s 2 S. We calculate as follows
(l1;l2):get ((l1;l2):put v s)
= (l1;l2):get (l1:put (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s) by deànition (l1;l2):put
= l2:get (l1:get (l1:put (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s)) by deànition (l1;l2):get
= l2:get (l2:put v (l1:get s)) by PG for l1
= v by PG for l2
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
.. [[E]] \ [[F ]] = ; ([[E]] [ [[F ]])
!
àlter E F 2 ([[E]] [ [[F ]]) () [[E]]
3.3.8 Lemma: LetE and F be regular expressions satisfying ([[E]]\[[F ]]) = ; and ([[E]] [ [[F ]])!.
Then àlter E F is a basic lens in ([[E]] [ [[F ]]) () [[E]]
Proof:
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I GetPut: Let s 2 ([[E]] [ [[F ]]) be a string. As ([[E]] [ [[F ]])!, there exist unique strings
s1 to sn such that s = (s1    sn). Let (e1; ; ek) denote the subsequence of (s1; : : : ; sn) that
belong to E and let (f1; ; fl) denote the subsequence of (s1; : : : ; sn) that belong to F . Using
these deànitions, we calculate as follows
(àlter E F ):put ((àlter E F ):get s) s
= (àlter E F ):put ((àlter E F ):get (s1    sn)) (s1    sn) by deànition s1 to sn
= (àlter E F ):put (stringf ilter E (s1    sn)) (s1    sn) by deànition (àlter E F ):get
= (àlter E F ):put (e1    ek) (s1    sn) by deànition string lter
= string unlter F (e1    ek) (s1    sn) by deànition (àlter E F ):put
= (s1    sn) by deànition string unlter
= s by deànition s1 to sn
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let s 2 ([[E]] [ [[F ]]) and e 2 [[E]] be strings. As ([[E]] [ [[F ]])!, there exist unique
strings s1 to sn such that s = (s1    sn) and e1 to ek such that e = (e1    ek). Using these
deànitions, we calculate as follows
(àlter E F ):get ((àlter E F ):put e s)
= (àlter E F ):get ((àlter E F ):put (e1    ek) (s1    sn)) by deànition s1 to sn and e1 to ek
= (àlter E F ):get (stringunlter F (e1    ek) (s1    sn)) by deànition (àlter E F ):put
= string lter E (stringunlter F (e1    ek) (s1    sn)) by deànition (àlter E F ):get
= (e1    ek) by deànition string lter
and string unlter
= e by deànition e1 to ek
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
.
.
S1!S2 V2!V1
l1 2 S1 () V1 l2 2 S2 () V2
l1  l2 2 (S1S2)() (V1V2)
3.3.9 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 () V1 and l2 2 S2 () V2 be basic lenses such that (S1!S2) and
(V2!V1). Then (l1  l2) is a basic lens in (S1S2)() (V2V1).
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Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 (S1S2). As S1!S2 there exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2 such
that s = s1s2. Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1  l2):put ((l1  l2):get s) s
= (l1  l2):put ((l1  l2):get (s1s2)) (s1s2) by deànition s1 and s2
= (l1  l2):put ((l2:get s2)(l1:get s1)) (s1s2) by deànition (l1  l2):get
= (l1:put (l1:get s1) s1)(l2:put (l2:get s2) s2) by deànition (l1  l2):put with V2!V1
and cod(l1:get) = V1
and cod(l2:get) = V2
= (s1s2) by GP for l1 and l2
= s by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let v 2 (V2V1) and s 2 (S1S2). As V2!V1 there exist unique strings v2 2 V2 and
v1 2 V1 such that v = (v2v1). Similarly, as S1!S2 there exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and
s2 2 S2 such that s = s1s2. Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1  l2):get ((l1  l2):put v s)
= (l1  l2):get ((l1  l2):put (v2v1) (s1s2)) by deànition v2, v1, s1, and s2
= (l1  l2):get ((l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s2)) by deànition (l1  l2):put
= (l2:get (l2:put v2 s2))(l1:get (l1:put v1 s2)) by deànition (l1  l2):get with S1!S2
and cod(l1:put) = S1
and cod(l2:put) = S2
= (v2v1) by PG for l2 and l1
= v by deànition v2 and v1
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
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Quotient Lens Proofs
.. l 2 S () Vlift l 2 S==() V==
4.2.1 Lemma: Let l 2 S () V be a basic lens. Then lift l is a quotient lens in S==() V==.
Proof:
I GetEquiv: Let s 2 S and s0 2 S be strings such that s = s0. We immediately have
((lift l):get s) = ((lift l):get s0).
I PutEquiv: Let v 2 V and v0 2 V be strings such that v = v0 and, likewise, let s 2 S and
s0 2 S be strings such that s = s0. We immediately have ((lift l):put v s) = ((lift l):get v0 s0).
I CreateEquiv: Let v 2 V and v0 2 V be strings such that v = v0. We immediately have
((lift l):create v) = ((lift l):create v0).
I GetPut: Immediate by (the basic lens version of) GP for l.
I PutGet: Immediate by (the basic lens version of) PG for l.
I CreateGet: Immediate by (the basic lens version of) CG for l. 
.
.
q 2 S . U=U l 2 U=U () V=V
s S s0 () q:canonize s U q:canonize s0
lquot q l 2 S=S () V=V
4.2.3 Lemma: Let q 2 S . U=U be a canonizer and l 2 U=U () V=V be a quotient
lens. Then (lquot q l) is a quotient lens in S=S () V=V where s S s0 if and only if
q:canonize s U q:canonize s0.
Proof:
I GetEquiv: Let s and s0 be strings in S such that s S s0. By the deànition of S we have
q:canonize s U q:canonize s0
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Using this equivalence, we calculate as follows
(lquot q l):get s
= l:get (q:canonize s) by deànition (lquot q l):get
V l:get (q:canonize s0) by GE for l
= (lquot q l):get s0 by deànition (lquot q l):get
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutEquiv: Let v and v0 be strings in V such that v V v0. Likewise, let s and s0 be strings in
S such that s S s0. We will prove that
(lquot q l):put v s S (lquot q l):put v0 s0
by showing that
q:canonize ((lquot q l):put v s) U q:canonize ((lquot q l):put v0 s0)
By the deànition of S we have
q:canonize s U q:canonize s0
Using this fact, we calculate as follows
q:canonize ((lquot q l):put v s)
= q:canonize (q:choose (l:put v (q:canonize s))) by deànition (lquot q l):put
U l:put v (q:canonize s) by RC for q
U l:put v0 (q:canonize s0) by PE for l
U q:canonize (q:choose (l:put v0 (q:canonize s0))) by RC for q
= q:canonize ((lquot q l):put v0 s0) by deànition (lquot q l):put
The required equivalence follows using transitivity and the deànition of S . (Throughout the
rest of this dissertation, we will silently use elementary facts about equivalence relations, such
as the transitivity of U .)
I CreateEquiv: Similar to the proof for PE.
I GetPut: Let s 2 S be a string. We will prove that
(lquot q l):put ((lquot q l):get s) s S s
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by showing that
q:canonize ((lquot q l):put ((lquot q l):get s) s) U q:canonize s
We calculate as follows, abbreviating q:canonize as cn
cn ((lquot q l):put ((lquot q l):get s) s)
= cn (q:choose (l:put ((lquot q l):get s) (cn s))) by deànition (lquot q l):put
U l:put ((lquot q l):get s) (cn s) by RC for q
= l:put (l:get (cn s)) (cn s) by deànition (lquot q l):get
U cn s by GP for l
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let v 2 V and s 2 S be strings. By RC for q we have
q:canonize (q:choose (l:put v (q:canonize s))) U l:put v (q:canonize s)
Using this equivalence, we calculate as follows, abbreviating q:canonize as cn
(lquot q l):get ((lquot q l):put v s)
= l:get (cn (q:choose (l:put v (cn s)))) by deànition (lquot q l):get and (lquot q l):put
V l:get (l:put v (cn s)) by GE for l
V v by PG for l
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateGet: Analogous to the previous case (using CG for l instead of PG). 
.
.
l 2 S=S () U=U q 2 V . U=U
v V v0 () q:canonize v U q:canonize v0
rquot l q 2 S=S () V=V
4.2.4 Lemma: Let l 2 S=S () U=U be a quotient lens and q 2 V . U=U a can-
onizer. Then rquot l q is a quotient lens in S=S () V=V where v V v0 if and only if
q:canonize v U q:canonize v0.
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Proof:
I GetEquiv: Let s 2 S and s0 2 S be strings such that s S s0. We will prove that
(rquot l q):get s V (rquot l q):get s0
by showing that
q:canonize ((rquot l q):get s) U q:canonize ((rquot l q):get s0)
We calculate as follows
q:canonize ((rquot l q):get s)
= q:canonize (q:choose (l:get s)) by deànition (rquot l q):get
U l:get s by RC for q
U l:get s0 by GE for l
U q:canonize (q:choose (l:get s0)) by RC for q
= q:canonize ((rquot l q):get s0) by deànition (rquot l q):get
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutEquiv: Let v 2 V and v0 2 V be strings such that v V v0 and similarly, let s 2 S and
s0 2 S be strings such that s S s0. By the deànition of V , we have that
q:canonize v U q:canonize v0
Using this fact, we calculate as follows
(rquot l q):put v s
= l:put (q:canonize v) s by deànition (rquot l q):put
S l:put (q:canonize v0) s0 by PE for l
= (rquot l q):put v0 s0 by deànition (rquot l q):put
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateEquiv: Similar to the proof for PG.
I GetPut: Let s 2 S. We calculate as follows
(rquot l q):put ((rquot l q):get s) s
= l:put (q:canonize (q:choose (l:get s))) s by deànition (rquot l q):get and (rquot l q):put
S l:put (l:get s) s by RC for q and PE for l
S s by GP for l
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and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let v 2 V and s 2 S. We will show that
(rquot l q):get ((rquot l q):put v s) V v
by showing that
q:canonize ((rquot l q):get ((rquot l q):put v s)) U q:canonize v
We calculate as follows
q:canonize ((rquot l q):get ((rquot l q):put v s))
= q:canonize (q:choose (l:get ((rquot l q):put v s))) by deànition (rquot l q):get
U l:get ((rquot l q):put v s) by RC for q
= l:get (l:put (q:canonize v) s) by deànition (rquot l q):put
U (q:canonize v) By PG for l
and obtain the desired equivalence.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
..q 2 V
. U=U U is a reànement of U 0
q 2 V . U=U 0
4.2.5 Lemma: Let q 2 V . U=U be a canonizer and let U 0 be an equivalence relation on
U such that U 0 is a reànement of U . Then q is also a canonizer in V . U=U 0 .
Proof:
IReCanonize: Let u 2 U be a string. As q 2 V . U=U we have q:canonize (q:choose u)U u.
Since U reànes U 0 we immediately have that q:canonize (q:choose u) U 0 u, as required. 
..
l1 2 S=S () U=U l2 2 U=U () V=V
l1;l2 2 S=S () V=V
4.2.6 Lemma: Let l1 2 S=S () U=U and l2 2 U=U () V=V be quotient lenses. Then
(l2;l2) is a quotient lens in S=S () V=V .
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Proof:
I GetEquiv: Let s 2 S and s0 2 S be strings such that s S s0. We calculate as follows
(l1;l2):get s
= l2:get (l1:get s) by deànition (l1;l2):get
V l2:get (l1:get s0) by GE for l1 and l2
= (l1;l2):get s0 by deànition (l1;l2):get
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutEquiv: Let v 2 V and v0 2 V be strings such that v V v0 and similarly, let s 2 S and
s0 2 S be strings such that s S s0. We calculate as follows
(l1;l2):put v s
= l1:put (l2:put s (l1:get s)) s by deànition (l1;l2):put
S l1:put (l2:put v0 (l:get s0)) s0 by GE for l and PE for l1 and l2
= (l1;l2):put v0 s0 by deànition (l1;l2):put
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateEquiv: Similar to the proof for PG.
I GetPut: Let S 2 S be a string. We calculate as follows
(l1;l2):put ((l1;l2):get s) s
= l1:put (l2:put (l2:get (l1:get s)) (l1:get s)) s by deànition (l1;l2):get and (l1;l2):put
S l:put (l:get s) s by GP for l2 and PE for l1
S s by GP for l
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let v 2 V and s 2 S. We calculate as follows
(l1;l2):get ((l1;l2):put v s)
= l2:get (l1:get (l1:put (l2:put v (l:get s)) s)) by deànition (l1;l2):get and (l1;l2):put
V l2:get (l2:put v (l1:get s)) by PG for l1 and GE for l2
V v by PG for l2
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
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.. l 2 S=S () U=U
canonizer of lens l 2 S . U=U
4.2.7 Lemma: Let l 2 S=S () U=U be a quotient lens. Then (canonizer of lens l) is a
canonizer in S . U=U .
Proof:
I ReCanonize:
Let u 2 U be a string. We calculate as follows, abbreviating (canonizer of lens l) as q
q:canonize (q:choose u)
= l:get (l:create u) by deànition q:canonize and q:choose
U u by CG for l
and obtain the required equivalence. 
.
.
S1!S2 V1!V2
l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1
l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2
S = S1 S2 V = V1 V2
l1l2 2 (S1S2)=S () (V1V2)=V
4.3.2 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1 and l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2 be quotient lenses
such that (S1!S2) and (V1!V2). Then (l1l2) is a quotient lens in (S1S2)=S () (V1V2)=V
where S , (S1 S2) and V , (V1 V2).
Proof:
I GetEquiv: Let s 2 (S1S2) and s0 2 (S1S2) be strings such that s S s0. As S1!S2 there
exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2 and s01 2 S1 and s02 2 S2 such that s = (s1s2) and
s0 = (s01s02). Also, by the deànition of S we have that s1 S1 s01 and s2 S2 s02. Using these
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facts and deànitions, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):get s
= (l1:get s1)  (l2:get s2) by deànition (l1l2):get
V (l1:get s01)  (l2:get s02) by GE for l1 and l2
= (l1l2):get s0
by deànition (l1l2):get
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutEquiv: Let v 2 (V1V2) and v0 2 (V1V2) be strings such that v V v0 and similarly, let
s 2 (S1S2) and s0 2 (S1S2) be strings such that s S s0. As V1!V2 there exist unique strings
v1 2 V1 and v2 2 V2 and v01 2 V1 and v02 2 V2 such that v = (v1v2) and v0 = (v01v02). Likewise,
as S1!S2 there exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2 and s01 2 S1 and s02 2 S2 such that
s = (s1s2) and s0 = (s01s02). Moreover, by the deànition of V we have that v1 V1 v01 and
v2 V2 v02 and similarly, that s1 S1 s01 and s2 S2 s02. Using these facts and deànitions, we
calculate as follows
(l1l2):put v s
= (l1l2):put (v1v2) (s1s2) by deànition v1 and v2 and s1 and s2
= (l1:put v1 s1)  (l2:put v2 s2) by deànition (l1l2):put
S (l1:put v01 s01)  (l2:put v02 s02) by PE for l1 and l2
= (l1l2):put (v01v02) (s01s02) by deànition (l1l2):put
= (l1l2):put v0 s0 by deànition v1 and v2 and s1 and s2
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateEquiv: Similar to the proof for PE.
I GetPut: Let s 2 (S1S2) be a string. As S1!S2 there exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2
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such that s = (s1s2). Using this fact, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):put ((l1l2):get s) s
= (l1l2):put ((l1l2):get (s1s2)) (s1s2) by deànition s1 and s2
= (l1l2):put ((l1:get s1)(l2:get s2)) (s1s2) by deànition (l1l2):get
= (l1:put (l1:get s1))(l2:put (l2:get s2) s2) by deànition (l1l2):put with V1!V2
and cod(l1:get) = V1 and cod(l2:get) = V2
S s1  s2 By GP for l1 and l2 and deànition of S
= s by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let v 2 (V1V2) and s 2 (S1S2) be strings. As V1!V2 there exist unique strings
v1 2 V1 and v2 2 V2 such that v = (v1v2). Likewise, as S1!S2 there exist unique strings
s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2 such that s = (s1s2). Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):get ((l1l2):put v s)
= (l1l2):get ((l1l2):put (v1v2) (s1s2)) by deànition v1 and v2 and s1 and s2
= (l1l2):get ((l1:put v1 s1)  (l2:put v2 s2)) by deànition (l1l2):put
= (l1:get (l1:put v1 s1))  (l2:get (l2:put v2 s2)) by deànition (l1l2):get with S1!S2
and cod(l1:put) = S1 and cod(l2:put) = S2
V v1  v2 By PG for l1 and l2
= v by deànition v1 and v2
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
..l 2 S=S () V=V S
! V !
l 2 S=(S)() V =(

V )
4.3.4 Lemma: Let l 2 S=S () V=V be a quotient lens such that S! and V !. Then l is a
quotient lens in S=S () V =

V .
Proof:
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I GetEquiv: Let s 2 S and s0 2 S be strings s S s0. As S! there exist unique strings
s1 2 S to sn 2 S and s01 2 S to s0m 2 S such that s = (s1    sn) and s0 = (s01    s0m). More-
over, by the deànition of S we have that (n = m) and si C s0i for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Using
these facts, we calculate as follows
l:get s
= l:get (s1    sn) by deànition s1 to sn
= (l:get s1)    (l:get sn) by deànition l:get
V  (l:get s01)    (l:get s0n) by GE for l (n times)
= l:get (s01    s0n) by deànition l:get
= l:get s0 by deànition s01 to s0n
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutEquiv: Let v 2 V  and v0 2 V  such that v V  v0 and similarly, let S 2 S and s0 2 S
such that s S s0. As V ! there exist unique strings v1 2 V to vn 2 V and v01 2 V to v0m 2 V
such that v = (v1    vn) v0 = (v01    v0n). Similarly, as uniqueiterS there exist unique strings
s1 2 V to so 2 V and s01 2 V to s0p 2 V such that s = (s1    so) s0 = (s01    s0p). Moreover, by
the deànition of V  we have (m = n) and vi V v0i for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Also, by the deànition
of S we have (o = p) and si S s0i for i 2 f1; : : : ; og. Using these facts and deànitions, we
calculate as follows
l:put v s
= l:put (v1    vn) (s1    so) by deànition v1 to vn and s1 to so
= s001    s00n by deànition l:put
where s00i =
8<:l:put vi si for i 2 f1; : : : ;max(n; o)gl:create vi for i 2 fmax(n; o) + 1; : : : ; og
S s0001    s000n by PE for l (n times)
where s000i =
8<:l:put v0i s0i for i 2 f1; : : : ;max(n; o)gl:create v0i for i 2 fmax(n; o) + 1; : : : ; og
= l:put (v01    v0n) (s01    s0o) by deànition v01 to v0n and s01 to s0o
= l:put a0 c0 by deànition l:put
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateEquiv: Similar to the proof for PE.
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I GetPut: Let s 2 S. By S! there exist unique strings s1 2 S to sn 2 S such that s =
(s1    sn). We calculate as follows
l:put (l:get s) s
= l:put (l:get (s1    sn)) (s1    sn) by deànition s1 to sn
= l:put ((l:get s1)    (l:get sn)) (s1    sn) by deànition l:get
= (l:put (l:get s1) s1)    (l:put (l:get cn) cn) by deànition l:put with V !
and cod(l:get) = V
S s1    sn by GP for l
= s by deànition s1 to sn
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let v 2 V  and s 2 S be strings. As V !, there exist unique strings v1 2 V to
vn 2 V such that v = (v1    vn). Similarly, as S! there exist unique strings s1 2 S to sn 2 S
such that s = (s1    sm). We calculate as follows
l:get (l:put v s)
= l:get (l:put (v1    vn) (s1    sm) by deànition v1 to vn and s1 to sm
= l:get (s01    s0n) by deànition l:put
where s00i =
8<:l:put vi si for i 2 f1; : : : ;max(m;n)gl:create vi for i 2 fmax(m;n) + 1; : : : ; ng
= (l:get (s01))    (l:get (s0n)) by deànition l:get and S!
and cod(l:put) = S
V  v1    vn by PG and CG for l
= v by deànition v1 to vn
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
.
.
l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1
l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2
S1 \ S2 = ;
8v; v0 2 (V1 \ V2): v V1 v0 () v V2 v0
S = S1 [ S2 V = V1 [ V2
l1 j l2 2 S1 [ S2=V () V1 [ V2=V
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4.3.5 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1 and l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2 be quotient lenses
such that (S1\S2) = ; and for all v and v0 in (V1\V2) we have v V1 v0 if and only if v V2 v0.
Then (l1 j l2) is a quotient lens in S1 [ S2=S () V1 [ V2=V where S = (S1 [ S2) and
V = (V1 [ V2).
Proof:
I GetEquiv: Let s 2 (S1[S2) and s0 2 (S1[S2) be strings such that sS s0. As (S1\S2) = ;,
we either have s 2 S1 and s0 2 S1 and s S1 s0 or s 2 S2 and s0 2 S2 and s S2 s0. We analyze
each case separately.
Case s 2 S1 and s0 2 S1: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):get s
= l1:get s
V l1:get s0 by GE for l1
= (l1 j l2):get s0
Case s 2 S1 and s0 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
I PutEquiv: Let v 2 (V1 [ V2) and v0 2 (V1 [ V2) be strings such that v V v0 and similarly, let
s 2 (S1 [ S2) and s0 2 (S1 [ S2) be strings such that s V s0. By the conditions on V1 and
V2 for strings in the intersection (V1 \ V2), we either have:
 v 2 (V1 \ V2) and v0 2 (V1 \ V2) with v V1 v0 and v V2 v0
 or v 2 (V1   V2) and v0 2 (V1   V2) with v V1 v0
 or v 2 (V2   V1) and v0 2 (V2   V1) with v V2 v0
Similarly, as (S1 \ S2) = ;, we either have
 s 2 S1 and s0 2 S1 and s S1 s0
 or s 2 S2 and s0 2 S2 s S2 s0.
We analyze several cases.
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Case v 2 V1 and v0 2 V1 and s 2 S1 and s0 2 S1: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):put v s
= l1:put v s by deànition (l1 j l2):put
S l1:put v0 s0 by PE for l1
= (l1 j l2):put v0 s0 by deànition (l1 j l2):put
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case v 2 V2 and v0 2 V2 and s 2 S2 and s0 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
Case v 2 (V1   V2) and v0 2 (V1   V2) and s 2 S2 and s0 2 S2: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):put v s
= l1:create v s by deànition (l1 j l2):put
S l1:create v0 s0 by CE for l1
= (l1 j l2):put v0 s0 by deànition (l1 j l2):put
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case v 2 (V2   V1) and v0 2 (V2   V1) and s 2 S1 and s0 2 S1: Symmetric to the previous case.
I CreateEquiv: Similar to the proof for PE.
I GetPut: Let s 2 (S1 [ S2). We analyze several cases.
Case s 2 S1: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):put ((l1 j l2):get s) s
= (l1 j l2):put (l1:get s) s by deànition (l1 j l2):get
= l1:put (l1:get s) s by deànition (l1 j l2):put and as cod(l1:get) = V1
S s by GP for l1
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
I PutGet: Let v 2 (V1 [ V2) and s 2 (S1 [ S2). We analyze several cases.
200
Case v 2 V1 and s 2 S1: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):get ((l1 j l2):put v s)
= (l1 j l2):get (l1:put v s) by deànition (l1 j l2):put
= l1:get (l1:put v s) by deànition (l1 j l2):get and cod(l1:put) = S1
V v by PG for l1
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case v 2 V2 and s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
Case v 2 (V1   V2) and s 2 S2: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):get ((l1 j l2):put v s)
= (l1 j l2):get (l1:create v) by deànition (l1 j l2):put
= l1:get (l1:create v) by deànition (l1 j l2):get and cod(l1:create) = S1
V v by CG for l1
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case V 2 (V2   V1) and s 2 S1 : Symmetric to the previous case.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
.
.
S1!S2 V2!V1
l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1 l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2
S = S1 S2 V = V2 V1
(l1  l2) 2 (S1S2)=S () (V1V2)=V
4.3.6 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1=S1 () V1=V1 and l2 2 S2=S2 () V2=V2 be quotient lenses
such that (S1!S2) and (V2!V1). Then (l1  l2) is a quotient lens in (S1S2)=S () (V2V1)=
V where S , (S1 S2) and V , (V2 V1).
Proof:
I GetEquiv: Let s 2 (S1S2) and s0 2 (S1S2) be strings such that s S s0. As S1!S2 there
exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2 and s01 2 S1 and s02 2 S2 such that s = (s1s2) and
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s0 = (s01s02). Also, by the deànition of S we have that s1 S1 s01 and s2 S2 s02. Using these
facts and deànitions, we calculate as follows
(l1  l2):get s
= (l2:get s2)  (l1:get s1) by deànition (l1  l2):get
V (l2:get s02)  (l1:get s01) by GE for l2 and l1
= (l1  l2):get s0 by deànition (l1  l2):get
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutEquiv: Let v 2 (V2V1) and v0 2 (V2V1) be strings such that v V v0 and similarly, let
s 2 (S1S2) and s0 2 (S1S2) be strings such that s S s0. As V2!V1 there exist unique strings
v2 2 V2 and v1 2 V1 and v02 2 V2 and v01 2 V1 such that v = (v2v1) and v0 = (v02v01). Likewise,
as S1!S2 there exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2 and s01 2 S1 and s02 2 S2 such that
s = (s1s2) and s0 = (s01s02). Moreover, by the deànition of V we have that v2 V2 v02 and
v1 V1 v01 and similarly, that s1 S1 s01 and s2 S2 s02. Using these facts and deànitions, we
calculate as follows
(l1  l2):put v s
= (l1  l2):put (v2v1) (s1s2) by deànition v2 and v1 and s1 and s2
= (l1:put v1 s1)  (l2:put v2 s2) by deànition (l1  l2):put
S (l1:put v01 s01)  (l2:put v02 s02) by PE for l1 and l2
= (l1  l2):put (v02v01) (s01s02) by deànition (l1  l2):put
= (l1  l2):put v0 s0 by deànition v2 and v1 and s1 and s2
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateEquiv: Similar to the proof for PE.
I GetPut: Let s 2 (S1S2) be a string. As S1!S2 there exist unique strings s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2
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such that s = (s1s2). Using this fact, we calculate as follows
(l1  l2):put ((l1  l2):get s) s
= (l1  l2):put ((l1  l2):get (s1s2)) (s1s2) by deànition s1 and s2
= (l1  l2):put ((l2:get s2)(l1:get s1)) (s1s2) by deànition (l1  l2):get
= (l1:put (l1:get s1))(l2:put (l2:get s2) s2) by deànition (l1  l2):put with V2!V1
and cod(l2:get) = V2 and cod(l1:get) = V1
S s1  s2 By GP for l1 and l2 and deànition S
= s by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let v 2 (V2V1) and s 2 (S1S2) be strings. As V2!V1 there exist unique strings
v2 2 V2 and v1 2 V1 such that v = (v2v1). Likewise, as S1!S2 there exist unique strings
s1 2 S1 and s2 2 S2 such that s = (s1s2). Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1  l2):get ((l1  l2):put v s)
= (l1  l2):get ((l1  l2):put (v2v1) (s1s2)) by deànition v2 and v1 and s1 and s2
= (l1  l2):get ((l1:put v1 s1)  (l2:put v2 s2)) by deànition (l1  l2):put
= (l1:get (l1:put v1 s1))  (ls:get (l2:put v2 s2)) by deànition (l1  l2):get with S1!S2
and cod(l1:put) = S1 and cod(l2:put) = S2
V v1  v2 By PG for l2 and l1g
= v by deànition v1 and v2
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
.
.
q1 2 S1 . U1=U1 q2 2 S2 . U2=U2
S1!S2 U = TransClosure(U1 U2)
split 2 u : (U1U2): f(u1; u2) 2 (U1  U2) j (u1u2) = ug
q1q2 2 S1S2 . U1U2=U
4.3.7 Lemma: Let q1 2 S1 . U1=U1 and q2 2 S2 . U2=U2 be canonizers such that S1!S2.
Also let split be a function in u : (U1U2): f(u1; u2) 2 (U1  U2) j (u1u2) = u. Then (q1q2)
is a canonizer in S1S2 . U1U2=U where U = TransClosure(U1 U2).
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Proof:
I ReCanonize: Let u 2 U1U2 with split u = (u1; u2). We calculate as follows
(q1q2):canonize ((q1q2):choose u)
= (q1q2):canonize ((q1q2):choose (u1c2)) by deànition u1 and u2
= (q1q2):canonize ((q1:choose u1)(q2:choose u2)) by deànition (q1q2):choose
= (q1:canonize (q1:choose u1)) as S1!S2 and cod(q1:choose) = S1
(q2:canonize (q2:choose u2)) and cod(q2:choose) = S2
U (u1u2) by RC for q1 and q2
= u by deànition u1 and u2
and obtain the required equivalence. 
.
.
q 2 S . U=U
S! 0U = TransClosure(

U )
split 2 u : : f[u1; : : : ; un] 2 U list j (u1   un) = ug
q 2 S . U=0U
4.3.9 Lemma: Let q 2 S . U=U be a canonizer such that S!. Also let split be a function
in u : : f[u1; : : : ; un] 2 U list j (u1   un) = ug. Then q is a canonizer in S . U=0U
where 0U = TransClosure(U).
Proof:
I ReCanonize: Let u 2 U be a string and let split u = [u1; : : : ; un] a list of strings. We
calculate as follows
q:canonize (q:choose u)
= q:canonize ((q:choose u1)    (q:choose bn)) by deànition q:choose
= (q:canonize (q:choose u1))    by deànition q:canonize
(q:canonize (q:choose un)) and S! and cod(q:choose) = S
U u1   un by RC for q (n times)
= u by deànition of u1   un
and obtain the required equivalence. 
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.
.
q1 2 S1 . U1=U1 (S1 \ S2) = ;
q2 2 S2 . U2=U2 U = TransClosure(U1 [ U2)
q1 j q2 2 (S1 [ S2) . (U1 [ U2)=TransClosure(U1 [ U2)
4.3.10 Lemma: Let q1 2 S1 . U1=U1 and q2 2 S2 . U2=U2 be canonizers such that
(S1 \ S2) = ;. Then (q1 j q2) is a canonizer in S1 [ S2 . (U1 [ U2)=U where U =
TransClosure(U1 [ U2).
Proof:
I ReCanonize: Let u 2 (U1 [ U2). We analyze two cases.
Case u 2 U1: We calculate as follows
(q1 j q2):canonize ((q1 j q2):choose u)
= (q1 j q2):canonize (q1:choose u) by deànition (q1 j q2):choose
= q1:canonize (q1:choose u) by deànition (q1 j q2):canonize
and cod(q1:choose) = S1
U U by RC for q1
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case u 2 U1: Symmetric to the previous case. 
.
.
l 2 S=S () V1=V1 f 2 S ! V2
V1!V2 V = V1 Tot(V2)
dup1 l f 2 S=S () (V1V2)=V
4.4.1 Lemma: Let l 2 S=S () V1=V1 be a basic lens and f 2 S ! V2 a function such that
V1!V2. Then (dup1 l f) is a quotient lens in S=S () (V1V2)=V where V = V1 V2 .
Proof:
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I GetEquiv: Let s 2 S and s0 2 S be strings such that s S s0. We calculate as follows
(dup1 l f):get s
= (l:get s)(f s) by deànition (dup1 l f):get
V (l:get s0)(f s0) by GE for l and deànition of V
= (dup1 l f):get s0
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutEquiv: Let v 2 (V1V2) and v0 2 (V1V2) be strings such that v V v0 and similarly let
s 2 S and s0 2 S be strings such that s S s0. As V1!V2 there exist unique strings v1 2 V1 and
v2 2 V2 such that v = (v1v2) and v01 2 V1 and v02 2 V2 such that v0 = (v01v02). Moreover, by the
deànition of V we have v1 V1 v01. Using these facts and deànitions, we calculate as follows
(dup1 l f):put v s
= (dup1 l f):put (v1v2) s by deànition v1 and v2
= l:put v1 s by deànition (dup1 l f):put
S l:put v01 s0 by PE for l
= (dup1 l f):put (v01v02) s0 by deànition (dup1 l f):put
= (dup1 l f):put v0 s0 by deànition v01 and v02
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateEquiv: Similar to the proof for PE.
I GetPut: Let s 2 S be a string. We calculate as follows
(dup1 l f):put ((dup1 l f):get s) s
= (dup1 l f):put ((l:get s)(f s)) s by deànition (dup1 l f):get
= l:put (l:get s) by deànition (dup1 l f):put and V1!V2
and cod(l:get) = V1 and cod(f) = V2
S s by GP for l
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let v 2 V and s 2 S be strings. As V1!V2, there exist unique strings v1 2 V1 and
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v2 2 V2 such that v = (v1v2). Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(dup1 l f):get ((dup1 l f):put v s)
= (dup1 l f):get ((dup1 l f):put (v1v2) s) by deànition v1 and v2
= (dup1 l f):get (l:put v1 s) by deànition (dup1 l f):put
= (l:get (l:put v1 s))(f (l:put v1 s)) by deànition (dup1 l f):get
V v by PG for l and deànition of V
and obtain the required equivalence.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG. 
..
f 2 S ! S0 S0  S 8s 2 S0: f s = s
normalize f 2 S . S0==
4.4.2 Lemma: Let S and S0 be sets such that S0  S. Also let f 2 S ! S0 be a function from
S to S0. Then (normalize f) is a canonizer in S . S0==.
Proof:
I ReCanonize: Let s 2 S0. We calculate as follows
(normalize f):canonize ((normalize f):choose s)
= (normalize f):canonize s by deànition (normalize f):choose
= f s by deànition (normalize f):canonize
= s as s 2 S0
and obtain the required equality. 
.
.
n 2 N sp 2  nl 2 
(nl) \ S0 = ;
S = [(sp [ nl)=sp]S0
columnize n S0 sp nl 2 S . S0==
4.4.3 Lemma: Let n be a number, S0   a language, and sp 2  and nl 2  strings
such that nl does not occur in any string in S0. Then (columnize n S0 sp nl) is a canonizer in
S . S0== where S = [(sp [ nl)=sp]S0.
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Proof:
I ReCanonize: Let s be a string in S0. The required equality,
(columnize n S0 sp nl):canonize (columnize n S0 sp nl):choose s = s
is immediate as nl does not occur in s, (columnize n S0 sp nl):choose replaces some occurrences
of s with nl, and (columnize n S0 sp nl):canonize replaces every occurrence of nl with s. 
Resourceful Lenses Proofs
5.2.2 Lemma [PutChunks]: For every resourceful lens l 2 S C;t:k() V , string v 2 bV c, skeleton
c 2 C, and resource r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg we have locs(l:put v (c; r)) = locs(v).
Proof: Let l 2 S C;t:k() V be a resourceful lens, v 2 bV c a string, c 2 C a skeleton, and
r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a resource. We calculate as follows
locs(l:put v (c; r))
= locs(l:get (l:put v (c; r))) by GC for l
= locs(v) by PG for l
and obtain the required equality. 
5.2.3 Lemma [CreateChunks]: For every resourceful lens l 2 S C;t:k() V , string v 2 bV c, and
resource r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg we have locs(l:create v r) = locs(v).
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.2.2. 
5.2.4 Lemma [ReorderPut]: For every resourceful lens l 2 S C;t:k() V , string v 2 bV c, rigid
complement c 2 C, resource r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg, and permutation q 2 Perms(v) we have:
q	 (l:put v (c; r)) = l:put ( q	 v) (c; r  q 1).
Proof: Let l 2 S C;t:k() V be a resourceful lens, v 2 bV c a string, c 2 C a rigid complement,
r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a resource, and q 2 Perms(v) a permutation on the chunks in v such that
dom(r) = (locs(v)). To shorten the proof, deàne strings s1 and s2 as follows:
s1 , l:put ( q	 v) (c; r  q 1) s2 , q	 (l:put v (c; r))
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First, we demonstrate that the sets of locations in s1 and s2 are identical, by calculating as
follows:
locs(s1) = locs(l:put ( q	 v) (c; r  q 1)) by deànition s1
= locs( q	 v) by Lemma 5.2.2 for l
= locs(v) by deànition locs and 	
= locs(l:put v (c; r)) by Lemma 5.2.2 for l
= locs( q	 (l:put v (c; r))) by deànition locs and 	
= locs(s2) by deànition of s2
Next, we show that for every location x 2 locs(s1) the chunk at x in s1 is identical to the
chunk at x in s2. Let x 2 locs(s1) be a location. We analyze two cases.
Case q 1(x) 2 dom(r): We calculate as follows
s1[x] = l:put ( q	 v) (c; r  q 1)[x] by deànition s
= k:put (( q	 v)[x]) ((r  q 1)(x)) by CP for l
= k:put (v[q 1(x)]) (r(q 1(x))) by deànition 	 and []
= (l:put v (c; r))[q 1(x)] by CP for l
= ( q	 (l:put v (c; r)))[x] by deànition 	 and []
= s2[x] by deànition s2
and obtain the required equality.
Case q 1(x) 62 dom(r): Similar to the previous case.
Finally, we prove that skel(s1) = skel(s2). Observe that skel(v) = skel( q	 v). Using this fact,
we calculate as follows:
skel(s1) = skel(k:put ( q	 v) (c; r  q 1)) by deànition s1
= skel(l:put v (c; r)) by SP for l
= skel( q	 (l:put v (c; r))) by deànition skel and 	
= skel(s2) by deànition s2
Putting all these facts together we have s1 = s2, which completes the proof. 
A.1.29 Lemma [ReorderCreate]: For every resourceful lens l 2 S C;t:k() V , string v 2 bV c,
rigid complement c 2 C, resource r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg, and permutation q 2 Perms(v) we have:
q	 (l:create v r) = l:create ( q	 v) (r  q 1).
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Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.2.4. 
.. l 2 S
C;t:k() V
blc 2 bSc () bV c
5.2.5 Lemma: Let l 2 S C;t:k() V be a resourceful lens. Then blc is a basic lens in bSc () bV c.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 bSc. We calculate as follows
blc:put (blc:get s) (blc:res s)
= blc:put (l:get s) s by deànition blc:get and blc:res
= l:put (l:get s) (c; r  g) by deànition blc:put
where c; r = l:res s
and g = align(l:get s; l:get s)
= l:put (l:get s) (c; r) By AI, GC, and RC
= l:put (l:get s) (l:res s) by deànition (c; r)
= s by GP for l
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let v 2 bV c and s 2 bSc. We calculate as follows
blc:get (blc:put v s)
= blc:get (l:put v (c; r  g)) by deànition blc:put
where c; r = l:res s
and g = align(v; l:get s)
= l:get (l:put v (c; r  g)) by deànition blc:get
= v by PG for l
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Let v 2 bV c. We calculate as follows
blc:get (blc:create v)
= blc:get (l:create v fjjg) by deànition blc:create
= l:get (l:create v fjjg) by deànition blc:put
= v by CG for l
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and obtain the required equality, which completes the proof. 
..k 2 S
0 () V 0 l 2 S () Vbl 2 S S;t:k() V
5.3.1 Lemma: Let l 2 S () V and k 2 S0 () V 0 be basic lenses. Then bl is a resourceful lens
in S C;t:k() V .
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 bSc be a string. As S is an ordinary regular expression, we have that
s 2 S. Using this fact, we calculate as follows
bl:put (bl:get s) (bl:res s)
= bl:put (l:get s) (l:res s; fjjg) by deànition of bl:get and bl:res
= l:put (l:get s) (l:res s) by deànition of bl:put
= s by GP for l
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let v 2 bV c be a string, c 2 C a rigid complement, r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a resource.
As V is an ordinary regular expression, we have that v 2 V . Using this fact, we calculate as
follows bl:get (bl:put v (c; r))
= bl:get (l:put v c) by deànition bl:put
= l:get (l:put v c) by deànition bl:get
= v by PG for l
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Let v 2 bV c be a string and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a resource. As V is an ordinary
regular expresion, we have that v 2 V . Using this fact, we calculate as follows
bl:get (bl:create v r)
= bl:get (l:create v) by deànition bl:create
= l:get (l:create v) by deànition bl:get
= v by CG for l
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and obtain the required equality.
I GetChunks: Let s 2 bSc. We calculate as follows
locs(s) = ; as S is an ordinary regular expression
= locs(bl:get s) as V is an ordinary regular expression
and obtain the required equality.
I ResChunks: Let s 2 bSc be a string, c 2 C a rigid complement, and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a
resource such that (c; r) = bl:res s. By the deànition of bl:res we have that r = fjjg. Using this
fact, we calculate as follows
locs(s) = ; as S is an ordinary regular expression
= dom(r) as r = fjjg
and obtain the required equality.
I ChunkPut: Vacuously holds. Suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists a string v 2 bV c,
a resource r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg, and a location x 2 (locs(v)\dom(r)). As V is an ordinary regular
expression, we have locs(v) = ;, which contradicts x 2 locs(v).
I ChunkCreate: Vacuously holds by the same argument as the proof for CP.
I NoChunkPut: Vacuously holds by the same argument as the proof for CP.
I NoChunkCreate: Vacuously holds by the same argument as the proof for CP.
I SkelPut: Let v 2 bV c and v0 2 bV c be strings, c 2 C a rigid complement, and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg
and r0 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg resources such that skel(v) = skel(v0). As V is an ordinary regular
expression, we have that v = v0. Using this fact, we calculate as follows:
skel(bl:put v (c; r))
= skel(l:put v c) by deànition bl:put
= skel(l:put v0 c) as v = v0
= skel(bl:put v0 (c; r0)) by deànition bl:put
and obtain the required equality.
I SkelCreate: Similar to the proof for SP. 
..t 2 T k 2 S () V
ht : ki 2 hSi fg;t:k(=) hV i
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5.3.2 Lemma: Let t 2 T be a tag and k 2 S () V be a basic lens. Then ht : ki is a resourceful
lens in hSi fg;t:k(=) hV i.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 bhSic. By the semantics of chunk-annotated regular expressions we also
have s 2 S. Using this fact, we calculate as follows
ht : ki:put (ht : ki:get s) (ht : ki:res s)
= ht : ki:put (k:get s) (; fj1 7! sjg) by deànition ht : ki:get and ht : ki:res
= k:put (k:get s) (fj1 7! sjg(1)) by deànition ht : ki:put with 1 2 dom(fj1 7! sjg)
= k:put (k:get s) s by deànition application
= s by GP for k
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let v 2 bhV ic be a string,  2 fg a rigid complement, and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a
resource. By the semantics of chunk-annotated regular expressions we also have v 2 V . Using
this fact, we calculate as follows
ht : ki:get (ht : ki:put v (; r))
=
8<:k:get (k:put v r(1)) if 1 2 dom(r)k:get (k:create v) otherwise by the deànition of ht : ki:get and ht : ki:put
= v by PG or CG for l
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG.
I GetChunks: Let s 2 bhSic. We calculate as follows
locs(s) = f1g by deànition locs
= locs(ht : ki:get s) by deànition locs
and obtain the required equality.
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I ResChunks: Let s 2 bhSic be a string,  2 fg a rigid complement, and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a
resource such that (; r) = ht : ki:res s. We calculate as follows
dom(r) = dom(fj1 7! sjg) by deànition ht : ki:res with r = ht : ki:res s
= f1g by deànition dom
= locs(s) by deànition locs
and obtain the required equality.
I ChunkPut: Let v 2 bhV ic be a string,  2 fg a rigid complement, r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a
resource, and x 2 (locs(v) \ dom(r)) a location. As locs(v) = f1g we must have that x = 1
and 1 2 dom(r). Using these facts and deànitions, we calculate as follows
(ht : ki:put v (; r))[x]
= ht : ki:put v (; r) by deànition [] and x = 1
= k:put v (r(1)) by deànition ht : ki:put and as 1 2 dom(r)
= k:put (v[x]) (r(x)) by deànition [] and x = 1
and obtain the required equality.
I ChunkCreate: Similar to the proof of CP.
I NoChunkPut: Let v 2 bhV ic be a string,  2 fg a rigid complement, r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a
resource, and x 2 (locs(v)   dom(r)) a location. As locs(v) = f1g we must have that x = 1
and 1 62 dom(r). Using these facts and deànitions, we calculate as follows
(ht : ki:put v (; r))[x]
= ht : ki:put v (; r) by deànition [] and x = 1
= k:create v by deànition ht : ki:put and as 1 62 dom(r)
= k:create (v[x]) by deànition [] and x = 1
and obtain the required equality.
I NoChunkCreate: Similar to the proof for NCP.
I SkelPut: Let v 2 bhV ic and v0 2 bhV ic be strings,  2 fg a rigid complement, and
r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg and r0 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg resources such that skel(v) = skel(v). We calculate as
follows
skel(ht : ki:put v (; r)) =  by deànition skel
= skel(ht : ki:put v0 (; r0)) by deànition skel
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and obtain the required equality.
I SkelCreate: Similar to the proof for SP, which completes the proof. 
.
.
bS1c!bS2c bV1c!bV2c
l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2
(l1l2) 2 (S1S2) (C1C2);t:k(===) (V1V2)
5.3.3 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 and l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2 be resourceful lenses such that
bS1c!bS2c and bV1c!bV2c. Then (l1l2) is a resourceful lens in (S1S2) (C1C2);t:k(===) (V1V2).
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 bS1S2c. As bS1c!bS2c there exist unique strings s1 2 bS1c and s2 2 bS2c
such that s = (s1s2). Using this fact, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):put ((l1l2):get s) ((l1l2):res s)
= (l1l2):put ((l1l2):get (s1s2)) ((l1l2):res (s1s2)) by deànition s1 and s2
= (l1l2):put ((l1:get s1) by deànition (l1l2):get
(l2:get s2)) ((c1; c2); r1 ++ r2) and (l1l2):res
where c1; r1 = l1:res s1
and c2; r2 = l2:res s2
= (l1:put (l1:get s1) (c1; r01)) by deànition (l1l2):put with bV1c!bV2c
(l2:put (l2:get s2) (c2; r02)) and cod(l1:get) = bV1c
where r01; r02 = split(jl:get s1j; r1 ++ r2) and cod(l2:get) = bV2c
= (l1:put (l1:get s1) (c1; r1)) by GC and RC for l1
(l2:put (l2:get s2) (c2; r2)) and deànition split
= (s1s2) by GP for l1 and l2
= s by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let v 2 bV1V2c and (c1; c2) 2 (C1 C2) and r 2 fjN 7! k:C 0jg. As bV1c!bV2c there
exist unique strings v1 2 bV1c and v2 2 bV2c such that v = v1v2. Using this fact, we calculate
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as follows
(l1l2):get ((l1l2):put v ((c1; c2); r))
= (l1l2):get ((l1l2):put (v1v2) ((c1; c2); r)) by deànition v1 and v2
= (l1l2):get ((l1:put v1 (c1; r1))(l2:put v2 (c2; r2))) by deànition (l1l2):put
where r1; r2 = split(jv1j; r)
= (l1:get (l1:put v1 (c1; r1))) by deànition (l1l2):get with bS1c!bS2c
(l2:get (l2:put v2 (c2; r2))) and cod(l1:put) = bS1c
and cod(l2:put) = bS2c
= (v1v2) by PG for l1 and l2
= v by deànition v1 and v2
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG.
I GetChunks: Let s 2 bS1S2c. As bS1c!bS2c there exist unique strings s1 2 bS1c and
s2 2 bS2c such that s = s1s2. Using this fact, we calculate as follows
locs(s)
= locs(s1s2) by deànition s1 and s2
= f1; : : : ; (js1j+ js2j)g by deànition locs
= f1; : : : ; (jl1:get s1j+ jl2:get s2j)g by GC for l1 and l2
= locs((l1:get s1)(l2:get s2)) by deànition locs
= locs((l1l2):get (s1s2)) by deànition (l1l2):get
= locs((l1l2):get s) by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equality.
I ResChunks: Let s 2 bS1S2c be a string, (c1; c2) 2 (C1  C2) a rigid complement, and
r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a resource with ((c1; c2); r) = (l1l2):res s. As bS1c!bS2c there exist unique
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strings s1 2 bS1c and s2 2 bS2c such that s = (s1s2). Using this fact, we calculate as follows
dom(r)
= dom(r1 ++ r2) by deànition r and (l1l2):res
where r1; c1 = l1:res s1
and r2; c2 = l2:res s2
= dom(r1) [ fi+max(dom(r1)) j i 2 dom(r2)g by deànition (++) and dom
= (locs(s1)) [ fi+max(locs(s1)) j i 2 (locs(s2))g by RC for l1 and l2
= f1; : : : ; (js1j+ js2j)g by deànition j  j
= locs(s1s2) by deànition locs
= locs(s) by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equality.
I ChunkPut: Let v 2 bV1V2c and (c1; c2) 2 (C1  C2) and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg and x 2
(locs(v)\ dom(r)). As bV1c!bV2c there exist unique strings v1 2 bV1c and v2 2 bV2c such that
v = (v1v2). We analyze two cases.
Case x 2 locs(v1): We calculate as follows
((l1l2):put v ((c1; c2); r))[x]
= ((l1l2):put (v1v2) ((c1; c2); r))[x] by deànition v1 and v2
= ((l1:put v1 (c1; r1))(l2:put v2 (c2; r2)))[x] by deànition (l1l2):put
where r1; r2 = split(jvj; r)
= (l1:put v1 (c1; r1))[x] by Lemma 5.2.2 and deànition []
= k:put (v1[x]) (r1(x)) by CP for l1
= k:put ((v1v2)[x]) ((r1 ++ r2)(x)) by deànition [] and (++)
= k:put (v[x]) (r(x)) by deànition split and v1; v2; r1 and r2
and obtain the required equality.
Case x 62 (locs(v1)): Similar to the previous case.
I ChunkCreate: Similar to the proof for CP.
I NoChunkPut: Similar to the proof for CP.
I NoChunkCreate: Similar to the proof for CP.
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I SkelPut: Let v 2 bV1V2c and v0 2 bV1V2c be strings, (c1; c2) 2 (C1C2) a rigid complement,
and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg and r0 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg resources such that skel(v) = skel(v0). As
bV1c!bV2c there exist unique strings v1 2 bV1c and v2 2 bV2c and v01 2 bV1c and v02 2 bV2c
such that v = (v1v2) and v0 = (v01v02). Moreover, using the deànition of skel we have that
skel(v1) = skel(v01) and skel(v2) = skel(v02). Using these facts and deànitions, we calculate as
follows
skel((l1l2):put v (c1; c2; r))
= skel((l1l2):put (v1v2) ((c1; c2); r)) by deànition v1 and v2
= skel(l1:put v1 (c1; r1))(l2:put v2 (c2; r2)) by deànition (l1l2):put
where r1; r2 = split(jv1j; r)
= skel(l1:put v1 (c1; r1))skel(l2:put v2 (c2; r2)) by deànition skel
= skel(l1:put v01 (c1; r01))skel(l2:put v02 (c2; r02)) by SP for l1 and l2
where r01; r02 = split(jv01j; r0)
= skel(l1:put v01 (c1; r01))(l2:put v02 (c2; r02)) by deànition skel
= skel((l1l2):put (v01v02) ((c1; c2); r0)) by deànition (l1l2):put and r01 and r02
= skel((l1l2):put v0 ((c1; c2); r)) by deànition v01 and v02
and obtain the required equality.
I SkelCreate: Similar to the proof for SP, which completes the proof. 
..l 2 S
C;t:k() V bSc! bV c!
l 2 S (C list);t:k(=) V 
5.3.4 Lemma: Let l 2 S C;t:k() V be a resourceful lens such that bSc! and bV c!. Then l is a
resourceful lens in S (C list);t:k(=) V .
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 bSc. As bSc! there exist unique strings s1 2 bSc to sn 2 bSc such
that s = (s1    sn). To shorten the proof, let (ci; ri) = l:res si for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and
r = (r1 ++ : : : ++ rn). Also let r000 = r and (r0i; r00i ) = split(jl:get sij; )r00i for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng.
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Using these facts and deànitions, we calculate as follows
l:put (l:gets) (l:res s)
= l:put (l:get(s1    sn)) (l:res (s1    sn)) by deànition s1 to sn
= l:put ((l:get s1)    (l:get sn)) ([c1; : : : ; cn]; r) by deànition l:get and l:res
= (l:put (l:get s1) (c1; r01))    by deànition l:put with bV c!
(l:put (l:get sn) (cn; r0n)) and cod(l:get) = bV c
= (l:put (l:get s1) (c1; r1))    by GC and RC for l
(l:put (l:get sn) (cn; rn)) and deànition split
= (s1    sn) by GP for l
= s by deànition s1 to sn
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let v 2 bV c be a string, [c1; : : : ; cm] 2 (C list) a rigid complement, and r 2
fjN 7! k:Sjg a resource. As bV c! there exist unique strings v1 2 bV c to vn 2 bV c such that
v = (v1    vn). Let r00 = r and (ri; r0i) = split(jvij; r0(i 1)) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Using these facts
and deànitions, we calculate as follows
l:get (l:put v ([c1; : : : ; cm]; r))
= l:get (l:put (v1    vn) ([c1; : : : ; cm]; r)) by deànition of v1 to vn
= l:get (s01    s0n) by the deànition of l:put
where s0i =
8<:l:put vi (ci; ri) i 2 f1; : : : ;min(n;m)gl:create vi ri i 2 fm+ 1; : : : ; ng
= (l:get s01)    (l:get s0n) by the deànition of l:get with bV c!
and cod(l:put) = cod(l:create) = bV c
= (v1    vn) by PG and CG for l
= v by the deànition of v1 to vn
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG.
I GetChunks: Let s 2 bSc. As bSc! there exist unique strings s1 2 bSc to sn 2 bSc such
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that s = (s1    sn). Using these facts, we calculate as follows
locs(s)
= locs(s1    sn) by deànition s1 to sn
= f1; : : : ;Pni=1 jsijg by deànition locs
= f1; : : : ;Pni=1 jl:get sijg by GC for l
= locs((l:get s1)    (l:get sn)) by deànition locs with bV c! and cod(l:get) = bV c
= locs(l:get (s1    sn)) by deànition l:get
= locs(l:get s) by deànition s1 to sn
and obtain the required equality.
I ResChunks: Let s 2 bSc be a string, c 2 (C list) a rigid complement, and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg)
a resource such that c; r) = l:res s. As S! there exist unique strings s1 2 bSc to sn 2 bSc
such that s = (s1    sn). To shorten the proof, let (ci; ri) = l:res si for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Using
these fact and deànitions, we calculate as follows
dom(r)
= dom(r1 ++ : : : ++ rn) by deànition l:res
=
Sn
i=1 fj +
P(i 1)
k=1 max(dom(rk)) j j 2 dom(ri)g by deànition (++) and dom
=
Sn
i=1 fj +
P(i 1)
k=1 max(locs(l:get xk)) j j 2 locs(l:get si)g by RC for l
= f1; : : : ;P i = 1n jl:get sijg by deànition j  j
= locs((l:get s1)    (l:get sn)) by deànition locs
= locs(l:get (s1    sn)) by deànition l:get
= locs(l:get s) by deànition s1 to sn
and obtain the required equality.
I ChunkPut: Let v 2 bV c be a string, [c1; : : : ; cm] 2 (C list) a rigid complement, r 2 fjN 7!
k:Sjg a resource, and x 2 (locs(v) \ dom(r)) a location. As bV c! there exist unique strings
v1 2 bV c to vn 2 bV c such that v = (v1    vn). To shorten the proof, let r00 = r and (ri; r0i) =
split(jvij; r0(i 1)) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. We analyze several cases.
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Case x 2 locs(v1): We calculate as follows
(l:put v ([c1; : : : ; cm]; r))[x]
= (l:put (v1    vn) ([c1; : : : ; cm]; r))[x] by deànition v1 to vn
= (s01    s0n)[x] by deànition l:put
where s0i =
8<:l:put vi (ci; ri) i 2 f1; : : : ;min(n;m)gl:create vi ri i 2 fm+ 1; : : : ; ng
= s01[x] by Lemmas 5.2.2-5.2.3 and deànition []
= k:put v1 (r1(x)) by CP and CC for l
= k:put (v1    vn)[x] ((r1 ++ : : : ++ rn)(x)) by deànition [] and ++
= k:put v[x] (r(x)) by deànition split , v1 to vn, and r1 to rn
and obtain the required equality.
Case x 62 locs(v1): Similar to the previous case.
I ChunkCreate: Similar to the proof for CP.
I NoChunkPut: Similar to the proof for CP.
I NoChunkCreate: Similar to the proof for CP.
I SkelPut: Let v 2 bV c and v0 2 bV c be strings, [c1; : : : ; cm] 2 (C list) a rigid complement,
and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg and r0 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg resources such that skel(v) = skel(v0). As
bV c! there exist unique strings v1 2 bV c to vn 2 bV c and v01 2 bV c to v0n 2 bV c such that
v = (v1    vn) and v0 = (v1    v0o). Moreover, by the deànition of skel we have that n = o and
skel(vi) = skel(v0i) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng. To shorten the proof, let
r00 = r (ri; r0i) = split(jvij; r0(i 1)) for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
r000 = r0 (r00i ; r
000
i ) = split(jv0ij; r000(i 1)) for i 2 f1; : : : ; og
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Using these facts and deànitions, we calculate as follows
skel(l:put v ([c1; : : : ; cm]; r))
= skel(l:put (v1    vn) ([c1; : : : ; cm]; r)) by deànition v1 to vn
= skel(s01    s0n) by the deànition of l:put
where s0i =
8<:l:put vi (ci; ri) i 2 f1; : : : ;min(n;m)gl:create vi ri i 2 fm+ 1; : : : ; ng
= (skel(s01))    (skel(s0n)) by the deànition of skel
= (skel(s001))    (skel(s00n)) by SP and SC for l
where s00i =
8<:l:put v0i (ci; r00i ) i 2 f1; : : : ;min(n;m)gl:create v0i r00i i 2 fm+ 1; : : : ; ng
= skel(s001    s00n) by the deànition of skel
= skel(l:put (v01    v0n) ([c1; : : : ; cm]; r0)) by deànition l:put and r001 to r00n
= skel(l:put v0 ([c1; : : : ; cm]; r0)) by deànition v01 to v0n
and obtain the required equality.
I SkelCreate: Similar to the proof for SP. 
.
.
bS1c \ bS2c = ; bV1c \ bV2c  bV1 \ V2c
l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2
(l1 j l2) 2 (S1 [ S2) (C1+C2);t:k(===) (V1 [ V2)
5.3.5 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 and l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2 be resourceful lenses such that bS1c \
bS2c = ; and bV1c \ bV2c  bV1 \V2c. Then (l1 j l2) is a resourceful lens in (S1 [S2) (C1+C2);t:k(===)
(V1 [ V2).
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 bS1 [ S2c. We analyze two cases.
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Case s 2 bS1c: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):put ((l1 j l2):get s) ((l1 j l2):res s)
= (l1 j l2):put (l1:get s) (Inl(c1); r) by deànition (l1 j l2):get and (l1 j l2):res
where c1; r = l:res s with s 2 bS1c
= l1:put (l1:get s) (c1; r) by the deànition of (l1 j l2):put
with cod(l:get) = bV1c
= l1:put (l1:get s) (l1:res s) by the deànition of (c1; r)
= s by PG for l1
and obtain the required equality, which ànishes the case.
Case s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
I PutGet: Let v 2 bV1 [V2c and c 2 (C1+C2) and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg. We analyze several cases.
Case v 2 bV1c and c = Inl(c1): We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):get ((l1 j l2):put v (c; r))
= (l1 j l2):get (l1:put v (c1; r)) by deànition (l1 j l2):put
= l1:get (l1:put v (c1; r)) by deànition (l1 j l2):get with cod(l1:put) = bS1c
= v by PG for l
and obtain the required equality.
Case v 2 bV2c and c = Inr(c2): Symmetric to the previous case.
Case v 62 bV2c and c = Inr(c2): We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):get ((l1 j l2):put v (c; r))
= (l1 j l2):get (l1:create v r) by deànition (l1 j l2):put
= l1:get (l1:create v r) by deànition (l1 j l2):get with cod(l1:create) = bS1c
= v by CG for l
and obtain the required equality.
Case v 62 bV1c and c = Inl(c1): Symmetric to the previous case.
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I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG.
I GetChunks: Let s 2 bS1 [ S2c. As (bV1c \ bV2c)  bV1 \ V2c, for every v 2 bV1 \ V2c we
have that the set of chunks of v speciàed by V1 and by V2 are identical. We analyze two cases.
Case s 2 bS1c: We calculate as follows
locs(s) = locs(l1:get s) by GC for l1
= locs((l1 j l2):get s) by deànition (l1 j l2):get with s 2 bS1c
and obtain the required equality.
Case s 2 bS2c: Symmetric to the previous case.
I ResChunks: Let s 2 bS1 [S2c be a string, c 2 (C1+C2) a rigid complement, and r 2 fjN 7!
k:Sjg a resource such that (c; r) = (l1 j l2):res s. We analyze two cases.
Case s 2 bS1c: By the assumption of the case and the deànition of (l1 j l2):res we have that
c = Inl(c1) where c1; r = l1:res s. The required equality, locs(s) = dom(r), is immediate
by RC for l1.
Case s 2 bS1c: Symmetric to the previous case.
I ChunkPut: Let v 2 bV1[V2c be a string, k 2 (C1+C2) a rigid complement, r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg
a resource, and x 2 (locs(v) \ dom(r)) a location. We analyze several cases.
Case v 2 bV1c and c = Inl(c1): As (bV1c \ bV2c)  bV1 \V2c, we have that x is also a location
of a chunk as speciàed by V1. Using this fact, we calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):put v (c; r)[x]
= l1:put v (c1; r)[x] by deànition (l1 j l2):put with v 2 bV1c and c = Inl(c1)
= k:put (v[x]) (r(x)) by CP for l1
and obtain the required equality.
Case v 2 bV2c and c = Inr(c2): Symmetric to the previous case.
224
Case v 62 bV2c and c = Inr(c2): We calculate as follows.
(l1 j l2):put v (c; r)[x]
= l1:create v r[x] by deànition (l1 j l2):put with v 62 bV2c and c = Inr(c2)
= k:put (v[x]) (r(x)) by CC for l1
and obtain the required equality.
Case v 62 bV1c and c = Inl(c1): Symmetric to the previous case.
I ChunkCreate: Similar to the proof for CP.
I NoChunkPut: Similar to the proof for CP.
I NoChunkCreate: Similar to the proof for CP.
I SkelPut: Let v 2 bV1 [ V2c and v0 2 bV1 [ V2c be strings, c 2 (C1 +C2) a rigid complement,
and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg and r0 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg resources such that skel(v) = skel(v0). We analyze
several cases.
Case v 2 bV1c and v0 2 bV1c and c = Inl(c1): Using the assumptions of the case, we calculate
as follows
skel((l1 j l2):put v (c; r))
= skel(l1:put v (c1; r)) by deànition (l1 j l2):put with v 2 bV1c and c = Inl(c1)
= skel(l1:put v0 (c1; r0)) by SP for l1
= skel((l1 j l2):put v0 (c; r0)) by deànition (l1 j l2):put with v0 2 bV1c and c = Inl(c1)
and obtain the required equality.
Case v 2 bV2c and v0 2 bV2c and c = Inr(c2): Symmetric to the previous case.
Case v 2 bV1c and v0 2 bV1c and c = Inr(c2): Similar to the àrst case.
Case v 2 bV2c and v0 2 bV2c and c = Inl(c1): Similar to the àrst case.
Case v 2 bV1c and v0 62 bV1c: Can’t happen. As skel(v) = skel(v0), we have the sets of loca-
tions locs(v) and locs(v0) are identical. Let v00 be the string obtained from v by setting
the chunk at every location in locs(v) to the corresponding chunk in v0. By construction,
we have v0 = v0. By chunk compatibility we also have v00 2 bV1c. However, by the
assumptions of the case, we have v0 62 bV1c, which is a contradiction.
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Case v 2 bV2c and v0 62 bV2c: Symmetric to the previous case.
I SkelCreate: Similar to the proof for SP, which completes the proof. 
..
l1 2 S C1;t1:k1(=) U l2 2 U C2;t2:k2(=) V
(l1;l2) 2 S (C1
C2);t2:(k1;k2)(=====) V
5.3.6 Lemma: Let l1 2 S C1;k1(=) U and l2 2 U C2;k2(=) V be resourceful lenses. Then (l1;l2) is a
resourceful lens in S (C1
C2);(k1;k2)(=====) V .
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 bSc. We calculate as follows
(l1;l2):put ((l1;l2):get s) ((l1;l2):res s)
= (l1;l2):put (l2:get (l1:get s)) (hc1; c2i; zip r1 r2) by deànition (l1;l2):get
where c1; r1 = l1:res s and (l1;l2):res
and c2; r2 = l2:res (l1:get s)
= l1:put (l2:put (l2:get (l1:get s)) (c2; r02)) (c1; r01) by deànition (l1;l2):put
with r01; r02 = unzip (zip r1 r2)
= l1:put (l2:put (l2:get (l1:get s)) (c2; r2)) (c1; r1) as unzip(zip r1 r2) = r1; r2
= l1:put (l2:put (l2:get (l1:get s)) (l2:res (l1:get s))) (l1:res s) by deànition (c1; r1)
and (c2; r2)
= l1:put (l1:get s) (l1:res s) by GP for l2
= s by GP for l1
and obtain the required equality.
I PutGet: Let v 2 V and hc1; c2i 2 (C1 
 C2) and r 2 fjN 7! (k1;k2):Cjg. We calculate as
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follows
(l1;l2):get ((l1;l2):put v (hc1; c2i; r))
= (l1;l2):get (l1:put (l2:put v (c2; r2)) (c1; r1)) by deànition (l1;l2):put
where r1; r2 = unzip r
= l2:get (l1:get (l1:put (l2:put v (c2; r2)) (c1; r1))) by deànition (l1;l2):get
= l2:get (l2:put v (c2; r2)) by PG for l1
= v by PG for l2
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG.
I GetChunks: Let s 2 bSc. We calculate as follows
locs(s) = locs(l1:get s) by GC for l1
= locs(l2:get (l1:get s)) by GC for l2
= locs((l1;l2):get s) by deànition (l1;l2):get
and obtain the required equality.
I ResChunks: Let s 2 bSc be a string, (c1; c2) 2 (C1
C2), a rigid complement, and r 2 fjN 7!
(k1;k2):Cjg a resource with (c; r) = (l1;l2):res s. The proof goes in three steps.
First, we show that the set of locations in s is equal to the domain of the resource computed
from s using l1:res.
locs(s) = dom(r1) by RC for l1
where c1; r2 = l1:res s
Next, we show that the set of locations in s is equal to the domain of the resource computed
from (l1:get s) using l2:res.
locs(s) = locs(l1:get s) by GC for l1
dom(r2) by RC for l2
where c2; r2 = l2:res (l1:get s)
Finally, using these facts, we calculate as follows
locs(s)
= dom(zip r1 r2) by deànition zip with dom(r1) = locs(s) = dom(r2)
= dom(r) by deànition (l1;l2):res
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and obtain the required equality.
I ChunkPut: Let v 2 bV c be a string, hc1; c2i 2 (C1 
 C2) a rigid complement, r 2 fjN 7!
(k1;k2):Cjg a resource, and x 2 (locs(v) \ dom(r)) a location. We calculate as follows
((l1;l2):put v (hc1; c2i; r))[x]
= (l1:put (l2:put (c2; r2)) (c1; r1))[x] by deànition (l1;l2):put
where r1; r2 = unzip r
= k1:put ((l2:put v (c2; r2))[x]) (r1(x)) by CP for l1
= k1:put (k2:put (v[x]) (r2(x))) (r1(x)) by CP for l2
= (k1;k2):put (v[x]) hr1(x); r2(x)i by deànition of (k1;k2):put
= (k1;k2):put (v[x]) (r(x)) by deànition (r1; r2) and unzip
and obtain the required equality.
I ChunkCreate: Similar to the proof for CP.
I NoChunkPut: Similar to the proof for CP.
I NoChunkCreate: Similar to the proof for CP.
I SkelPut: Let v 2 bV c and v0 2 bV c be strings hc1; c2i 2 C1 
 C2 a rigid complement, and
r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg and r0 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg resources such that skel(v) = skel(v0). To shorten the
proof, let r1 and r2 and r01 and r02 be resources, and u and u0 be strings deàned as follows:
r1; r2 = unzip r
r01; r02 = unzip r0
u = l2:put v (c2; r2)
u0 = l2:put v0 (c2; r02)
Observe that skel(u) = skel(u0) by SP for l2. Using these facts and deànitions, we calcu-
late as follows
skel((l1;l2):put v (hc1; c2i; r))
= skel(l1:put (l2:put v (c2; r2)) (c1; r1)) by deànition (l1;l2):put
= skel(l1:put u (c1; r1)) by deànition u
= skel(l1:put u0 (c1; r01)) by SP for l1
= skel(l1:put (l2:put v0 (c2; r02)) (c1; r01)) by deànition u0
= skel((l1;l2):put v0 (hc2; c2i; r0)) by deànition (l1;l2):put
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and obtain the required equality.
I SkelCreate: Similar to the proof for SP. 
.
.
bS1c!bS2c bV2c!bV1c
l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2
(l1  l2) 2 (S1S2) (C2C1);t:k(===) (V2V1)
5.3.7 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 C1;t:k() V1 and l2 2 S2 C2;t:k() V2 be lenses with bS1c!bS2c and
bV1c!bV2c. Then (l1  l2) is a resourceful lens in (S1S2) (C2C1);t:k(===) (V2V1).
Proof:
I GetPut: Let s 2 bS1S2c. As bS1c!bS2c there exist unique strings s1 2 bS1c and s2 2 bS2c
such that s = (s1s2). Using this fact, we calculate as follows
(l1  l2):put ((l1  l2):get s) ((l1  l2):res s)
= (l1  l2):put ((l1  l2):get (s1s2)) ((l1  l2):res (s1s2)) by deànition s1 and s2
= (l1  l2):put ((l2:get s2)(l1:get s1)) ((c2; c1); r2 ++ r1) by deànition (l1  l2):get
where c1; r1 = l1:res s1 and (l1  l2):res
and c2; r2 = l2:res s2
= (l1:put (l1:get s1) (c1; r01))(l2:put (l2:get s2) (c2; r02)) by deànition (l1  l2):put
where r01; r02 = split(jv2j; r2 ++ r1) with bV2c!bV1c
and cod(l2:get) = bV2c
and cod(l1:get) = bV1c
= (l1:put (l1:get s1) (c1; r1)) by GC for l1
(l2:put (l2:get s2) (c2; r2)) and RC for l1
and deànition split
= (l1:put (l1:get s1) (l1:res s1)) by deànition (c1; r1)
(l2:put (l2:get s2) (l2:res s2)) and (c2; r2)
= (s1s2) by GP for l1 and l2
= s by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equality.
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I PutGet: Let v 2 bV1V2c and (c2; c1) 2 (C2  C1) and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg. As bV2c!bV1c there
exist unique strings v2 2 bV2c and v1 2 bV1c such that v = (v2v1). Using this fact, we calculate
as follows
(l1  l2):get ((l1  l2):put v ((c2; c1); r))
= (l1  l2):get ((l1  l2):put (v2v1) ((c2; c1); r)) by deànition v2 and v1
= (l1  l2):get ((l1:put v1 (c1; r1))(l2:put v2 (c2; r2))) by deànition (l1  l2):put
where r2; r1 = split(jv2j; r)
= (l2:get (l2:put v2 (c2; r2))) by deànition (l1  l2):get
(l1:get (l1:put v1 (c1; r1))) and bS1c!bS2c
with cod(l1:put) = bS1c
and cod(l2:put) = bS2c
= (v2v1) by PG for l2 and l1
= v by deànition v2 and v1
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof for PG.
I GetChunks: Let s 2 bS1S2c. As bS1c!bS2c there exist unique strings s1 2 bS1c and s2 2
bS2c such that s = s1s2. Using this fact, we calculate as follows
locs(s)
= locs(s1s2) by deànition s1 and s2
= f1; : : : ; (js1j+ js2j)g by deànition locs
= f1; : : : ; (jl1:get s1j+ jl2:get s2j)g by GC for l1 and l2
= locs((l2:get s2)(l1:get s1)) by deànition locs
= locs((l1  l2):get (s1s2)) by deànition (l1  l2):get
= locs((l1  l2):get s) by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equality.
I ResChunks: Let s 2 bS1S2c be a string, (c1; c2) 2 (C1  C2) a rigid complement, and
r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg a resource with ((c1; c2); r) = (l1  l2):res s. As bS1c!bS2c there exist unique
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strings s1 2 bS1c and s2 2 bS2c such that s = (s1s2). Using this fact, we calculate as follows
dom(r)
= dom(r2 ++ r1) by deànition r and (l1  l2):res
where r1; c1 = l1:res s1
and r2; c2 = l2:res s2
= dom(r2) [ fi+max(dom(r2)) j i 2 dom(r1)g by deànition (++) and dom
= locs(s2) [ fi+max(locs(s2)) j i 2 locs(s1)g by RC for l2 and l1
= f1; : : : ; (js2j+ js1j)g by deànition j  j
= locs(s1s2) by deànition locs
= locs(s) by deànition s1 and s2
and obtain the required equality.
I ChunkPut: Let v 2 bV2V1c and (c2; c1) 2 (C2  C1) and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg and x 2
(locs(v)\ dom(r)). As bV2c!bV1c there exist unique strings v2 2 bV2c and v1 2 bV1c such that
v = (v2v1). To shorten the proof, deàne the following resources and permutations:
r2; r1 = split(jv2j; r)
q2 = l2:perm (l2:put v2 (c2; r2))
q1 = l1:perm (l1:put v1 (c1; r1))
q = (q2  q1)
We analyze two cases.
Case x 2 locs(v2): Let y be a location satisfying q(y) = x. From x 2 locs(v2) and the deànition
of (), we have that y > n1 and q(y) = q2(y   n1) where n1 = jl:put v1 (c1; r1)j. Using
these facts, we calculate as follows:
((l1  l2):put v ((c2; c1); r))[y]
= ((l1  l2):put (v2v1) ((c2; c1); r))[y] by deànition v2 and v1
= ((l1:put v1 (c1; r1))(l2:put v2 (c2; r2)))[y] by deànition (l1  l2):put
where r2; r2 = split(jv2j; r)
= l2:put v2 (c2; r2)[y   n1] by deànition []
= k:put v2[x] (r2(x)) by CP for l2
= k:put (v1v2)[x] ((r2 ++ r1)(x)) by deànition [] and (++)
= k:put (v[x]) (r(x)) by deànition split and v1; v2; r1, and r2
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and obtain the required equality.
Case x 62 locs(v2): Similar to the previous case.
I ChunkCreate: Similar to the proof for CP.
I SkelPut: Let v 2 bV2V1c and v0 2 bV2V1c be strings, (c1; c2) 2 (C1C2) a rigid complement,
and r 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg and r0 2 fjN 7! k:Sjg resources such that skel(v) = skel(v0). As
bV2c!bV1c there exist unique strings v2 2 bV2c and v1 2 bV1c and v02 2 bV2c and v01 2 bV1c
such that v = (v2v1) and v0 = (v02v01). Moreover, from the deànition of skel we have that
skel(v2) = skel(v02) and skel(v1) = skel(v01). Using these facts and deànitions, we calculate as
follows
skel((l1  l2):put v (c1; c2; r))
= skel((l1  l2):put (v2v1) ((c1; c2); r)) by deànition v2 and v1
= skel(l1:put v1 (c1; r1))(l2:put v2 (c2; r2)) by deànition (l1  l2):put
where r1; r2 = split(jv2j; r)
= skel(l1:put v1 (c1; r1))skel(l2:put v2 (c2; r2)) by deànition skel
= skel(l1:put v01 (c1; r01))skel(l2:put v02 (c2; r02)) by SP for l1 and l2
where r01; r02 = split(jv01j; r0)
= skel(l1:put v01 (c1; r01))(l2:put v02 (c2; r02)) by deànition skel
= skel((l1  l2):put (v02v01) ((c1; c2); r0)) by deànition (l1  l2):put and r01 and r02
= skel((l1  l2):put v0 ((c1; c2); r)) by deànition v02 and v01
and obtain the required equality.
I SkelCreate: Similar to the proof for SP. 
Secure Lens Proofs
6.1.1 Lemma: The redact lens is a secure lens at the following type:
((SPACETIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):T j (ASTERISKTIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):E)
.
.() ((TIMEDESCNEWLINE):T j (TIMEBUSYNEWLINE):E)
Proof: Suppose that we have annotated some of the regular expressions in the redact lens with
security labels indicating that the data handled by the public lens is tainted:
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let public : lens =
del ( SPACE:T ) .
copy ( ( TIME . DESC ):T ) .
del ( LOCATION:T ) .
copy ( NEWLINE:T )
let private : lens =
del ASTERISK .
copy ( TIME ) .
( ( DESC . LOCATION ) <-> "BUSY" ) .
copy NEWLINE
let redact : lens =
public* . ( private . public* )*
We do not explicitly add annotations for E data since every regular expression R is equivalent
to R:E in the two-point integrity lattice.
By the typing rules for del, copy, <->, and concatenation we have:
public 2 (SPACETIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):T ..() (TIMEDESCNEWLINE):T
private 2 (ASTERISKTIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE) ..() (TIMEBUSYNEWLINE)
The syntactic type that would be computed mechanically using our typing rules is slightly more
complicated but semantically equivalent; we use such equivalences throughout this proof—e.g.,
between ((R :T)(S :T)):T and (RS):T.
By the typing rule for iteration, using the equivalence between (R :T) :T and (R :T), we
have:
public* 2 ((SPACETIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):T) ..() ((TIMEDESCNEWLINE)):T
Next, by the typing rule for concatenation, and as E observes the unambiguous concatenability
of the types in the view, we have:
private . public* 2 (ASTERISKTIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE)
((SPACETIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):T)
.
.() (TIMEBUSYNEWLINE)
((TIMEDESCNEWLINE):T)
Then, by the typing rule for iteration, as E observes the unambiguous iterability of the types in
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the view, we have:
(private . public*)* 2 ((ASTERISKTIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE)
((SPACETIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE):T))
.
.() ((TIMEBUSYNEWLINE)
((TIMEDESCNEWLINE):T))
Finally, by the typing rule for concatenation, and again as E observes the unambiguous con-
catenability of the types in the view, we have:
public* . (private . public*)* 2
(((SPACETIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE)):T)
(ASTERISKTIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE)
(((SPACETIMEDESCLOCATIONNEWLINE)):T)
.
.()
(((TIMEDESCNEWLINE)):T)
(TIMEBUSYNEWLINE)
(((TIMEDESCNEWLINE)):T)
The equivalent type stated in the lemma can be obtained using the equivalence between (R :
T)(S(R :T)) and ((R :T) jS) which holds when R and S are disjoint and unambiguously
iterable. 
6.2.2 Lemma: Secure lenses admit the following inference rule:
v0 k l:get s k v
l:put v0 (l:put v s) k l:put v0 s
(PPE)
Proof: Let k 2 Q be a label, and let v; v0 2 V and s 2 S be strings such that v k (l:get s) and
v0 k (l:get s). By PG for l we have:
l:get (l:put v s) = v
By the reáexivity of k it follows that:
l:get (l:put v s) k v
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Using this fact, we calculate as follows:
l:put v0 (l:put v s)
k l:put v s by GP for l
k s by GP for l
Also by GP for l we have
l:put v0 s sk s
The required equivalence follows from the transitivity of k. 
.. E well-formed
copy E 2 E ..() E
6.4.1 Lemma: LetE 2 R be a security-annotated regular expression. Then (copy E) is a secure
lens in E ..() E.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let k 2 Q and e; e0 2 E with e0 k (copy E):get e. We calculate as follows
(copy E):put e0 e
= e0 by deànition of (copy E):put
k (copy E):get e by assumption
= e by deànition of (copy E):get
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let e; e0 2 E. We calculate as follows
(copy E):get ((copy E):put e0 e)
= (copy E):get e0 by deànition of (copy E):put
= e0 by deànition of (copy E):get
and obtain the required equality.
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I GetNoLeak: Let j 2 P and e; e0 2 E with e0 j e. We calculate as follows
(copy E):get e
= e by deànition of (copy E):get
j e0 by assumption
= (copy E):get e0 by deànition of (copy E):get
and obtain the required equivalence, which completes the proof. 
..E;F well-formed jL(F )j = 1
const E F 2 E ..() F
6.4.2 Lemma: Let E and F be well-formed security-annotated regular expressions such that
jL(F )j = 1. Then (const E F ) is a secure lens in E ..() F .
Proof:
I GetPut: Let q 2 Q and e 2 E and u 2 F with u q (const E F ):get e. By the deàni-
tion of (const E F ):put we have (const E F ):put u e = e. The required equivalence follows as
k is reáexive.
I PutGet: Let u 2 F and e 2 E. We calculate as follows
(const E F ):get ((const E F ):put u e)
= (const E F ):get e by deànition of (const E F ):put
= representative(F ) by deànition of (const E F ):get
= u as jL(F )j = 1
and obtain the required equality.
I CreateGet: Similar to the proof of PG.
I GetNoLeak: Let j 2 P and e; e0 2 E with e j e0. Let u be the unique element of F . By the
deànition of (const E F ):get we have (const E F ):get e = u = (const E F ):get e0. The required
equivalence follows as j is reáexive, which completes the proof. 
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..
(S1 \ S2) = ;
l1 2 S1 ..() V1 l2 2 S2 ..() V2
q =
Wfk j k min obs. V1 6= V2 ^ V1 & V2 agreeg
p =
Wfk j k min obs. (S1 \ S2) = ;g
l1 j l2 2 (S1 jS2):q ..() (V1 jV2):p
6.4.3 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 ..() V1 and l2 2 S2 ..() V2 be secure lenses such that (S1\S2) = ;.
Then (l1 j l2) is a secure lens in (S1 jS2): q ..() (V1 jV2): p where q =
Wfk j k min obs. V1 6=
V2 ^ V1 & V2 agreeg and p =
Wfk j k min obs. (S1 \ S2) = ;g.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let k 2 Q and s 2 (S1 jS2): q and v 2 (V1 jV2):p with v k get s. We analyze two
cases.
Case k 6w q: Then k is the total relation on (S1 jS2):q and (l1 j l2):put v s k s trivially.
Case k w q and v 2 V1 and s 2 S1: From
v 2 V1 v (V1 jV2):pk (l1 j l2):get s k observes V1 & V2 agree
we have v V1k l1:get s. Using this fact, we calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):put v s
= l1:put v s by deànition of (l1 j l2):get
k s by GP for l1
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case k w q and v 2 V2 and s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
Case k w q and v 2 V2   V1 and s 2 S1: Can’t happen. The assumptions v k (l1 j l2):get s
and k observes V1 6= V2 lead to a contradiction.
Case k w q and v 2 V1   V2 and s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
I PutGet: Let v 2 (V1 jV2):p and s 2 (S1 jS2):q. We analyze several cases.
237
Case v 2 V1 and s 2 S1: We calculate as follows (cod() denotes the codomain of a function)
(l1 j l2):get ((l1 j l2):put v s)
= (l1 j l2):get (l1:put v s) by deànition of (l1 j l2):put
= l1:get (l1:put v s) by deànition of (l1 j l2):get as cod(l1:put) = S1
= v by PG for l1
where the last line follows by PG for l1.
Case v 2 V2 and s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
Case V 2 (V1   V2) and s 2 S2: We calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):get ((l1 j l2):put v s)
= (l1 j l2):get (l1:create v) by deànition of (l1 j l2):put
= l1:get (l1:create v) by deànition of (l1 j l2):get as cod(l1:create) = S1
= v by CG for l1
and obtain the required equality.
Case v 2 (V2   V1) and s 2 S1: Symmetric to the previous case.
I GetNoLeak: Let j 2 P and s; s0 2 (S1 jS2):q with s j s0. We analyze two cases.
Case j 6w p: Thenj is the total relation on (V1 jV2):p so (l1 j l2):get sj (l1 j l2):get s0 trivially.
Case j w p and s 2 S1: From
s 2 S1 sjs0 k observes (S1 \ S2) = ;
we have s0 2 S1 and s S1k s0. Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):get s
= l1:get s by deànition of (l1 j l2):get
k l1:get s0 by GNL for l1
= (l1 j l2):get s0 by deànition of (l1 j l2):get
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case j w p and s 2 s2: Symmetric to the previous case. 
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..
l1 2 S1 ..() V1 S1!S2
l2 2 S2 ..() V2 V1!V2
q =
Wfk j k min obs. V1!V2g
p =
Wfk j k min obs. S1!S2g
l1l2 2 (S1S2):q ..() (V1V2):p
6.4.4 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 ..() V1 and l2 2 S2 ..() V2 such that S1!S2 and V1!V2. Then
(l1l2) is a secure lens in (S1S2): q ..() (V1V2): p where q =
Wfk j k min obs. V1!V2g and
p =
Wfk j k min obs. S1!S2g.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let k 2 Q be a label, (s1s2) 2 (S1S2) : q a string, and (v1v2) 2 (V1V2) : p a
string such that (v1v2) k (l1l2):get (s1s2). We analyze two cases.
Case k 6w q: Thenk is the total relation on (S1S2):q and so (l1l2):put (v1v2) (s1s2)k (s1s2)
trivially.
Case k w q: From the assumption of the case we have that k observes V1!V2 and so we also
have
v1 V1k l1:get s1 v2 V2k l2:get s2
using the deànition of (l1l2):get. Using these equivalences, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):put (v1v2) (s1s2)
= (l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s2) by deànition of (l1l2):put
k s1s2 by GP for l1 and l2
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let (v1v2) 2 (V1V2):p and (s1s2) 2 (S1S2):q. We calculate as follows
(l1l2):get ((l1l2):put (v1v2) (s1s2))
= (l1l2):get ((l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s2)) by deànition of (l1l2):put
= (l1:get (l1:put v1 s1))(l2:get (l2:put v2 s2)) by deànition of (l1l2):get with S1!S2
= v1v2 by PG for l1 and l2
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and obtain the required equality.
I GetNoLeak: Let j 2 P and (s1s2); (s01s02) 2 (S1S2): q with (s1s2)j(s01s02). We analyze
two cases.
Case j 6w p: Thenj is the total relation on (V1V2):p and so (l1l2):get (s1s2)j (l1l2):get (s01s02)
trivially.
Case j w p: From the assumption of the case we have that j observes S1!S2 and so:
s1 S1j s01 s2 S2j s02
Using these equivalences, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):get (s1s2)
= (l1:get s1)(l2:get s2) by deànition of (l1l2):get
k (l1:get s01)(l2:get s02) by GNL for l1 and l2 and the deànition of k
= (l1l2):get (s01s02) by deànition of (l1l2):get
and obtain the required equivalence, which completes the proof. 
.
.
l 2 S ..() V S! V !
q =
W fk j k min obs. V !g
p =
W fk j k min obs. S!g
l 2 (S):q ..() (V ):p
6.4.5 Lemma: Let l 2 S ..() V be a secure lens such that S! and V !. Then l is a secure lens
in (S):q ..() (V ):p where q = W fk j k min obs. V !g and p = W fk j k min obs. S!g.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let k 2 Q be a label, (s1    sm) 2 (S) : q a string, and v1    vn 2 (V ) : p a
string such that (v1    vn) k l:get (s1    sm). We analyze two cases:
Case k 6w q: Then k is the total relation on (S):q and we trivially have:
l:put (v1    vn) (s1    sm) k (s1    sm)
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Case k w q: From
k observes V ! (v1    vn) k l:get (s1    sm)
we have
m = n vi k l:get si for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
Using these facts, we calculate as follows
l:put (v1    vn) (s1    sn)
= (l:put v1 s1)    (l:put vn sn) by the deànition of l:put
k (s1    sn) by GP for l (n times)
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let (v1    vn) 2 (V ):p and (s1    sm) 2 (S):q. We calculate as follows
l:get (l:put (v1    vn) (s1    sm))
= l:get (s01    s0n)
where s0i =
8><>:
l:put vi si for i 2 f1; : : : ;minm;ng
l:create vi for i 2 fm+ 1; : : : ; ng
by deànition l:put
= (l:get s01)    (l:get s0n) by deànition of l:get as S!
= (v1    vn) by PG for l (m times)
and CG for l (n m times)
and obtain the required equality.
I GetNoLeak: Let j 2 P be a label and let (s1    sm) and (s01    s0n) be strings in (S):q such
that (s1    sm) j (s01    s0n). We analyze two cases.
Case j 6w p: Then j is the total relation on (V ):p and so
l:get (s1    sn) j l:get (s01    c0n)
trivially.
Case j w p: From
j observes S! (s1    sm)j(s01    s0n)
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we have
m = n si Sj s0i for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
Using these facts, calculate as follows
l:get (s1    sn)
= (l:get s1)    (l:get sn) by deànition of l:get
j (l:get s01)    (l:get s0n) by GNL for l (n times)
= l:get (s01    s0n) by deànition of l:get
and obtain the required equivalence, which completes the proof. 
..l1 2 S
.
.() T l2 2 T ..() V
l1;l2 2 S ..() V
6.4.6 Lemma: Let l1 2 S ..() T and l2 2 T ..() V be secure lenses. Then (l1;l2) is a secure
lens in S ..() V .
Proof:
I GetPut: Let k 2 Q and s 2 S and v 2 V with v k (l1;l2):get s. By the deànition of
(l1;l2):get we have:
v k l2:get (l1:get s)
By GP for l2 we also have
l2:put v (l1:get s) k (l1:get s)
Using this fact and GP for l1 we obtain
(l1;l2):put v s = l1:put (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s k s
as required.
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I PutGet: Let v 2 V and s 2 S. We calculate as follows
(l1;l2):get ((l1;l2):put v s)
= (l1;l2):get (l1:put (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s) by deànition of (l1;l2):put
= l2:get (l1:get (l1:put (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s)) by deànition of (l1;l2):get
= l2:get (l2:put v (l1:get s)) by PG for l1
= v by PG for l2
and obtain the required equality.
I GetNoLeak: Let j 2 P be a label, and let s and s0 strings in S such that s j s0. We calculate
as follows:
(l1;l2):get s
= l2:get (l1:get s) by deànition of (l1;l2):get
j l2:get (l1:get s0) by GNL for l1 and l2
= (l1;l2):get s0 by deànition of (l1;l2):get
and obtain the required equivalence.

.
.
E;F well-formed (L(E) \ L(F )) = ; (L(E) j L(F ))!
q =
W fk j k min obs. E!g
p w Wfk j k observes E!F and F !Eg
àlter E F 2 (E:q jF :p) ..() E
6.4.7 Lemma: Let E and F be well-formed security-annotated regular expressions such that
(L(E)\L(F )) = ; and (L(E) j L(F ))!. Then (àlter E F ) is a secure lens in (E:q jF:p) ..()
E where q = W fk j k min obs. E!g and p w Wfk j k observes E!F and F !Eg.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let k 2 Q and (s1    sm) 2 (E:q jF:p) and (v1    vn) 2 E with
(v1    vn) k ((àlter E F ):get (s1    sm))
We analyze two cases.
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Case k 6w q: From the assumption of the case we have that hidek() maps elements of E to
. Let (f1; : : : ; fo) be the elements of F in (s1    sm). By the deànition of unlter, the
elements of F in unlter F (v1    vn) (s1    sm) are also (f1; : : : ; fo). Using these facts,
we calculate as follows
hidek((àlter E F ):put (v1    vn) (s1    sm))
= hidek(unlter F (v1    vn) (s1    sm)) by deànition of (àlter E F ):put
= hidek(f1    fo) as hidek() maps E to 
= hidek(s1; : : : ; sm) also as hidek() maps E to 
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case k w q: Let (t1; : : : ; to) be the elements of (E : q) in (s1    sm). From
k observes E! (v1    vn) k (àlter E F ):get (s1    sm)
we have:
n = o vi Ek ti for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
Using these facts, we calculate as follows:
hidek((àlter E F ):put (v1    vn) (s1    sm))
= hidek(unlter F (v1    vn) (s1    sm)) by deànition of (àlter E F ):put
= hidek(s01    s0m) by deànition of unlter
where s0i =
8><>:
vj if si is the jth element of 2 E in (s1    sm)
si if si 2 F
= hidek(s1    sm) as hidek(vi) = hidek(ti)
for i 2 f1; : : : ; og
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutGet: Let (v1    vn) 2 E and (s1    sm) 2 (E : q jF : p). Observe that string lter
preserves the elements ofE in its argument and that string unlter propagates all of the elements
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in its àrst argument, which all belong to E. Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(àlter E F ):get ((àlter E F ):put (v1    vn) (s1    sm))
= (àlter E F ):get (unlter F (v1    vn) (s1    sm)) by deànition of (àlter E F ):put
= string lter E (string unlter F (v1    vn) (s1    sm)) by deànition of (àlter E F ):get
= (v1    vn) by deànition string lter
and string unlter
and obtain the required equality.
IGetNoLeak: Let j 2 P and (s1    sm); (s01;    s0n) 2 (E:q jF :p)with (s1    sm)j (s01    s0n).
We analyze two cases
Case j 6w p: Then hidej() maps elements of F to . Let (e1; : : : ; ei) and (e01; : : : ; e0j) be the
elements of (s1    sm) and (s1    c0n) that belong to E. From (s1    sm) j (s01    s0n)
we calculate as follows
hidej(s1    sm) = hidej(s1    sn)
i:e:; hidej(e01    e0i) = hidej(e01    e0j)
as hidej() maps elements of F to 
i:e:; hidej((àlter E F ):get (s1    sm)) = hidej((àlter E F ):get (s01    s0n))
by deànition of (àlter E F ):get
i:e:; (àlter E F ):get (s1    sm) j (àlter E F ):get (s01    s0n)
by deànition of j
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case j w p: Let (e11    e1i); : : : ; (eo1    eoj) and (e011    e01q); : : : ; (ep1;    ; epr) be the contigu-
ous—i.e, those not separated by an F—elements of E in (s1    sm) and (s01    s0n). From
(s1    sm) j (s01    s0n) and j observes E!F and F !E we have o = p and
hidej(e11    e1i) = hidej(e011    e01q) : : : hidej(eo1    eoj) = hidej(e0p1    e0pr)
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Using these facts, we calculate as follows
hidej(e11    e1i)    hidej(eo1    eoj) = hidej(e011    e01q)    hidej(e0p1    e0pr)
i:e:; hidej((e11    e1i)    (eo1    eoj)) = hidej((e011    e01q)    (e0p1    e0pr))
by deànition hidej()
i:e:; hidej(string lter E (s1    sm)) = hidej(string lter E (s01    s0n))
by deànition of lter
i:e:; hidej((àlter E F ):get (s1    sm)) = hidej((àlter E F ):get (s01    s0n))
by deànition of (àlter E F ):get
i:e:; ((àlter E F ):get (s1    sm)) j ((àlter E F ):get (s01    s0n))
by deànition of j
and obtain the required equivalence, which completes the proof. 
..l 2 S
.
.() V q 2 Q p 2 P
l 2 (S:q) ..() (V :p)
6.4.8 Lemma: Let l 2 S ..() V be a secure lens and let q 2 Q and p 2 P be labels. Then l is
also a secure lens in (S:q) ..() (V :p).
Proof:
I GetPut: Let k 2 Q and s 2 (C : q) and s 2 (V : p) with v k l:get s. We analyze two
cases:
Case k 6w q: Then k is the total relation on (C:q) and so and so l:put v s k s trivially.
Case k A q: By the deànition of the semantics of V : p we have v Vk l:get s. By GP for
l we have l:put v s Sk s. Finally, by the deànition of the semantics of S : q we have
l:put v s (S:q)k s, as required.
I PutGet: Follows directly from PG for l.
I GetNoLeak: Let j 2 P and s; s0 2 (S:q) with s k s0. We analyze two cases:
Case j 6w p: Then j is the total relation on V :p and so and so l:get s j l:get s0 trivially.
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Case j w p: By the deànition of the semantics of S: q we have s Sj s0. Then, by GNL
for l we have l:get s Vk l:get s0. By the deànition of the semantics of V : p we also have
l:get s j l:get s0 as required, which completes the proof. 
6.5.1 Lemma: Let E be a well-formed security-annotated regular expression. Then (copy E) is
a secure lens in E ..() E.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let (j; k) 2 C and s 2 E and v 2 E with (copy E):safe (j; k) v s. By the deà-
nition of (copy E):safe we have v k s. Using this fact, we calculate as follows
(copy E):put v s
= v by the deànition of (copy E):put
k s
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and s; s0 2 E and v; v0 2 E with s j s0 and v j v0 and
(copy E):safe (j; k) v s and (copy E):safe (j; k) v0 s0. We calculate as follows
(copy E):put v s
= v by deànition of (copy E):put
j v0 by assumption
= (copy E):put v0 s0 by deànition of (copy E):put
and obtain the required equivalence.
I SafeNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and s; s0 2 E and v; v0 2 E with v j v0 and s j s0. Then as
j  k we have s k s0 and v k v0. Using these equivalences, we calculate as follows
(copy E):safe (j; k) v s
() v k s by deànition of (copy E):safe
() v0 k s0 by symmetry and transitivity of k
() (copy E):safe (j; k) v0 s0 by deànition of (copy E):safe
and obtain the required equality, which completes the proof. 
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..E;F well-formed jL(F )j = 1
const E F d 2 E ..() F
6.5.2 Lemma: Let E and F be well-formed security-annotated regular expressions such that
jL(F )j = 1. Then (const E F ) is a secure lens in E ..() F .
Proof:
I GetPut: Identical to previous proof of GP for the secure lens version of const.
I PutNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and s; s0 2 E and v; v0 2 F with s j s0 and v j v0 and
(const E F ):safe (j; k) v s and (const E F ):safe (j; k) v0 s0. We calculate as follows
(const E F ):put v s
= s by deànition of (const E F ):put
j s0 by assumption
= (const E F ):put v0 s0 by deànition of (const E F ):put
and obtain the required equivalence.
I SafeNoLeak: Let s; s0 2 E and v; v0 2 E with s j s0 and v j v0. We have
(const E F ):safe (j; k) v s = > = (const E F ):safe (j; k) v s
immediately, which completes the proof. 
.
.
l1 2 S1 ..() V1 S1!S2
l2 2 S2 ..() V2 V1!S2
p =
Wfk j k min obs. S1!S2g
l1l2 2 (S1S2) ..() (V1V2):p
6.5.3 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 ..() V1 and l2 2 S2 ..() V2 such that S1!S2 and V1!V2. Then
(l1l2) is a secure lens in (S1S2) ..() (V1V2):p where p =
Wfk j k min obs. S1!S2g.
Proof:
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I GetPut: Let (j; k) 2 C be a clearance, (v1v2) 2 (V1V2): p a string, and (s1s2) 2 (S1S2) a
string such that (l1l2):safe (j; k) (v1v2) (s1s2). By the deànition of (l1l2):safe we have:
l1:safe (j; k) v1 s1 l2:safe (j; k) v2 s2
Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):put (v1v2) (s1s2)
= (l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s2) by deànition of (l1l2):put
k s1s2 by GP for l1 and l2
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and (s1s2); (s01s02) 2 (S1S2) and (v1v2); (v01v02) 2 (V1V2): p
with:
(s1s2) j (s01s02) (v1v2) j (v01v02)
(l1l2):safe (j; k) (v1v2) (s1s2) (l1l2):safe (j; k) (v01v02) (s01s02)
From the deànition of (l1l2):safe, we have that j observes S1!S2 and V1!V2 and hence:
s1 S1j s01 s2 S2j s02
v1 V1j v01 v2 V2j v02
Also by the deànition of (l1l2):safe we have
l1:safe (j; k) v1 s1 l2:safe (j; k) v2 s2
l1:safe (j; k) v1 s01 l2:safe (j; k) v2 s02
Using all these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):put (v1v2) (s1s2)
= (l1:put v1 s1)(l2:put v2 s02) by deànition of (l1l2):put
j (l1:put v01 s01)(l2:put v02 s02) by PNL for l1 and l2
= (l1l2):put (v01v02) (s01s02) by deànition of (l1l2):put
and obtain the required equivalence.
I SafeNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and (s1s2); (s01s02) 2 (S1S2) and (v1v2); (v01v02) 2 (V1V2): p
with (s1s2) j (s01s02) and (v1v2) j (v01v02). We analyze two cases.
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Case j observes S1!S2 and V1!V2: From the assumptions of the case and the deànition of j
we have:
s1 S1j s01 s2 S2j s02
v1 V1j v01 v2 V2j v02
Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1l2):safe (j; k) (v1v2) (s1s2)
() (l1:safe (j; k) v1 s1) ^ (l2:safe (j; k) v2 s2) by deànition of (l1l2):safe
() (l1:safe (j; k) v01 s01) ^ (l2:safe (j; k) v02 s02) by SNL for l1 and l2
() (l1l2):safe (j; k) (v01v02) (s01s02)
and obtain the required equality.
Case j does not observe S1!S2 and V1!V2: Then
(l1l2):safe (j; k) (v1v2) (s1s2) = ? = (l1l2):safe (j; k) (v01v02) (s01s02)
immediately, which completes the case and the proof. 
.
.
(S1 \ S2) = ;
l1 2 S1 ..() V1 l2 2 S2 ..() V2
p =
Wfk j k min obs. (S1 \ S2) = ;g
l1 j l2 2 (S1 jS2) ..() (V1 jV2):p
6.5.4 Lemma: Let l1 2 S1 ..() V1 and l2 2 S2 ..() V2 be secure lenses such that (L(S1) \
L(S2)) = ;. Then (l1 j l2) is a secure lens in (S1 jS2) ..() (V1 jV2):p where
p =
_
fk j k min obs. (S1 \ S2) = ;g:
Proof:
I GetPut: Let (j; k) 2 C and s 2 (S1 jS2) and v 2 (V1 jV2) : p with (l1 j l2):safe (j; k) v s.
We analyze two cases.
Case s 2 S1: From the assumption of the case and (l1 j l2):safe (j; k) v s we have:
v 2 V1 l1:safe (j; k) v s
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Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):put v s
= l1:put v s by deànition of (l1 j l2):put
k s by GP for l1
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
I PutNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and s; s0 2 (S1 jS2) and v; v0 2 (V1 jV2):p with:
s j s0 (l1 j l2):safe (j; k) v s
v j v0 (l1 j l2):safe (j; k) v0 s0
We analyze two cases.
Case s 2 S1: From the deànition of (l1 j l2):safe we have that j observes (S1 \ S2) = ; and
V1 & V2 agree. Using this fact and the assumption that s j s0 we have that s0 2 S1 and
s S1j s0. Next, from (l1 j l2):safe (j; k) v s and (l1 j l2):safe (j; k) v0 s0 we have:
v 2 V1 l1:safe (j; k) v s
v0 2 V1 l1:safe (j; k) v0 s0
Finally, from j observes V1 & V2 agree we also have v V1j v0. Putting all these facts
together, we calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):put v s
= l1:put v s by deànition of (l1 j l2):put
j l1:put v s0 by PNL for l1
= (l1 j l2):put v s0 by deànition of (l1 j l2):put
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
I SafeNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and v; v0 2 (V1 jV2): p and s; s0 2 (S1 jS2) with v j v0 and
s j s0 and (l1 j l2):safe v s and (l1 j l2):safe v0 s0. We analyze several cases.
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Case j observes (S1 \ S2) = ; and V1 & V2 agree and s 2 S1: From the assumptions of the case
we have s0 2 S1 and s S1j s0. We also have v 2 V1 if and only if v0 2 V1 and v V1j v0.
Using these facts we calculate as follows
(l1 j l2):safe (j; k) v s
() v 2 V1 ^ l1:safe (j; k) v s by deànition of (l1 j l2):safe
() v0 2 V1 ^ l1:safe (j; k) v0 s0 by SNL for l1
() (l1 j l2):safe (j; k) v0 s0 by deànition of (l1 j l2):safe
Case j observes (S1 \ S2) = ; and V1 & V2 agree and s 2 S2: Symmetric to the previous case.
Case j does not observe (S1 \ S2) = ; and V1 & V2 agree: Then
(l1 j l2):safe (j; k) v s = ? = (l1 j l2):safe (j; k) v0 s0
immediately, which completes the case and the proof. 
.
.
l 2 S ..() V
p =
W fk j k min obs. S!g
l 2 S ..() (V ):p
6.5.5 Lemma: Let l 2 S ..() V be a secure lens such that S! and V !. Then l is a secure lens
in (S) ..() (V ):p where p = W fk j k min obs. S!g.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let (j; k) 2 C be a clearance, (v1    vn) 2 (V ): p a string, and (s1    sm) 2 C a
string with l:safe (j; k) (v1    vn) (s1    sm). By the deànition of l:safe we have n = m and
l:safe (j; k) vi si for every i from 1 to n. Using these facts, we calculate as follows
l:put (v1    vn) (s1    sm)
= (l:put v1 s1)    (l:put vn sn) by deànition of l:put
k s1    sm by GP for l (n times)
and obtain the required equivalence.
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I PutNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and (v1    vm); (v01    v0n) 2 (V ): p and (s1    so); (s01    s0p) 2
S with
(v1    vm) j (v01    v0n) l:safe (j; k) (v1    vm) (s1    so)
(s1    so) j (s01    s0p) l:safe (j; k) (v01    v0n) (s1    s0p)
By the deànition of l:safe we have that j observes S! and V ! and so m = n = o = p and
l:safe (j; k) vi si l:safe (j; k) v0i s0i si Sj s0i vi Vj v0i for i 2 f1; : : : ; ng
Using these facts, we calculate as follows
l:put (v1    vn) (s1    so)
= (l:put v1 s1)    (l:put vn sn) by deànition of l:put
j (l:put v01 s01)    (l:put v0m s0m) by PNL for l (n times)
= l:put (v01    v0m) (s01    s0p) by deànition of l:put
and obtain the required equivalence.
I SafeNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and (v1    vn); (v01    v0m) 2 (V ):p and (s1    so); (s01    s0p) 2
S with:
(v1    vn) j (v01    v0m) (s1    so) j (s01    s0p)
We analyze several cases.
Case j observes S! and V ! and n = o: From the assumptions and the deànition of l:safe we
have that
m = n = o = p vi Vk v0i si Sj s0i for i 2 f1 : : : ng
Using these facts we calculate as follows
l:safe (j; k) (v1    vn) (s1    sn)
() l:safe (j; k) v1 s1 ^    ^ l:safe (j; k) vn sn by deànition l:safe
() l:safe (j; k) v01 s01 ^    ^ l:safe (j; k) v0n s0n by SNL for l (n times)
() l:safe (j; k) (v01    v0n) (s01    s0n) by deànition l:safe
and obtain the required equality.
Case j observes S! and V ! and n 6= o: From the assumptions of the case and
(v1    vn) j (v01    v0m) (s1    so) j (s01    s0p)
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we have n = m and o = p. It follows that
l:safe (j; k) (v1    vn) (s1    so) = ? = l:safe (v01    v0m) (s01    s0p)
Case j does not observe S! and V !: Then
l:safe (j; k) (v1    vn) (s1    so) = ? = l:safe (v01    v0m) (s01    s0p)
immediately, which completes the case and the proof. 
..l1 2 S
.
.() T l2 2 T ..() V
l1; l2 2 S ..() V
6.5.6 Lemma: Let l1 2 S ..() T and l2 2 T ..() V be secure lenses. Then (l1;l2) is a secure
lens in S ..() V .
Proof:
I GetPut: Let (j; k) 2 C and s 2 S and v 2 V with (l1;l2):safe (j; k) v s. By the deànition of
(l1;l2):safe we have
l1:safe (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s
Using this fact, we calculate as follows
(l1;l2):put v s
= l1:put (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s by deànition of (l1;l2):put
k s by GP for l1
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and v; v0 2 V and s; s0 2 S with s j s0 and v j v0 and
(l1;l2):safe v s and (l1;l2):safe v0 s0. By the deànition of (l1;l2):safe we have
l1:safe (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s l1:safe (l2:put v0 (l1:get s0)) s0
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Using these facts, we calculate as follows
(l1;l2):put v s
= l1:put (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s by deànition of (l1;l2):put
j l1:put (l2:put v0 (l1:get s0)) s0 by PNL for l1
= (l1;l2):put v0 s0 by deànition of (l1;l2):put
and obtain the required equivalence.
I SafeNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and s; s0 2 S and v; v0 2 V with s j s0 and v j v0. By
GNL for l1 we have that:
(l1:get s) j (l1:get s0)
By PNL for l2 we have
l2:put v (l1:get s) j l2:put v0 (l1:get s0)
Using SNL for l1 we obtain the required equality
l1:safe (l2:put v (l1:get s)) s = l1:safe (l2:put v0 (l1:get s0)) s0
which completes the proof. 
.
.
E;F well-formed L(E) \ L(F ) = ; (L(E) j L(F ))!
p w Wfk j k observes E!F and F !Eg
8 (j; k) 2 C: Ej  Ek
àlter E F 2 (E jF :p) ..() E
6.5.7 Lemma: Let E and F be well-formed security-annotated regular expressions such that
(L(E)\L(F )) = ; and (L(E) j L(F ))!. Then (àlterE F ) is a secure lens in (E jF:p) ..() E
where p w Wfk j k observes E!F and F !Eg.
Proof:
I GetPut: Let (j; k) 2 C and (v1    vn) 2 E and (s1    sm) 2 (E jF:p) with:
(àlter E F ):safe (j; k) (v1    vn) (s1    sm)
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Let (t1; : : : ; to) be the elements of E in (s1    sm). By the deànition of (àlter E F ):safe we have
that
k observes E! (v1    vn) k string lter E (s1    sm)
and hence:
n = o vi Ek ti for i 2 f1 : : : ng
Using these facts, we calculate as follows
hidek((àlter E F ):put (v1    vn) (s1    sm))
= hidek(unlter F (v1    vn) (s1    sm)) by deànition of (àlter E F ):put
= hidek(s01    s0m) by deànition of unlter
where s0i =
8><>:
vj if si is the jth element of 2 E in (s1    sm)
si if si 2 F
= hidek(s1    sm) as vi k ti for i 2 f1; : : : ; og
i:e: (àlter E F ):put (v1    vn) (s1    sm) k (s1    sm)
and obtain the required equivalence.
I PutNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and (v1    vm); (v01    v0n) 2 E and (s1    so); (s01    s0p) 2
(E jF:p) :  with:
(v1    vm) j (v01    v0n) (àlter E F ):safe (j; k) (v1    vm) (s1    so)
(s1    so) j (s01    s0p) (àlter E F ):safe (j; k) (v01    v0n) (s01    s0p)
Let (t1; : : : ; tw) and (t01; : : : ; t0x) be the elements of E in (s1    so) and (s01    s0p) respectively.
As j observes E! we have that
m = n and vi j v0i for i 2 f1; : : : ;mg
Let (f11    f1i); : : : ; (fy1    fyj) and (f 011    f 01k); : : : ; (f 0z1;    ; f 0zl) be the contiguous elements
of F in (s1    so) and (s01    s0p). As (s1    so) j (s01    s0p) and j observes E!F and F !E we
have that y = z and
(f11    f1i) j (f 011    f 01k) ^ : : : ^ (fy1    fyj) j (f 0z1    f 0zl)
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Using these facts, we calculate as follows
hidej((àlter E F ):put (v1    vm) (s1    so))
= hidej(unlter (v1    vm) (s1    so))
by deànition of (àlter E F ):put
= hidej(s001    s00o+(m w))
by deànition of unlter
where s0i =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
vi w if i > o
vj if i  o and si is the jth element of 2 E in (s1    so)
si if si 2 F
= hidej(s0001    s000p+(n x))
by above facts
where s0i =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
v0i x if i > p
v0j if i  p and s0i is the jth element of 2 E in (s01    s0p)
s0i if s0i 2 F
= hidej(unlter (v01    v0n) (s01    s0p))
by deànition of unlter
= hidej((àlter E F ):put (v01    v0n) (s01    s0p))
by deànition of (àlter E F ):put
i:e:; (àlter E F ):put (v1    vn) (s1    so) j (àlter E F ):put (v01    v0n) (s01    s0p)
and obtain the required equivalence.
I SafeNoLeak: Let (j; k) 2 C and (v1    vn); (v01    v0m) 2 E and (s1    so); (s01    s0p) 2
(E jF:p) with:
(v1    vn) j (v01    v0m) (s1    so) j (s01    s0p)
We analyze two cases.
Case j observes E!F and F !E and j and k observe E!: Let (t1; : : : ; tw) and (t01; : : : ; t0x) be the
elements of E in (s1    so) and (s01    s0p). From assumptions of the case we have that
w = x and also
hidej(ti) = hidej(t0i) for i 2 f1; : : : ; wg
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As Ej  Ek we also have:
hidek(ti) = hidek(t0i) for i 2 f1; : : : ; wg
Using this fact, we calculate as follows
(àlter E F ):safe (j; k) (v1 : : : vm) (s1    so)
() (v1 : : : vn) k string lter E (s1    so) by deànition of (àlter E F ):safe
() hidek(v1    vm) = hidek(t1    tx) by deànition of string lter
() hidek(v01    v0n) = hidek(t01    t0w) by symmetry and transitivity of =
() (v1 : : : v0n) k string lter E (s01    s0p) by deànition of lter
() (àlter E F ):safe (j; k) (v01 : : : v0n) (s01    s0p) by deànition of (àlter E F ):safe
and obtain the required equivalence.
Case j does not observe E!F and F !E or j or k do not observe E!: Then
(àlter E F ):safe (j; k) (v1 : : : vm) (s1    so)
= ?
= (àlter E F ):safe (j; k) (v01 : : : v0n) (s01    s0p)
immediately, which completes the proof. 
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